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FLUCTUATIONS IN THE SUPPLY OF CREDIT AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF JAPANESE FIRMS 
By Konstantinos Voutsinas 
This study examines how fluctuations in the supply of credit and financial constraints 
affect capital structure. It is one of the first studies to do so and its methodology is 
inspired by the recent studies of Faulkender & Petersen (2006) and Bougheas et al. 
(2006). It examines the economy of Japan, a perfect testing ground for this theory due 
to the extreme credit supply fluctuations that have occurred during the past years.  
 
Furthermore  under  this  new  perspective  of  capital  structure  theory  two  more 
hypotheses are tested. A “horse race” test between the two predominant theories of 
capital  structure,  the  trade-off  and  the  pecking  order  hypothesis,  is  run.  The 
methodology utilised to perform this test is similar to that derived by Shyam-Sunder 
& Myers (1999). Finally the role of trade credit, a factor overlooked by the majority 
of  previous  capital  structure  studies,  is  investigated  through  the  use  of  a  similar 
methodology as that utilised by Mateut et al. (2006). 
 
The results of this panel data study, applied in a large sample of public and private 
firms, clearly indicate that fluctuations in the supply of credit affect capital structure 
and also that Japanese firms face financial constraints. The pecking order hypothesis 
is proven to be the winner of the “horse race” test and trade credit is found to be a 
significant factor of capital structure and more specifically a substitute to bank credit. 
These findings should be taken into consideration by future research and even perhaps 
lead into the creation of a new theory of capital structure. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Capital structure is an area of finance that has received a great deal of attention by 
many researchers around the world. From the classic 1958 paper of Modigliani and 
Miller on capital structure irrelevance to the  most recent ones, a  great amount of 
research on the factors that affect the firms’ mix of debt and equity financing has been 
conducted. 
 
The two main theories that have been derived so far are the trade-off theory (Taub, 
1975)  and  the  pecking  order  hypothesis  (Myers  and  Majluf,  1984).  These  two 
competitive theories have used demand side explanations in order to solve the capital 
structure puzzle. The trade-off theory supports the existence of an optimal level of 
leverage derived by comparing the benefits of interest tax shields with the costs of 
financial distress. The pecking order hypothesis on the other hand has as its basis 
information asymmetries that influence financial policy decisions.  
 
Due to the important role they play in explaining capital structure, these theories must 
necessarily  be  analysed  (section  2.2.2.0).  However,  despite  the  important 
contributions  that  these  two  models  have  made  in  our  understanding  of  financial 
policy decisions, neither of them have been able to find or thoroughly explain the 
driving  forces  that  determine  the  firms’  capital  structure  and  provide  a  universal 
theory regarding financial policy decisions.  
  
According to recent papers, such as those of Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Kisgen 
(2006)  and  Bougheas et  al.  (2006),  the  shortcomings  of the  two existing  theories   17 
derive from the fact that previous researchers have failed to take into account the 
fluctuations in the supply of credit and other financial constraints that companies face. 
In simple terms, financial policy studies should take into account that the financial 
managers’ wishes do not necessarily come true. 
 
In order to successfully insert financial constraints into capital structure studies we 
must also take into consideration the source from which they are created. Existing 
literature  provides  two  such  possible  sources.  Firstly,  credit  supply  fluctuations 
originating from monetary policy transmission channels. Monetary policy affects the 
economy not only through money supply but also from a credit channel. The two 
predominant theories in this area separately support the existence of a bank lending 
(Bernanke  and  Blinder  1988)  and  a  balance  sheet  channel  (Gertler  and  Gilchrist 
1993). The difference between these two theories is that in the bank lending channel, 
bank  loans  are  given  a  special  role  within  the  economy.  Secondly,  even  if  no 
monetary shocks take place, it would still be likely that financial constraints exist due 
to  the  second  source  provided  by  literature,  namely,  credit  rationing.  The  credit 
rationing  theory  (Stiglitz  and  Weiss  1981)  states  that  even  in  equilibrium,  due  to 
information asymmetries, the demand of loans will not equal the supply, with the 
supply being the short end of the stick. 
 
It is not the direct concern of this paper to identify which of these theories holds or is 
the predominant explanation for the existence of credit constraints in the financial 
markets.  What  is  of  interest  is  that  the  results  of  all  these  theories  indicate  that 
financial constraints exist and are more severe for small, bank dependent firms than   18 
their larger counterparts, while at the same time these problems appear to be more 
significant during monetary tightenings.  
 
This paper’s intention is to take credit supply movements and financial constraints 
into consideration in order to provide important insights regarding Japanese firms’ 
capital structure decisions. The dramatic decrease of the incredibly high bank lending 
levels during the burst of the land bubble in the late 80’s and the record low levels 
documented in 2003, makes Japan as a perfect testing ground for the importance that 
credit supply fluctuations have on capital structure. 
 
A panel data set comprised of a large number of Japanese firms, has been constructed.  
This was extracted from Nikkei Needs Financial Quest and included both public and 
private firms. It should be noted that de-listed companies were also included in the 
sample.  Non  manufacturing  firms  and  firms  that  did  not  submit  their  financial 
statements at the end of March were dropped. The final sample included 3955 firms 
for the time period of 1980-2007.  
 
At the same time regression models investigating leverage, private and public debt 
levels as well as the probability of a firm issuing debt or equity have been utilised. 
Furthermore, a large number of factors that have been frequently used in the previous 
studies containing asset tangibility, profitability and size amongst others, have been 
added to the analysis. Finally, a distinction between different periods of the business 
cycle and between small and large firms has been made. This measure was taken 
because previous studies (Dimitrov and Tice 2006, Huang 2003 amongst others) have   19 
documented that expansions or contractions in the economy are likely to affect small 
and large firms in different ways.      
  
Furthermore,  under  this  new  perspective  of  examining  financial  policy  the  two 
competitive theories for explaining capital structure, the trade-off and the pecking 
order hypothesis, will be investigated. This is achieved through what is commonly 
known as a “horse race” test showing which of the two theories is more suitable. The 
methodology used follows the footsteps of the two main studies in the field, that of 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and that of Frank and Goyal (2003). Fluctuations in 
the  supply  of  credit  as  well  as  firm  characteristics  are  once  more  taken  into 
consideration. 
 
Additionally, the existence of financial constraints and credit supply fluctuations will 
also be taken into consideration for examining the effect of trade credit on capital 
structure. Several recent papers such as those of Mateut (2005), Rodriguez (2006) and 
Love et al. (2007) have reported that trade credit acts as a substitute for other forms of 
external finance such as bank loans. Following a similar methodology, this study will 
attempt  to  verify  the  findings  of  these  previous  papers  and  thus  draw  important 
insights on capital structure. The only other relevant paper on trade credit for the 
market of Japan comes from Fukuda et al. (2006) that rejects the role of trade credit as 
a  substitute for  bank  loans.  Nevertheless  Fukuda  et  al.  (2006)  use  a  data  set  that 
includes solely private companies and is restricted to a short time period. 
 
It is the author’s belief that this study will contribute towards the enrichment of our 
knowledge in the area of capital structure. The reasons behind this are as follows:    20 
 
This  paper  combines  the  methodology  used  by  recent  studies,  taking  into 
consideration supply side factors while investigating financial policy decisions. It is 
the first  study of its kind  to examine Japan,  the  world’s  second largest economy, 
which due to its severe credit supply fluctuations during the past 30 years can be 
considered as an ideal testing ground. Moreover data sets larger in size and richer in 
information can be obtained, compared to other countries.  
 
It is the first paper performing a “horse race” test between the trade-off and pecking 
order theory in Japan. Furthermore it is also the first study to take into consideration 
the  existence  of  financial  constraints,  credit  supply  fluctuations  and  the  firms’ 
characteristics while performing this analysis.  
 
Concerning the examination of trade credit, this study uses a superior data set that 
includes  credit  supply  fluctuations  over  a  longer  time  period  and  a  much  larger 
number  of  Japanese  firms  compared  to  the  one  used  by  Fukuda  et  al.  (2006). 
Additionally a more up to date methodology is utilised based on the recent studies of 
Mateut (2005), Rodriguez (2006) and Love et al. (2007). This is likely to provide 
valuable information on the effect that trade credit has on capital structure. 
 
The results of this study, clearly indicate that fluctuations in the supply of credit affect 
capital  structure.  The  pecking  order  hypothesis  is  proven  to  be  the  winner  of  the 
“horse race” test and trade credit is found to be a significant factor of capital structure 
and more specifically a substitute to bank credit. These findings should be taken into   21 
consideration by future research and even possibly into the creation of a new theory of 
capital structure. 
 
Chapter 2 contains this paper’s literature review providing a summary of previous 
capital structure and credit supply studies as well as a short description of the features 
of the Japanese market. In chapter 3 the reader can witness the methodology used to 
investigate the Japanese firms’ capital structure decisions’ as well as the results of this 
analysis. Chapter 4 contains the empirical analysis of the “horse race” tests between 
the trade-off and the pecking order hypothesis. In chapter 5 the role of trade credit in 
capital structure is examined. Finally this study’s conclusions, drawn from chapters 3, 
4 and ,5 are put together and discussed in chapter 6. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
One of the most important issues in the area of corporate finance is that of capital 
structure. Capital  structure is  the  mix  of  the  debt  and  equity  financing  of  a  firm. 
Nowadays this could be viewed as a simplification since many different kinds of debt 
and equity securities are traded in the financial markets. After more than 50 years of 
discussion amongst academics on if and how financial decisions can affect a firm’s 
value, the debate rages on. 
 
2.1.0 The Miller Modigliani Theorem 
 
Despite the many different opinions in the area of capital structure there is a theory 
that has come to be generally accepted. This is the Miller & Modigliani (hereafter 
M&M) theorem of capital structure irrelevance. Since 1958 and 1963 when the two 
seminal papers of M&M were published, the irrelevancy of financial policy has come 
to be considered as a benchmark for further studies in this field. 
 
The general result of the M&M (1958,1963) studies is that, “The market value of any 
firm is independent of its capital structure and is given by capitalising its expected 
return at the rate ρ appropriate to its risk class”; Miller and Modigliani (1958, page 
268). 
 
The authors were able to derive this extreme conclusion only after incorporating a 
large set of assumptions. It is suggested necessary to mention these assumptions since   23 
they will prove to be important for further discussion. Copeland  et al. (2005) are 
quoted since they have made an excellent compilation of the explicit and implicit 
assumptions that M&M (1958,1963) have taken. More specifically: 
 
•  Capital markets are frictionless. 
•  Individuals can borrow and lend at the risk-free rate. 
•  There are no costs to bankruptcy or to business disruption. 
•  Firms issue only two types of claims: Risk-free debt and (risky) equity. 
•  All firms are assumed to be in the same risk class (operating risk). 
•  Corporate taxes are the only form of government levy (i.e., there are no wealth 
taxes on corporations and no personal taxes). 
•  All cash flow streams are perpetuities (i.e., no growth). 
•  Corporate insiders and outsiders have the same information (i.e., no signaling 
opportunities). 
•  Managers always maximize shareholders’ wealth (i.e., no agency costs). 
•  Operating  cash  flows  are  completely  unaffected  by  changes  in  capital 
structure. 
 
These assumptions are quite restrictive, an issue that will be discussed shortly. The 
two main propositions of the M&M (1958) theorem. 
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2.1.1 Proposition 1 
 
M&M’s  (1958)  proposition  1  very  simply  states  that  no  combination  of  capital 
structure is better than any other. In other words the firm’s overall market value is 
independent of its financial policy. In order to prove this, M&M (1958) produced the 
following example which is quoted here in Allen et al’s (2006, pages 446-448) more 
refined and simplified form: 
    
Suppose there are two firms, the first of which is entirely financed through equity and 
the second is levered. Since we know that the value of a firm equals the amount of 
equity plus that of debt, equation 1 should hold.  V ,E , D stand for the firm’s Value, 
Equity and Debt respectively. The subscripts U  and  L  are used to show if a company 
is levered or unlevered.  
 
D E V + =  
Equation 1:M&M (1958) Theorem 1.0 
  
   
Now imagine an individual who would be willing to invest in the first firm by buying 
1% of its common stock. The result would be this: 
 
Investment  Return 
0.01Vu  0.01×Profits 
 
 
Alternatively the same individual could buy the same fraction of debt and equity of 
the levered firm. The result in this case would be this:   25 
 
  Investment  Return 
Debt  0.01DL  0.01×Interest 
Equity  0.01EL  0.01×(Profits – Interest) 
Total  0.01×(DL+ EL)=0.01VL  0.01×Profits 
 
 
 
As the reader can see both strategies offer the same return. Therefore they both must 
have  the  same  cost.  Thus  the  value  of  the  all  equity  firm  should  be  equal  to  the 
levered one (equation 2). 
L U V V =  
Equation 2:M&M (1958) Theorem 1.1 
 
 
If this individual was willing to run a little more risk then he would buy 1% of the 
levered firm’s equity. The example is portrayed like this: 
 
 
Investment  Return 
0.01EL=0.01(VL- DL)  0.01×(Profits – Interest) 
 
This investor though has another option; he could borrow 1% debt on his own accord 
and use this money to purchase  % 1  of the all equity firm. This strategy could have 
the following result 
 
  Investment  Return 
Debt  -0.01DL  -0.01×Interest 
Equity  0.01Vu  0.01×Profits 
Total  0.01(Vu-DL)  0.01×(Profits – Interest) 
   26 
The payoff is the same in both cases. Therefore this example verifies the fact that 
value of the two firms is one and the same. 
 
In the end M&M’s (1958) proposition 1 implies that as long as investors can borrow 
or lend on their own accord any changes that will take place in the firm’s capital 
structure will not affect them. As M&M (1958, page 268) state, “The market value of 
any firm is independent of its capital structure”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   27 
2.1.2 Proposition 2 
 
In  order  to  complete  their  ideas  and  compose  their  second  proposition  on  capital 
structure M&M (1958) used the weighted average cost of capital formula (WACC). In 
this  model  the  expected  returns  of  debt  and  equity  according  to  their  proportions 
determine the total expected returns of a firm’s assets. WACC (3) can be expressed 
as: 
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Equation 3:M&M (1958) Theorem 2.0 
 
 
A r , D r , E r  stand  for  the  expected  return  of  a  company’s  assets,  debt  and  equity 
respectively. We can easily transform the previous equation in order to depict the 
expected return of equity (4): 
 
( )
E
D
r r r r D A A E − + =  
Equation 4:M&M (1958) Theorem 2.1 
 
  
 
This version of the WACC represents the core of M&M’s (1958) proposition 2: The 
expected  return  of  equity  relates  directly  to  the  debt/equity  ratio  and  the  spread 
between the firms’ expected return of assets and the expected return of debt.  
   28 
As we can see from equation 4, the expected return of equity increases as the debt to 
equity  ratio  increases.  One could  argue  that  it  would  be  in  the  shareholders’  best 
interests that the firm increases its debt levels as high as possible since this would 
mean that the expected return on equity would rise. This however is half the story. 
Indeed the expected return of equity would rise but only due to the higher risk of the 
firm’s stock (since it has a very high amount of outstanding debt), as Markowitz’s 
(1959) portfolio theory predicts. 
 
M&M’s (1958) proposition 2 is also depicted in Figure 1.  The reader can see that the 
expected return on equity increases linearly with the debt to equity ratio if debt has no 
risk. A significant rise in the firm’s levels of leverage though will cause debt to be 
more risky. The debt holders will demand a higher return and this will result in a slow 
down of the  E r  increase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
Rates of return 
Debt /Equity  
rE= Expected return on equity 
rA= Expected return on assets 
rD= Expected return on debt   29 
2.1.3 Final thoughts on M&M 
 
Concluding  on  M&M’s  (1958,  1963)  theorem,  proposition  1  states  that  financial 
leverage has absolutely no effect of shareholders’ wealth. Any combination of debt 
and equity, long and short debt or any other choice of financial securities would not 
increase the market value of the firm as long as investors can duplicate the firm’s 
choices. Furthermore proposition 2 predicts that borrowing increases the shareholders 
returns but that is only because the risk of the stock increases simultaneously. 
 
Several critics of M&M’s (1958, 1963) theorem, often named the “traditionalists”, 
have argued that there is indeed an optimum capital structure based on the fact that 
capital markets are far from perfect (Allen et al., 2006 pages 457-459). According to 
this view, investors are not able to borrow at the same rate as firms, thus they would 
be willing to pay a premium to buy the shares of levered firms. 
 
Few people would argue with  the fact that in  the  world of borrowing we witness 
economies of scale and that sometimes individuals cannot even tap into the credit 
markets. Nevertheless even if this, as we shall see shortly, is a step towards the right 
direction,  the  argument  itself  is  weak.  In  today’s  markets  literally  thousands  of 
levered  stocks are  traded  on a  daily  basis.  It  therefore  seems  unreasonable  for an 
unsatisfied clientele to exist. 
 
Despite its restrictive assumptions and criticism the M&M (1958, 1963) theorem has 
generally come to be accepted by the entire scientific community. Even if no one 
really believes that the financial policy is indeed irrelevant the M&M (1958, 1963)   30 
theorem has, for more than 50 years, become the starting point in all the research that 
has been undertaken around the area of capital structure. As Miller (1989, page 100) 
states: “…showing what doesn’t matter can also show, by implication, what does.”  
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2.2.0 Is Capital Structure Really Irrelevant? 
 
Despite the theoretical appeal of M&M’s (1958, 1963) theorem there are very few 
financial managers that would accept that financial policy does not matter. If that was 
the case, then financing decisions would be taken by low rank employees. On the 
contrary, firms’ capital structure changes are regularly seen on financial newspapers’ 
headlines and are decided by highly paid CEOs. Moreover if financial policy didn’t 
matter, firms’ leverage levels would be random. Several studies have shown that there 
are  distinct  patterns  amongst  industries  (Dedola  &  Lippi,  2005)  and  firm  sizes 
(Bougheas et al. 2006). 
  
As  mentioned  earlier  the  assumptions  taken  by  M&M  (1958,  1963)  are  very 
restrictive and large in number. Even though some of them can be relaxed, there are a 
few that must necessarily hold in order for capital structure to be irrelevant. Where as 
the ‘traditionalists’ tried to tackle the assumption of perfect markets and failed, others 
succeeded. 
 
More  specifically,  academics  and  practitioners  now  agree  that  corporate  taxes, 
financial innovation and more importantly information asymmetries and agency costs 
exist and severely affect the firms’ financial policies (Myers, 2001 & Titman, 2002). 
 
Taking these market imperfections into consideration researchers have developed two 
alternative  theories  of  financial  policy.  As  Harris  &  Raviv  (1991)  point  out,  the 
agency costs and tax savings based trade-off theory and the information assymetry 
derived pecking order hypothesis are the two predominant ways of understanding the   32 
firms’  financial  policy  decisions  and  have  been  frequently  tested  by  researchers. 
Nevertheless the results from these two mutually exclusive hypotheses are ambiguous 
and even until today a winner has not been announced. 
 
A discussion of these two theories is essential and therefore included below. This 
analysis will not only explain the driving forces behind these two theories but also 
point out the reasons why neither one of them has been successful in fully explaining 
the financial policy decisions that firms take.    
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2.2.1 Trade-off Theory 
The trade-off theory supports the view that an optimum capital structure does exist. 
According to this hypothesis, financial managers set target debt ratios by balancing 
out the benefits and costs of borrowing. 
  
One of the trade-off theory’s cornerstones is the ‘interest tax shield’. In the United 
States the interest a company pays its bondholders is a tax-deductible expense, thus by 
financing with debt instead of equity a firm can increase its total after tax return to 
debt and equity holders and therefore increase its value (Myers, 2001). On the other 
hand an increase of the firm’s debt levels would bring unwanted results. Financial 
distress costs (Miller & Modigliani, 1963) and agency conflicts between the firm’s 
bondholders  and  stockholders  (Jensen  &  Meckling,  1976)  would  arise.  Therefore, 
according to the trade-off theory the benefit of the last unit of the firm’s debt at the 
optimum level of leverage would just offset its cost.  This can also be seen in figure 2. 
It shows that the market value of a company is equal to its value, if it is all equity 
financed, plus the present value of its tax shields minus the present value of its cost of 
financial distress. 
 
Summarising, this theory predicts that firms with safe, tangible assets and large profits 
to shield, should exhibit higher debt ratios than unprofitable companies with risky, 
intangible assets, high advertising expenditures and unique products that should rely 
mostly on equity finance (Harris & Raviv, 1991). The above definition applied to the 
classical  static  trade-off  model.  Nevertheless  Fischer  et  al.  (1989)  developed  a 
dynamic  model  of  trade-off  theory.  In  Fischer  et  al.’s  (1989)  theory,  firms  have 
optimal ranges of debt to equity ratios instead of a single point due to the transaction   34 
costs they face. In other words the firms let their leverage ratios fluctuate over time in 
accordance to their accumulated earnings or losses. They will not adjust their debt 
levels until the value lost due to suboptimal capital structure, exceeds the adjustment 
costs. This model could be considered an improved version of  the  static trade-off 
model since market imperfections play a more important role and it allows for similar 
firms to show different capital structures.   
 
Concluding, the existence of a target capital structure seems appealing, at least on a 
theoretical level. It allows for capital market imperfections; it excludes extreme cases 
and predicts moderate borrowing. Generally, the trade-off theory promotes a realistic 
set of rules for financial policy decisions, but do the empirical results support it? 
 
  
Figure 2 
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2.2.2 Testing the Trade-off Theory 
  
An extensive number of papers have been published during the last 30 years studying 
the firms’ financial policy choices in relation to the trade-off theory. The findings are 
presented here, taking into account the differences in accounting practices as well as 
tax legislations, by reporting first on the results from studies based on US data and 
then continuing to international evidence.  
 
It is noteworthy to point out that most research in this area of corporate finance is 
conducted by running cross-sectional OLS regressions using firm specific data. The 
size of the data sets utilised can vary substantially in size, ranging from a few hundred 
observations to several thousands. In recent years though, panel data studies that take 
into consideration both the time-series and the cross-sectional nature of the data, have 
become increasingly popular. These models are of the following form: 
 
i i i X a Leverage ε β + + =  
Equation 5:General Leverage Regression 
 
 
Where Xi is a vector of firm specific variables and εi the common error term. The 
reader should keep in mind that numerous definitions of leverage have been used in 
the numerous papers reported in this study. Furthermore some researchers have also 
conducted research examining the probability of a firm to issue debt or equity by 
using probit or logit regression models.  
 
   36 
2.2.2.1 U.S. Studies 
 
The  first  paper  that  supports  the  static  trade-off  model  is  the  qualitative  research 
conducted by Graham & Harvey (2001). In this study, American CEOs had to fill out 
a questionnaire on how they handled their firm’s financial policy;  % 44  admitted, in 
accordance to the static trade-off model, that they had a target debt ratio in  mind 
against the mere  % 11  that stated the opposite. 
 
Several  quantitative  studies  have  also  reported  supportive  findings.  Taub  (1975) 
conducts research in the US examining a total of  89 Standard and Poor listed firms 
for 10 years. His maximum likelihood estimation uses the debt to equity ratio as the 
dependent variable and indicates that the factors accounting for size and tangibility of 
assets have positive coefficients and are statistically significant.  
 
Frank & Goyal (2004) present a panel data set of over 7,000 US firms during the 
1971-1998 time period and run a fixed-effects regression model to investigate  the 
issuance  of  debt.  Hovakimian  et  al.  (2004)  examine  the  factors  that  affect  the 
probability of a company issuing debt or equity; they run a probit regression model on 
a panel data set of approximately 14,000 US, firm-years. Finally, Hovakimian et al. 
(2001) perform a tobit analysis of debt to equity ratios on 39,387 firm-years during 
1979-1997. All these authors report consistent results with that of Taub (1975). All 
these studies have found that firms with tangible assets that can be used as collateral 
and thus lower agency costs, have higher leverage ratios. At the same time larger 
firms with lower bankruptcy costs also have increased debt to equity levels. All this is 
consistent with the predictions of the trade-off theory.    37 
 
Nevertheless, contradictory evidence is provided from Titman & Wessels (1988) who 
in their analysis distinguish long term from short term and convertible debt. They use 
a balanced data set of 469 US firms during 1974-1982. Furthermore, the authors use 
an application of the LISREL system to conduct their empirical analysis. They find 
that  size  has  a  negative  sign  and  that asset  structure  does  not  have a consistently 
positive or negative coefficient. This coefficient in many cases is not even statistically 
significant, or in other words does not influence the firms’ capital structures. 
 
Empirical findings seem to be in accordance with the view that financial distress costs 
could diminish the benefits of debt. The studies of Taub (1975), Titman & Wessels 
(1988) and Hovakimian et al. (2001) unanimously agree that the volatility of a firm’s 
earnings is inversely related to its level of debt. Bradley et al. (1984), investigate the 
determinants of capital structure through the use of a standard analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). They use a data set containing 851 US firms during 1962-1981 and, as the 
studies mentioned above, reach the conclusion that financial distress costs have an 
inverse relationship with leverage.  
 
It has already been mentioned that the tangibility of assets is an important factor to 
consider when testing the trade-off theory, since it lowers the agency costs a firm 
faces. Nevertheless, another important determinant of capital structure has been found 
to lower the agency conflicts of a firm: growth opportunities. As Jung et al. (1996) 
state,  companies  with  high  growth  prospects  should  use  equity  to  finance  their 
investments in order to reduce their agency costs. Moreover Jensen (1986) and Stultz 
(1990) suggest that firms with low growth opportunities should use debt due to its   38 
disciplinary role. According to this, growth opportunities should be inversely related 
to leverage. Hovakimian et al. (2004), Hovakimian et al. (2001) and Frank and Goyal 
(2004)  report  supportive  evidence  while  Titman  and  Wessel’s  (1988)  findings  are 
mixed. 
 
One of  the  basic implications  of the trade-off model is that  profitable  firms, with 
plenty of income to shield, are expected to have high debt to equity ratios. In reality 
we observe the opposite. They use their retained earnings in order to finance their 
investments. All the US studies report a significant and negative signed coefficient for 
the profitability factor (Bradley et al. 1984, Titman and Wessels 1988, Hovakimian et 
al. 2001, Hovakimian et al. 2004 and Frank and Goyal 2004). These authors, with the 
exception  of  Bradley  et  al.  (1984),  explain  this  finding  by  stating  that  this  is  in 
accordance  in  accordance  with  the  trade-off  theory’s  competitive  hypothesis,  the 
pecking order theory.  
 
The cornerstone of the trade-off theory, the debt tax shields, has produced ambiguous 
results in the relevant studies throughout the last 30 years. DeAngelo and Masulis 
(1980) in their theoretical paper, have argued that as long as bankruptcy costs are 
positive, an optimum trade-off point between the marginal expected benefit of interest 
tax  shields  and  the  marginal  cost  of  bankruptcy  will  exist.  Their  results  were 
empirically verified by MacKie-Mason’s (1990) study that utilises a probit model in 
order to investigate the probability of a firm issuing debt or equity. Using a data set of 
1747 observations during the 1977-1987 period, MacKie-Mason (1990) found that the 
possibility of a debt issuance is negatively related to the existence of other tax shields 
and financial distress  costs. Moreover, these findings  suggest that  not only do  tax   39 
shields matter, but they are imperative, since one standard deviation increase in non 
debt  tax  shields  causes  a  10%  fall  in  the  probability  of  a  firm  to  issue  debt. 
Nevertheless as Myers (2001) and Allen et al. (2006) report, MacKie-Mason’s (1990) 
results are not necessarily evidence in favour of the trade-off theory. It could also be 
consistent with Miller’s (1977) theoretical equilibrium model in which corporate and 
personal taxes cancel each other out, thus making financial policy irrelevant. 
 
Several academics seem to disagree with the idea of debt tax shields. Miller (1977) 
and Graham (2000) argue that according to trade-off supporters, the debt tax savings 
seem too large and certain while the bankruptcy costs are too small.  As shown in 
Graham’s (2000) statistical analysis of the Fortune 500 firms during the 1996-1998 
period, a very large percentage of firms seem to be under-levered. In other words 
many companies seem to be throwing money away by not issuing debt. Minton and 
Wruck (2001) and Lemmon and Zender (2001) support Graham’s (2000) results and 
also state that the existence of under-leveraged firms is not an industry phenomenon.  
 
More specifically, Minton and Wruck (2001) conduct a logit regression analysis on a 
panel data set containing data from 5,613 unique US firms for a period running from 
1974 to 1998. Their results indicate that firms with low debt to equity ratios do not 
have low tax rates or high non-debt tax shields, casting a further shadow on the trade-
off theory. Moreover, Lemmon and Zender (2001) find the same results conducting a 
similar study based on 31,975 US firm-years from 1980-1995. They use the ‘kink’ 
variable,  which,  as  defined  by  Graham  (2000)  indicates  the  point  that  a  firm  can 
increase  its existent  leverage  level  until  the  marginal expected  tax  benefit  of  debt 
financing begins to decrease, to classify firms. By comparing financial conservative   40 
firms  to  aggressive  ones,  the  authors  search  “where  the  light  is  brightest”. 
Nevertheless  the  results  from  Lemmon  and  Zender’s  (2001)  logistic  regression 
models  that  examine  the  probability  of  a  company  issuing  debt  or  equity  fail  to 
support the trade-off theory. Under levered firms do not face higher costs of debt 
while aggressive firms do not have substantially higher debt tax shields. 
 
Nevertheless  Graham’s  (2000)  results  have  also  been  severely  criticised.  Mollina 
(2005) using a dummy variable approach, reports that Graham’s (2000) study has not 
taken into consideration the effect that leverage has on a firm’s credit ratings. This 
significantly increases the financial distress costs caused by leverage, thus explaining 
the reason that firms appear to be under-levered. 
 
Continuing with the criticism of the tax shields’ effects on capital structure: Myers’ 
(1984, page 579) states that “…we would expect to find a strong tax effect in any 
cross-sectional test, regardless of whose theory of debt and taxes you believe”. This is 
not verified by the empirical studies on capital structure. Taub (1975) and Bradley et 
al. (1984) find the tax shield variable to have the wrong sign and be highly significant 
and despite the fact that Titman and Wessels (1988) report a negative relationship 
between  non-debt  tax  shields  and  leverage,  their  results  do  not  have  statistical 
significance. 
 
Supportive evidence for the validity of the trade-off theory comes from Flannery and 
Rangan (2006). The authors investigate the dynamic version of the trade-off theory 
while  arguing  that  previous  studies  have  failed  to  take  into  consideration  the 
probability of the firms’ incomplete adjustment to their leverage targets. Flannery and   41 
Rangan (2006) examine 12,919 US firms during 1965-2001 while utilising a partial 
adjustment  regression  model  to  perform  their  empirical  analysis.  The  dependent 
variable  of this  model  is the firms’  market  debt  ratio  and  the  independent  factors 
include a lagged set of commonly used capital structure determinants plus the lagged, 
market  debt  ratio  itself.  Fixed  effects  as  well  as  FM  (Fama  and  MacBeth,  1973) 
estimators are used to run the regressions. They conclude that companies do have 
capital structure targets and that a typical firm closes its leverage gap at the rate of 
approximately 30% every year.  
  
A final negative comment for the trade-off theory comes from Allen et al. (2006, 
pages 490) who state that ‘Debt ratios today are no higher than they were in the early 
1900s, when income tax rates were low (or zero)’.  
 
2.2.2.2 International Studies 
 
When  it  comes  to  international  evidence  on  capital  structure  the  most  frequently 
mentioned study is that of Rajan and Zingales (1995). These two researchers focused 
on the G-8  countries, excluding the United  States. They conducted cross-sectional 
leverage regressions on a large number of listed firms per country, adding up to a total 
of  4512  companies  for  the  1987-1991  time  period,  taking  into  consideration  the 
differences in accounting. After carefully choosing the most appropriate definition for 
leverage they were able to find positive and significant coefficients on the tangibility 
and  size  variables  and  negative  coefficients  for  the  growth  opportunities,  thus 
supporting the trade-off theory. The problem however, with the inverse relationship 
between  the  profitability  factor  and  the  debt  ratios  was  also  evident.  Rajan  and   42 
Zingales  (1995)  concluded  that  the  profitability  factor  supports  the  existence  of  a 
pecking order. 
 
A similar  study was conducted a few years later  by Booth et al.  (2001) this time 
focusing on emerging economies and running panel data fixed effect models while 
distinguishing between total and long-term debt. The panel data set consisted of 727 
firms based on 10 emerging economies for the time period 1985-1991. This study is 
more  useful  for  testing  the  trade-off  hypothesis  since  tax  rate  and  business  risk 
variables were included. Apart from the usual supportive results of collateral, growth 
opportunities, business risk and size variables, the evidence is not supportive making 
the results inconsistent with a trade-off model. As Taub (1975) has stated, increases in 
the tax rate should cause a firm to increase its debt to equity ratio. Nevertheless in this 
case an inverse and significant relationship amongst these two items is recorded. Tax 
shields do not provide evidence in support of the theory. Results reported from the 
profitability factor reject the trade-off theory and are supportive of the pecking order 
hypothesis. 
 
For the static trade-off model hopeful evidence comes from Asia. Allen and Mizuno 
(1989) examine 125 Japanese companies for the time period 1980-1983. The authors 
perform an ANOVA regression analysis using the standard set of independent factors 
usually seen in a capital structure study. The study of Hirota (1999) uses a data set 
comprising of approximately 500 Japanese corporations’ financial statement data for 
the years of 1977, 1982, 1987 and 1992. The study utilizes cross-sectional as well as 
pooled regression models in order to investigate the Japanese firms’ leverage ratios. 
Both  studies  findings  support  the  trade-off  theory.  Most  importantly,  in  both  the   43 
factors  of  non-debt  tax  shields  have  an  inverse  relationship  with  the  dependent 
variable thus reaffirming the validity of the benefits of debt. As usual the variables of 
fixed assets, firm size, growth opportunities and business risk are supportive while the 
profitability factor remains an issue. 
 
Similar results come from more recent panel data studies in Japan. Paker and Hodder 
(2002) concentrate in the turbulent period of 1984-2000 in order to study the effect of 
the burst of the land bubble on firms’ capital structure and use a balanced panel data 
set of 361 Japanese companies. The authors make a distinction between keiretsu and 
non-keiretsu members to see if keiretsu membership is an important factor to financial 
policy decisions. Their fixed effects leverage regressions find the usual positive signs 
in  size  and  tangibility  while  growth  opportunities  are  negatively  correlated  with 
leverage. By simply comparing leverage level averages Paker and Hodder (2002) find 
that keiretsu members consistently have higher leverage levels than their counterparts. 
Despite all this, profitability still has a negative significant sign.   
 
Contradictory  results  come  from  Nishioka  and  Baba  (2004).  The  authors  use  a 
balanced  panel  data  set,  691  Japanese  firms,  for  the  period  of  1992-2003  while 
utilising a GMM regression model that examines leverage and distinguishes between 
market and book values. Their findings are mixed; the tangibility and size variables 
do not give clear results while the coefficient for growth opportunities is reported to 
be practically zero. The only factor that provides clear results is profitability which 
has a negative sign. 
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Supportive results for the trade-off theory also come from the Chinese studies of Chen 
(2004) and Huang & Song (2006). Chen (2004) provides a panel data study based of 
88 publicly listed companies for the 1995-2000 period. The author investigates the 
Chinese  companies’  total  and  long-term  leverage  levels  through  the  use  of  fixed, 
random and pooled OLS estimators.  Huang and Song (2006) also make a distinction 
between total and long-term leverage but use a much larger data set of 1200 public 
companies with a coverage spanning from 1994 to 2003. They use OLS estimators to 
conduct  their  empirical  analysis  while  the  regression  model  they  use  contains  the 
standard  set  of  independent  factors.  In  both  studies,  size,  collateral  and  financial 
distress  costs  are  supportive  of  the  trade-off  hypothesis  with  the  latter  however 
appearing to be insignificant in Huang and Song (2006). The inclusion of non-debt tax 
shields in Huang and Song (2006) provided a negative sign as predicted by the trade-
off theory even though in the case of Chen (2004) these results are not statistically 
significant. The results of the two studies are contradictory when it comes to growth 
opportunities. While Huang and Song (2006) report the expected negative sign, Chen 
(2004) finds an insignificant positive coefficient which according to him, depicts the 
low technological level of Chinese firms. Nevertheless both studies’ results show that 
the variable of profitability has a negative signed coefficient 
 
Similar results are reported by Bhabra et al. (2008) who study the long-term debt 
ratios of 1117 listed Chinese firms for the period 1992-2001. They run a pooled time-
series cross sectional Tobit analysis while making a distinction between private and 
public owned companies. The study’s findings show that the factors of size, asset 
tangibility  and  growth  opportunities  are  in  accordance  with  the  trade-off  theory.   45 
Nevertheless, as in the majority of capital structure studies, profitability is negatively 
associated with leverage. 
 
Other  Chinese  studies  though  do  not  provide  supportive  results  for  the  trade-off 
theory. Chen & Strange (2005) use a sample of 972 Chinese companies’ financial 
statement data for the year 2003 in order to investigate capital structure. They use two 
different definitions of leverage and take institutional shareholdings into consideration 
to examine the effect of corporate structure in financial policy decisions. Their OLS 
regression  analysis  shows that, as  stated by the  trade-off theory, size is positively 
related with the firms’ debt ratios. Of greater importance though is the fact that the 
variable of tax is proven not to influence capital structure and risk is positively related 
to leverage. The results from both of these factors are against the trade-off theory.  
 
Li et al.’s (2009) study on non-publicly traded Chinese companies, 417,068 firm-year 
observations during the 2000-2004 period, also contradicts the trade-off theory. They 
make a distinction between total, long and short-term debt in their leverage regression 
model and use OLS and fixed effects estimators to conduct their empirical analysis. 
As in most capital structure studies the size factor appears to be consistent with the 
trade-off  theory  and  has  a  positively  signed  coefficient.  Nevertheles  the  asset 
tangibility  and  profitability  factor  results  cast  doubts  over  the  existence  of  capital 
structure targets. 
 
Lastly for China, Qian et al. (2009) examine if 650 public firms, from 1999 to 2004, 
adjust their capital structures toward a target. They use a two-step GMM procedure 
and  conclude  that  company  size,  collateral  values  and  state  shareholdings  have  a   46 
positive relation with leverage. Contrary to the results of most studies in this area, 
they find that lagged profitability has a negligibly small, positive impact on the firms’ 
debt ratios. Most importantly though the authors conclude that Chinese firms have a 
desired capital structure and that the farther they are from it the faster their adjustment 
towards it is. These results support the existence of a dynamic trade-off theory. 
 
European studies also seem to provide in their majority evidence in support of the 
trade-off theory. Swiss evidence comes from Gaud et al. (2005) who conduct a panel 
data analysis on 104 firms for the period 1991-2000, using the Arellano and Bond 
two-step GMM estimator. Their results validate the static trade-off model since the 
independent  variables  size, tangibility  of assets and  growth  opportunities  have  the 
expected signs with the exception of profitability. A cross-sectional analysis of 1100 
Hungarian firms from 1992 to 1996 also seems to tell a similar story. Colombo (2001) 
estimates that the size and collateral factors have positive signs for all the five cross-
sectional regressions. Nevertheless both leverage studies do not include tax shields or 
financial distress costs in their regression models which would enable us to clearly 
accept or reject the trade-off model. 
 
Portuguese data are less encouraging though. Nunes and Serrasqueiro (2007) conduct 
a panel data analysis using random and fixed effects estimators specifically for the 
debt to assets levels of firms that belong in the service industry. In this 1999-2003 
study of  500 companies,  the  only supportive results for  the  trade-off theory come 
from the size factor. Profitability, as in most studies, has a negative sign but the worst 
news comes from  the  tangibility  variable  which  is  also  negatively  correlated  with   47 
leverage.  Financial  distress  costs  and  growth  opportunities  are  not  statistically 
significant.  
 
The  UK  based  research  of  Marsh  (1982)  accepts  the  existence  of  a  target  capital 
structure. He conducts an analysis based on the probability of a firm to issue debt or 
equity.  In  order  to  achieve  this  he  runs  probit  and  logit  regression  models, 
incorporating data from 748 debt and equity issuances in the UK. His results clearly 
indicate that capital structure targets do exist and are affected by the firms’ size, risk 
and collateral levels. 
 
2.2.2.3 Conclusions on the Trade-off Model 
 
The trade-off model tells a compelling and believable story. Nevertheless the results 
from research in capital structure do not send a clear message concerning the validity 
or not of this theory. 
 
Several  of  the  independent  variables  show  the  expected  signs  and  are  statistically 
significant. These factors include size, tangibility of assets, growth opportunities and 
financial distress costs. These results though could not be characterised as decisive for 
the  acceptance  of  the  trade-off  theory.  Some  of  them  are  also  supportive  of  the 
pecking order hypothesis.   
 
Furthermore, the profitability factor remains a serious issue since almost every capital 
structure study reports it as having an opposite sign from that which the trade-off 
theory  predicts.  Additionally,  U.S.  and  international  studies  have  reported   48 
controversial results for one of the cornerstones of the trade-off theory, the non-debt 
tax shields.  
 
In  order  for  the  reader  to  have  an  overview  of  the  total  research  that  has  been 
conducted in the area of capital structure in relation to the trade-off model, table 1 
which shows a summary of the empirical tests’ results is included in Appendix A. 
   
Despite  the  ongoing  criticism,  several  academic  papers  have  throughout  time 
supported the trade-off model (Marsh 1982, MacKie-Mason 1990, Hovakimian et al. 
2004) and several others have provided at least partial support of it (Fama and French 
2002, Gaud et al. 2005). 
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 2.2.3 The Pecking-Order Hypothesis 
  
The  trade-off  theory  is  not  the  only  hypothesis  that  has  tried  to  explain  the 
determinants of capital structure decisions. An alternative theory exists, the pecking 
order  hypothesis.  Where  the  trade-off  theory  tries  to  explain  matters  of  financial 
policy through tax shields and agency costs, the pecking order hypothesis does so by 
using information asymmetries. 
 
The pecking order hypothesis incorporates a very logical assumption; managers have 
information that investors do not. This makes investors try and decipher the firms’ 
financial decisions taken by its managers. Frequently we witness the value of a firm 
rising after a dividend payment. This happens because investors perceive the release 
of dividend as a signal of the managers’ confidence in their company. Myers (2001) 
states:  “…share prices fall not because the investors’ demand is inelastic, but because 
of  the information  inferred  from  the  decisions  to  issue;  it turns  out the  bad  news 
always outweighs the good.” 
 
Taking this into consideration, a manager who believes that his/her firm will increase 
its performance in the future will prefer to issue debt. This is to be expected since 
future positive announcements are likely to make the company’s shares increase in 
value.  If  the  firm  issues  equity  before  these  future  positive  announcements  are 
reflected in its shares then indirectly the manager would be throwing money away. A 
pessimistic manager on the other hand would rather issue equity; this though would 
signal to the market that the equity issued would not be a good investment. Thus as 
Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) predict, a firm would decide to issue   50 
equity if and only if debt was too costly; for example in the case where a firm had 
already very high debt levels. 
 
Therefore Myers and Majluf (1984), putting aside debt tax shields and bankruptcy 
costs, derived the pecking order hypothesis which states that: 
1.  Firms always prefer internal to external finance since internal financing does 
not include any information asymmetries. 
2.  Divided policies are sticky. This means that cuts in dividend payments are not 
used to finance the firms’ investments and that changes in cash requirements 
are not turned into short-run dividend changes. 
3.  If external funds are required, managers will decide to issue the safest security 
first. If internally generated cash exceeds capital investment, the surplus will 
be used to pay down debt rather than repurchase or retire equity. If the need 
for external financing increases the firm will issue debt, first the safest and 
then the riskier kind. Convertible securities or preferred stock will follow. An 
equity issuance will take place only as a last resort. 
4.   According to this, a firm’s debt ratio reflects its need for external financing. 
 
It is crucial to point out that this theory does not involve the firms having a target debt 
to equity ratio, something that has frequently been used by researchers to prove its 
validity. The pecking order hypothesis is also an attractive model because it is able to 
explain why some of the most profitable companies seem to borrow less. It is not 
because they have low target leverage ratios but simply because they do not need to 
issue debt since their retained earnings are enough to cover their financing needs. 
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Narayanan (1988) provides theoretical support to the pecking order hypothesis and 
states that in a world where only insiders know the quality of a firm, only undervalued 
firms will issue debt and overvalued firms will issue equity. Therefore as the author 
states “the use of debt act as a barrier to entry of inferior firms” (Narayanan 1988, 
page 49). The conclusions of both Narayanan (1988) and Myers and Majluf (1984) 
are similar. It is better to satisfy capital needs through financial reserves and debt is 
always preferred to equity.  
 
Even if the conclusions of both studies are the same the reasoning is different. The 
main difference between the model of Narayanan (1988) and the one of Myers and 
Majluf (1984) is that the latter assumes informational asymmetries not only of the 
proposed  project  but  also  for  the  assets  in  place.  Narayanan  (1988)  requires 
informational  asymmetry  only  for  the  new  investment  opportunity.  This  is  an 
advantage since Narayanan’s (1988) model can also be applied for a newly floated 
company or even for stable, mature firms that have no information asymmetries for 
their assets in place. Moreover this model can be applied even when the new project is 
going to be financed through a separate class of stock and/or debt. 
 
In a nutshell Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that managers who want to maximize 
their firms’ market value will try and avoid the issuance of equity if they have better 
information than outside investors who are rational. Figure 3 gives the pecking order 
theory.   52 
 
Figure 3 
Source: Fazzari et al. 1988, page 156. 
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2.2.4 Evidence of a Pecking Order 
 
As in section 2.2.2, the empirical results of studies investigating the validity of the 
pecking order hypothesis are going to be split in two sections. US based studies will 
be presented in section 2.2.4.1 and papers using international data are going to be 
depicted  in  section  2.2.4.2.  Most  of  the  papers  mentioned  in  sections  2.2.4.1  and 
2.2.4.2 have already being analysed in section 2.2.3. The reader can refer to section 
2.2.3  for  more  detailed  information  on  the  data,  period  of  estimation  and  the 
estimation methodology. 
 
2.2.4.1 US Studies.  
 
One  of  the  most  important  implications  of  the  pecking  order  hypothesis  is  that 
profitable firms are expected not to obtain any kind of external finance but instead use 
their  retained  earnings  to  finance  any  investment.  Almost  every  empirical  study 
supports  this  by  finding  that  debt  levels  have  an  inverse  relationship  with  the 
profitability factor. Bradley et al. (1984), Titman and Wessels (1988), Hovakimian et 
al. (2001), Hovakimian et al. (2004) and Frank and Goyal (2004) verify this view.  
 
Another factor to test the pecking order hypothesis is growth opportunities. According 
to the theory more profitable firms use less debt and since profitability is captured by 
a firm’s market value, firms with high earnings should also have high market to book 
values, a measure used to capture growth opportunities. Results are in support of the 
theory;  Titman  and  Wessels  (1988),  Hovikimian  et  al.  (2001),  Hovakimian  et  al. 
(2004) and Frank and Goyal (2004) report negatively signed market to book value   54 
ratios. Generally though these results should be taken with a pinch of salt; the trade-
off  model  also  predicts  a  similar  relationship  between  growth  opportunities  and 
leverage. 
 
The evidence is not as supportive for firms which choose to obtain external finance; 
the existence of a pecking order would predict that debt is issued first and equity last. 
Minton & Wruck (2001) as mentioned in section 2.2.2.1, follow the work of Graham 
(2000)  and conduct a  logit  analysis  concentrated  on  firms that  adopt  conservative 
financial policies and are thus characterised as under-levered. In this study the firms 
monitored indeed appear to follow a pecking order style of financial policy by issuing 
debt when their internal generated funds are exhausted. Moreover they show financial 
‘slack’ matters; firms use their ‘stockpiles’ of cash when retained earnings decline to 
finance capital expenditures. Nevertheless Minton & Wruck (2001) also report that in 
their sample, firms do not fully exhaust their internally generated cash before they tap 
the capital markets for credit.  
 
A slightly different story is told by Lemmon & Zender’s (2001) research. In a study 
that, as mentioned in section 2.2.2.1, focuses on  either financially conservative or 
financially aggressive firms; findings of a pecking order should be more evident. As 
predicted by theory, under-levered firms exhibit large cash ‘stockpiles’ that seem to 
decline before external finance is obtained. On the other hand though, stable or rising 
cash balances two years before the issuance of securities are reported. Furthermore, 
the logit regression models indicate that the probability of a under levered firm to 
issue equity is not different than that of an aggressive firm.   
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Ambiguous results also come from Helwege and Liang (1996)  who investigate initial 
public offerings of firms that went public in 1983. They examine IPOs of 220 US 
firms through the use of a logit regression analysis. They find that firms with a surplus 
of internally generated earnings tend to avoid obtaining external finance as predicted 
by the pecking order hypothesis. On the other hand, they also report that the size of 
the internal cash deficit does not predict future financial policy decisions and even 
worse, firms that do choose to obtain external finance do not act accordingly to a 
pecking order. 
 
Another paper based on the securities that are issued once a firm decides to tap the 
credit  markets,  which,  casts  serious  doubts  over  the  validity  of  the  pecking  order 
hypothesis is that of Frank and Goyal (2003). They analysed a panel data sample of 
over 88,000 firm years during the 1971-1989 period, following a methodology based 
on  the  Shyam-Sunder  and  Myers  (1999)  paper  analysed  in  the  next  section.  This 
showed that external finance is indeed heavily used and a large part of it is equity. 
Moreover, the deficit of  internal funds is closely related with equity and not  debt 
movements. All this of course is in contrast with the pecking order theory. A very 
important implication of this study is that according to evidence, the pecking order 
hypothesis seems to work better for large, profitable and mature firms rather than 
small, high growth ones. This is not expected since the pecking order hypothesis is 
based on information asymmetries which are supposed to be more severe for smaller 
more informational opaque firms; thus the pecking order should be more evident on 
them. 
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2.2.4.2 International Studies 
 
International  studies  have  presented  similar  results  to  US  studies  as  far  as  the 
profitability factor is concerned. Booth et al. (2001), state that profitability is the most 
consistent  and  important  factor  from  a  large  number  of  variables  tested  in  many 
emerging economies. Colombo (2001) and Gaud et al. (2005), both European based 
studies,  also  find  the  independent  variable  of  profitability  to  have  a  negative  and 
statistically  significant  coefficient.  Japanese  studies  confirm  all  the  previously 
mentioned  findings:  Allen  and  Mizuno  (1989),  Paker  and  Hodder  (2002)  and 
Nishioka  and  Baba  (2004)  report  a  negative  signed  profitability  factor.  Chinese 
papers, with the exception of Qian et al. (2009), also report an inverse association 
between internal finance and leverage (Chen 2004, Huang and Song 2006, Bhabra et 
al. 2008, Li et al. 2009).  
 
The growth opportunities factor also seems to provide support for the pecking order 
hypothesis. The studies of Rajan and Zingales (1995), Gaud et al. (2005), Booth et al. 
(2001), Hirota (1999), Allen and Mizuno (1989), Paker and Hodder (2002), Huang 
and  Song  (2006)  and  Bhabra  et  al.  (2008)  report  that  growth  opportunities  and 
leverage  have  a  negative  association.  The  only  paper  that  presented  contradictory 
results to the previously mentioned papers, is that of Chen (2004). 
 
The Chinese study of Chen (2004) seems to disagree with what the pecking order 
hypothesis  stipulates when the order  of the firms’ selection of externally obtained 
finance  is  examined.  Chen  (2004)  using  firm-level  panel  data  states  that  
Chinese firms, due to institutional differences and financial constraints in the banking   57 
sector, follow a “new Pecking order”. According to this, retained profit comes first 
followed by equity and then long term debt. 
 
2.2.4.3 Conclusions on the Pecking Order Hypothesis 
 
The reader can see that, as in the case of the trade-off model, the empirical evidence 
for  the  existence  of  a  pecking  order  is  controversial.  Nevertheless  its  basic 
implications seem to be valid and present in financial markets. Many could argue that 
even if the pecking order theory does explain several aspects of financial policy it 
could not be used as a universal model of understanding capital structure. It should be 
kept in mind that the father of the pecking order hypothesis, Myers (1984, page 582) 
himself  has  stated  that    “Of  course,  the  pecking  order  hypothesis  can  be  quickly 
rejected if we require it to explain everything…..But when one looks at aggregates, 
the heavy reliance on internal finance and debt is clear.”    
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2.2.5 Pecking Order vs. Tradeoff Theory 
 
The inconclusive findings from studies on the determinants of capital structure did not 
lead into the acceptance of one or the other theory. The trade-off and the pecking 
order hypothesis were in many cases, accepted or rejected both by the researchers. 
This gave incentives for the derivation of tests, commonly known as “horse races”, 
that were able to find out which of the two alternative theories was more powerful. 
 
The first to directly compare the two theories were Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). 
In their US based study, utilising a balanced panel data set of 157 companies for the 
period 1971-1989,  two similar regression models were derived in order to test the 
power of the trade-off and pecking order hypothesis. It should be stated that OLS, 
pooled cross-section and time-series analysis, as well as fixed effect estimators were 
utilised in order to run the regression. 
 
The  main focus  of  the trade-off  regression  was the prediction that  changes  in  the 
firm’s debt levels will cause it to revert to its target capital structure. This can be seen 
in equation 6: 
 
t i t i t i i t i D D b D , 1 , ,
*
, ) ( ε α + − + = ∆ −  
Equation 6:Trade-off Theory Testing Model  
 
 
Where  it D ∆  is the amount of debt issued per period, 
* D
 is the firm’s target leverage 
ratio and  i b  is the coefficient indicating how quickly companies are moving towards 
their optimal capital structure. It should be noted that according to the trade-off theory   59 
the results of the analysis should indicate that 0 = a  and  1 0 ≤ < i b . Due to the fact 
that 
* D  is  unobservable  its  calculation  is  problematic.  The  authors  calculated  the 
firms’ historical average values of leverage, either using a simple average of the entire 
sample or using a 3 or 5 year moving average, and assumed that this was the firms’ 
* D . 
 
While examining the pecking order hypothesis emphasis was given to the fact that 
yearly changes on leverage depended on the funds flow deficit. This gave birth to the 
following regression models (7,8): 
 
t i t i i t i DEF b D , , , ε α + + = ∆  
Equation 7:Pecking Order Hypothesis Testing Model 
 
 
The funds flow deficit is defined as: 
 
it it it it it it C R W X DIV DEF − + ∆ + + =  
Equation 8:Funds Flow Deficit 
 
 
 
Where: 
 
it C =Operating cash flows, after interest and taxes. 
 
it DIV =Dividend payments. 
 
it X =Capital expenditures. 
 
it W ∆ =Net increase in working capital. 
 
it R =Current portion of long term debt at start of period. 
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If a pecking  order exists then  0 = a  and  1 = i b . The results  of Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999), announced the pecking order hypothesis as the winner. As a means of 
validating the robustness of their initial analysis, they constructed and carried out tests 
of statistical power. The notion was to generate hypothetical time series for each firm, 
based on either the pecking order hypothesis or the trade-off theory and then see how 
well the models fit these simulated data. If, for example, the trade-off theory model 
has  statistical  power  it  should  not  be  able  to  explain  financing  decisions  that  are 
purely generated by the pecking order hypothesis and vice versa. The results of the 
tests of statistical power confirmed the initial empirical analysis. These findings were 
of  course  not  accepted  without  some  criticism.  Chirinko  and  Singha  (2000)  have 
argued  that  equity  issuances  could  cause  serious  negative  biases  in  the  tests  and 
severely distort the final results. 
 
A subsequent study by Fama and French (2002) focusing on both debt and dividend 
policies alike produced more controversial results. Concerning dividend policies the 
two  theories  have  common  expectations  according  to  which  profitable  and  low 
growth opportunities firms will pay high dividend payouts. The results from the Fama 
and  French’s  (2002)  dividend  regression  were  consistent  with  these  theoretical 
expectations.  Conducting  yearly  cross-sectional  leverage  regressions  the  authors 
found results similar to those of previous studies in capital structure. The coefficients 
of  size  and  non-debt  tax  shields  provide  support  for  the  trade-off  model  but 
profitability casts its doubt and at the same time is consistent with a pecking order. 
The  existence  of  target  debt  ratios,  an  implication  of  the  trade-off  model,  is  also 
difficult to prove. Nevertheless serious evidence against the pecking order hypothesis 
is reported since low leverage growth firms appear to be the largest equity issuers.   61 
 
Finally, another test comparing the trade-off theory and the pecking order comes from 
China. Tong and Green’s (2005) cross sectional OLS regression models use a sample 
of 44 of the largest Chinese firms during the 2001-2003 period. Their main findings 
show that both profitability and past dividends payments have a negative relationship 
with  leverage;  this  is  in  support  of  a  pecking  order  model.  Furthermore,  an 
inconclusive negative correlation between the growth of investment and the rate of 
past dividends is recorded. This study as well as Shyam-Sunders and Myers (1999) 
favours the pecking order model broadly. 
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2.2.6 Something Missing from Capital Structure Theories?   
 
After  almost  50  years  since  the  Modigliani  and  Miller  (1958,  1963) theorem  was 
published the determinants of financial policy are still not sufficiently explained. It 
seems  that research  in the field is reaching a  standpoint.  Evidence  in  support and 
against both theories has been presented and the debate does not seem to be reaching 
any conclusion. As Myers (2003) has stated “There is no universal theory of capital 
structure and no reason to expect one”. The latest findings, Frank and Goyal (2003) 
and Allen et al. (2006, page 494), seem to conclude that the pecking order hypothesis 
works best for large, mature and profitable firms while the trade-off model explains 
the financial decisions of younger, smaller, growth firms. 
 
It is the writer’s belief that a very important determinant of capital structure has been 
overlooked  by  a  large  number  of  studies.  It  seems  that  researchers  have  been 
investigating the demand of credit so fiercely that they have forgotten to take into 
consideration how its supply affects the firms’ financial decisions. It would be only 
natural to assume that in a world of imperfect markets, information asymmetries and 
agency costs, it is supply and not demand that determines capital structure decisions 
taken by financial managers.   
 
Not all firms, even in developed public markets such as that of the US or the UK, are 
able to obtain bank credit or issue debt in the public markets. Financial constraints are 
even more severe on the so called bank oriented economies such as that of Japan and 
Germany. For example it could be the case that small firms issue equity not because 
they  choose  to  do  so  but  simply  because  they  are  not  able  obtain  debt  instead.   63 
Furthermore turbulent economic conditions such as the credit crunch we are currently 
experiencing are likely to make matters even worse. 
 
Several recently published papers such as that of Bougheas et al. (2006), Faulkender 
and  Petersen  (2006),  Kisgen  (2006)  and  Leary  (2009)  seem  to  acknowledge  the 
existence of credit rationing and financial constraints and incorporate these in their 
financial policy studies. This only verifies the importance of credit supply in capital 
structure theory. 
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2.3.0 Credit Supply and Financial Policy Decisions 
 
 
The studies of Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Bougheas et al. (2006), Kisgen (2006) 
and Leary (2009) have underlined the implications that credit supply fluctuations have 
on the firms’ capital structure decisions. An increasing number of researchers have 
started to embrace the idea that firms are facing financial constraints and are being 
rationed  by  their  lenders.  The  constraints  that  these  firms  face  cause  severe 
restrictions in their financial policy decisions. Research in the area of capital structure 
has not yet taken into consideration the movements in the supply of credit; this could 
cause severe distortions in the reported results. Having discussed in detail the demand 
side theories of capital structure and stating why they are inadequate to sufficiently 
explain financial policy decisions, the writer continues by analysing the determinants 
of the credit supply theory and its effects on capital structure.  
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2.3.1 Credit Channels of Monetary Policy Transmission 
 
 
Changes in monetary policy are believed to be one of the main causes of credit supply 
fluctuations.  The traditional view  of how monetary policy works is based on  the 
special  characteristics  of  the  liability  side  of  the  banks’  balance  sheet.  When  the 
central bank  wishes to tighten monetary policy it  will drain the reserves from  the 
banking  system  thus  resulting  in  an  interest  rates  increase  and  a  reduction  of  the 
amount of money circulating in the economy. This of course will influence the cost of 
capital, expenditure on durable goods and ultimately the level of production. 
 
Nevertheless researchers have been arguing for the past 20 years or so, that monetary 
policy actions do not only affect the economy through money supply but also through 
a credit channel. As Bernanke and Gertler (1995) state, the traditional direct effects of 
monetary policy are amplified by the external finance premium; the difference in cost 
for a firm that chooses to raise external rather than internal finance, which is also a 
measure of credit market imperfections. According to the supporters of the ‘credit 
view’ (mentioned below in sections 2.3.1.1-2.3.1.2) , every change in interest rates 
caused  by  monetary  policy  actions  also  leads  to  a  same  direction  change  in  the 
external  finance  premium  that  firms  face.  This  of  course  magnifies  the  impact  of 
monetary policy in the economy. 
 
The two most prominent credit channel theories are the bank lending and the balance 
sheet channel.  
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2.3.1.1 The Bank Lending Channel 
 
While the traditional monetary policy theory works through the liabilities side of the 
banks’ balance sheets, the bank lending view suggests the use of the assets side, in 
other words the bank loans, instead.  
 
This suggestion makes the assumption that banks have a special role in the economy 
and this causes the bank loans to be imperfect substitutes with any other credit market 
security. This is supported by the views of Diamond (1984) and Fama (1985) who 
state that banks are indeed special since they are able, with their role as financial 
intermediaries, to gather specific information about borrowers and also monitor them 
on  behalf  of  the  depositors.  In  other  words  banks  help  to  lower  information 
asymmetry problems and other market frictions and extend credit to firms that would 
otherwise be unable to obtain it or pay very high external finance premiums. These 
firms are also known as ‘bank dependent’, a term that will be used in the rest of this 
study. 
 
The  key  point  of  the  bank  lending  theory  is  whether  or  not  a  monetary  policy 
tightening can reduce the bank loan supply merely by draining the banks’ reserves. 
This  of  course  will  cause  informational  opaque  firms  to  become  financially 
constrained. This is indeed something difficult to be observed in practice and has, 
even today, been a major difficulty of related studies. Is the reduction of bank lending 
really  due to an inward  shift in loan supply  or is  it  merely because the monetary 
policy contraction has caused lower levels of demand? 
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Despite  this  difficulty,  Bernanke  and  Blinder  (1988)  were  able  to  derive  a  bank 
lending model operating over and above the traditional IS-LM model. This model 
suggests  that  open  market  sales  by  the  Federal  Reserve  (that  drain  the  banks’ 
reserves) are also able to limit the supply of bank loans by reducing the banks’ access 
to loanable funds. Two key assumptions are necessary to hold in order for this theory 
to be valid: Firstly, that banks cannot easily replace their lost deposits by alternative 
sources of funds such as Certificates of Deposit (CD) or other securities. Secondly, 
that bank loans are imperfect substitutes with other securities. 
 
Of  the  two  assumptions  the  second  can  be  easily  accepted  because  informational 
asymmetries are logical to exist and sufficient evidence for their existence has been 
provided throughout the recent years (Myers and Majluf, 1984). The first assumption 
on the other hand is a bit more puzzling. In the U.S., the historical evidence clearly 
supports  it:  the  credit  crunch  of  1966  created  by  the  Federal  Reserve  imposing 
‘Regulation Q’ interest rate ceilings, is evidence enough. Nevertheless as Romer and 
Romer  (1990)  and  even  Bernanke  and  Gertler  (1995)  state,  the  deregulation  and 
liberalisation  of  the  credit  markets  have  made  the  bank  lending  model  provide  a 
poorer  description  of  reality  than  what  it  used  to.  Despite  this,  as  Bernanke  and 
Gertler (1995) mention the existence of a credit channel does not require banks to be 
totally incapable of replacing lost deposits. 
 
Several alternative methodologies have been derived to test the validity of the bank 
lending channel. The first one tried to find if money is a better predictor of economic 
activity than lending, by comparing the correlations between money-output and loans-
output.  One of the first papers that applied this was the one  by King  (1986).  His   68 
unrestricted vector auto regression results indicated that in contrast to bank lending 
theory, bank deposits seemed to be better predictors than bank assets. It should be 
taken into consideration though that, as Kashyap et al. (1993) state, correlation does 
not necessarily mean causation.  
 
Similar evidence was also reported by Romer and Romer (1990) while examining a 
number of monetary policy contraction episodes. The authors investigated the timing 
of the money-output and lending-output relationships; they found that money leads 
output  during  monetary  policy  shocks  and  not  at  other  times,  indicating  an 
independent causal relationship between money and output. On the contrary, no lag 
was found between lending and output either during or after monetary shocks. In a 
similar  study  though, conducted  by  Bernanke  and  Blinder  (1992),  a  lag  is  indeed 
reported. Despite the fact that after a monetary policy contraction the money stock 
falls immediately, bank loans also fall with a lag of 6-9 months. As the authors state, 
output and lending seems to move together thus supporting the existence of the bank 
lending theory. The different results of the two studies could be due to the authors 
choosing different indicators of monetary policy shifts. 
 
Of  course  even  if  monetary  policy  episodes  can  be  identified  correctly,  the 
identification of a causal relationship between lending and output is still problematic. 
Kashyap  et  al.  (1993)  tried  to  circumvent  around  that  problem  by  examining  the 
behavior of bank loans in relation to other finance substitutes, namely commercial 
paper.  According  to  the  authors,  if  a  monetary  policy  contraction  operated  solely 
through the money channel, a reduction in the demand of all credit products should be 
observed, including commercial paper. On the contrary, the mix of bank loans and   69 
commercial paper is severely changed after a monetary policy shock as bank loans 
decline while commercial paper issuances increase. 
 
Nevertheless, even when using this alternative methodology to test for the validity of 
the bank lending channel the evidence is contradictory. Oliner and Rudebusch (1995, 
1996a) enhance the research of Kashyap et al. (1993) in two main ways. Firstly, they 
include all forms of finance; short term bank loans, commercial paper and other forms 
of short-term debt. Through the use of this data the authors generate the ratio of short-
term bank loans to total short-term debt which is used as the dependent variable of 
their  analysis.  Oliner  and  Rudebusch  (1995,  1996a)  state  in  their  study  that  the 
inclusion solely of commercial paper and not of other sources of credit such as trade 
credit or bonds could seriously bias the results. Secondly, contrary to Kashyap et al. 
(1993), they use aggregated data in their empirical analysis. A data set of more than 
7,000 US manufacturing firms for the 1973-1991 period is constructed. Using this 
high  quality  dataset  Oliner  and  Rudebusch  (1995,  1996a)  are  able  to  make  a 
distinction  between  small  and  large  firms.  This  provides  useful  information  since 
commercial paper can be issued only by large, low risk firms. Since small firms are 
thought to bear the brunt of the bank lending channel the inclusion of solely larger, 
low risk companies can significantly affect the empirical findings.   
 
The results do not provide support to the bank lending theory since the mix of bank 
and  non-bank  debt  for  all  firms  remains  the  same  after  a  contraction  episode. 
Moreover the main conclusion is that all types of debt move from small to large firms 
and according to the authors this is what causes the results of Kashyap et al. (1993). 
The evidence of Oliner and Rudebusch (1995, 1996a) seems to indicate the existence   70 
of a broad credit channel, which will be discussed shortly, rather than that of a bank 
lending one. 
 
Contrary to Oliner and Rudebusch’s (1995, 1996a) findings Ludvigson (1998) reports 
results that support Kashyap et al. (1993). He investigates the existence of a bank 
lending channel through his examination of the US automobile industry during 1965-
1994. The author constructs a ratio of automobile credit to bank automobile credit to 
conduct his analysis. He examines whether the composition of automobile finance 
changes  in  response  to  an  unanticipated  movement  of  the  federal  funds  rate  and 
whether  this  change  affects  the  companies’  sales  levels.  The  author’s  vector 
autoregressive  empirical  analysis  indicates  that  a  contraction  of  monetary  policy 
causes a significant reduction in the supply of bank consumer loans and this produces 
a decline in real expenditure. 
  
Findings from other studies also fail to produce conclusive results. Fisher (1999) uses 
a  quantitative  equilibrium  model  allowing  for  credit  market  imperfections  while 
making a distinction between small and large firms. The author applied his partial 
equilibrium model in a US data set spanning 1984-1994. The existence of a bank 
lending channel is not verified. On the contrary Kim (1999), while examining the 
recent  financial  crisis  in  Korea  found  that  bank  lending  amplified  the  effects  of 
monetary  policy.  In  order  to  carry  out  his  analysis,  the  author  chose  to  examine 
several restrictive monetary policy episodes in a manner similar to that of Romer and 
Romer  (1990)  and  also  to  investigate  the  effects  of  monetary  shocks  to  banks’ 
primary assets while making a distinction between small and large banks. His results 
from  both  analyses  state  that  the  lending  channel  is  the  key  mechanism  for  the   71 
transmission  of  monetary  policy.  Nevertheless  the  co  existence  of  a  broad  credit 
channel cannot be excluded. 
 
Huang’s (2003) results from the UK also suggest that indeed tight money reduce bank 
loan  supply.  Huang  divides  firms  into  two  groups;  bank  and  non-bank  dependent 
according to their bank to total debt ratios. Furthermore the author employs a large 
panel data sample using balance sheet information of publicly listed firms. At the 
same  time  the  author  uses  a  dummy  variable  to  control  for  monetary  policy 
tightenings. Huang’s results show that bank loans and other debt instruments are not 
perfect substitutes since reductions in bank loans lead to a general reduction of debt. 
Furthermore  this  study  confirms  the  fact  that  bank  dependent  firms  are  credit 
constrained and this is especially so during negative monetary shocks.  
 
More recent studies have used an alternative methodology to investigate if a bank 
lending channel exists. These studies have made the assumption that only certain bank 
characteristics, such as size, liquidity and capitalisation, affect loan supply. On the 
other hand the demand for bank loans from potential  borrowers  is independent of 
these factors. This enables researches to distinguish between loan supply and loan 
demand movements and therefore investigate the existence of a bank lending channel. 
More specifically this hypothesis predicts that, if a bank lending channel exists, after a 
tightening of monetary policy small, illiquid and less capitalised banks will have to 
reduce their lending more than their larger, liquid and well capitalised counterparts. 
This of course occurs due to informational frictions and higher costs in raising non-
secured deposits. 
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Under this set of assumptions Kashyap and Stein (2000) conduct two-step estimations 
while using quarterly US commercial banks data for the 1976-1993 period (930,788 
observations). Their findings show that the impact of monetary policy is more evident 
on smaller banks with less liquid balance sheets and that the bank lending channel 
does exist.  
 
The studies  of  Kishan  and  Opiela  (2000)  and  Van  den  Heuvel  (2002) focus  their 
attention  on  the  relationship  between  bank  capital  and  monetary  policy.  Van  den 
Heuvel (2002) argues in his theoretical paper that banks with lower capital ratios are 
more affected by monetary policy contractions and this indicates the existence of a 
bank lending channel. This hypothesis  is empirically tested  by Kishan and Opiela 
(2000)  who  extract  data  from  the  banks’  Call  Reports  and  construct  a  data  set 
covering 1980-1995 with 13,042 banks in the US.  The authors divide banks into six 
asset sizes and then further subdivide each group into three more according to capital 
leverage ratios.  Kishan and  Opiela (2000) conclude that  the  banks’ asset size and 
capital levels affect their ability to raise funds and maintain loan growth during an 
economic contraction. These results clearly support the existence of a bank lending 
channel. 
 
In his Italian study Gambacorta (2005) utilises a data set containing 759 banks and 
35,678  observations  and  uses  a  second  data  set  extracted  from  Bankscope  as  a 
robustness measure. The author constructs a regression model that investigates the 
growth rate of lending using GMM estimators. Gambacorta’s (2005) results support 
the existence of a bank lending channel and show that liquid, well capitalised banks 
are  less  affected  by  monetary  policy  tightenings  and  that  the  factor  of  size  is   73 
irrelevant. Similar results come from Altunbas et al. (2009) who consider the effects 
of securitisation on loan supply. They extract data from Bankscope and Eurostat and 
create a data set of 2,948 banks from 12 EU countries. The authors conduct a GMM 
regression analysis of a similar form to that of Gambacorta (2005) and conclude that 
securitisation shelter’s banks from the effects of monetary policy thus dampening the 
effects of a bank lending channel. 
 
2.3.1.2 The Balance Sheet Channel 
 
The balance sheet channel, derived by Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), tells a similar 
story to the lending view with a major difference being that bank loans do not have a 
special role in the economy. This second credit channel theory instead focuses on all 
forms of external finance.  
 
As  the  traditional  Keynesian  theory  suggests,  when  a  monetary  policy  tightening 
occurs,  interest  rates  rise.  This  directly  affects  the  borrowers’  balance  sheets  by 
increasing their interest expenses and also reducing their net cash flows. Furthermore, 
rising interest rates contribute to a decrease on the value of the firms’ asset prices 
which they can use as collateral to obtain external finance. Finally, a contraction in 
the economy will also lower spending, thereby indirectly decreasing the borrowers’ 
revenues.  
 
It can be easily understood, as Gertler and Gilchrist (1993, 1994) have argued, that all 
this  will  cause  the  borrowers’  balance  sheets  to  deteriorate,  thus  increasing  their 
external finance premium and affect their supply of funds. As Bernanke and Gertler   74 
(1995)  have  stated  the  reason  for  this  deterioration  is  that  this  external  finance 
premium reflects the credit markets’ imperfections. More specifically they report that 
moral  hazard  and  adverse  selection  issues  exist  and  make  banks  more  hesitant  to 
extend loans to informational opaque firms with low valued assets that can be used as 
collateral. It is also to be expected that small and large firms will not be affected in the 
same way. In their research, Gertler and Gilchrist (1993, 1994) investigated these two 
groups separately throughout several economic crises during which the differences 
between them were expected to be more severe. 
 
Their results verified the fact that internal finance and investment spending are more 
closely connected during and after a monetary policy tightening than at other times. 
This of course is in accordance with the broad credit theory since if it was not, the 
earlier mentioned relationship would be stable throughout time. More specifically, the 
authors found that after a contraction of the economy, large secure firms are able to 
maintain  their  production  levels  by  obtaining  short-tem  borrowing  at  least 
temporarily,  while  smaller  high  growth  companies  with  limited  access  to  credit 
markets reduce their inventories almost immediately.  
 
Consistent results for the balance sheet channel also come from Oliner and Rudebusch 
(1996b).  In  this  paper,  the  authors  examined  the  link  between  liquidity  and  real 
spending for small and large firms and for a larger number of monetary shocks than 
previous studies while using quarterly data thus creating a richer data sample. Their 
results confirmed the existence of the broad credit theory.  
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Evidence that confirms the existence of a balance sheet channel comes from Bernanke 
et al. (1996). Even thought the authors never actually mention the term “balance-sheet 
channel” in their study, they state that a “financial accelerator” amplifies the adverse 
shocks in an economy. More specifically, they mention that small firms or households 
face  significant  agency  costs  of  borrowing  and  are  likely  to  bear  the  brunt  of  a 
monetary policy tightening. Furthermore during a macroeconomic shock, and due to a 
flight to quality, small firms and households should experience a reduced access to 
credit in relation to other borrowers that face fewer information asymmetries. This 
will  reduce  the  economic  activity  of  these  high  agency  cost  borrowers  and  thus 
magnify the  effects of the economic  downturn. This hypothesis is very close to a 
balance sheet channel. Bernanke et al. (1996) use a large panel data set taken from the 
Department of Commerce’s Quarterly Financial Reports (QFR) and verify the validity 
of the hypothesis mentioned above. 
 
Of  great  importance  for  the  validity  of  the  balance  sheet  channel  are  the  results 
coming  from  Angeloni  et  al.  (2003).  Their  book,  includes  the  results  of  a  major 
research initiative, instigated by the European Central Bank, to study the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy. As far as the validity of the balance sheet channel is 
concerned,  the  findings  are  mixed.  The  joint  reading  of  both  micro  and  macro 
evidence indicate that the classical interest rate channel is sufficient to explain the 
economical response to monetary policy. Nevertheless micro estimates support the 
idea that there are systematic cash flows effects on firms’ expenditures and that bank 
lending amplifies, at least to some extent, the traditional channel of monetary policy. 
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Supportive  evidence  comes  from  Cantillo  and  Wright  (2000).  Their  firm  specific 
panel  data  allows  their  study  to  examine  the  credit  channel  from  a  different 
perspective. While investigating how firms choose their lenders over different phases 
of  the  business  cycle  the  authors  lend  support  to  the  broad  credit  channel  while 
rejecting  the  lending  view.  They  report  that  the  flight  to  quality  story,  especially 
during economic downturns, holds.  
 
These findings seem to generally be in agreement with the views of the scientific 
community on the matter. As Bernanke and Gertler (1995) state “the existence of a 
balance sheet channel seems fairly well established”. Nevertheless the same cannot be 
said  for  the  lending  view  for  which,  as  mentioned  earlier,  research  has  provided 
controversial  results.  Despite  this,  literature  seems  to  indicate  with  certainty  that 
monetary  shocks  do  affect  the  supply  of  funds  to  firms  and  furthermore  that  this 
causes a large number of them to become financial constrained.    
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2.3.2 Credit Rationing 
 
 
As well as the monetary policy based credit theories, many researchers have pointed 
out  the  significance  of  credit  rationing  on  its  own.  Jaffe  and  Russell  (1976)  and 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) have stated that, even in equilibrium the demand for loans 
exceeds the supply at the ruling price (in this case the interest rate) due to information 
asymmetries that exist. 
 
As we know, the standard economic theory states that in every market an equilibrium 
level (or else market clearing) exists where the supply equals the demand. The credit 
rationing theory predicts that in the bank credit market another kind of equilibrium 
exists and it is established when the bank optimal interest rate is reached. This is due 
to adverse selection and moral hazard problems. More specifically, borrowers who are 
willing to pay high interest rates probably bear more risk. They are willing to receive 
a high interest loan simply because they know that the probability of repaying it is 
quite low. On the other hand banks also realise that safer projects will drop out when 
interest rates increase too much, thus banks that operate rationally are reluctant to 
accept the higher interest rates that are being offered to them.  
 
Therefore, due to the default risk the banks will not raise their interest above the bank 
optimal level because above it the expected return of the loan can only be lower. Thus 
in the bank optimal rate the demand will not equal the supply, with supply being the 
shorter  end  of  the  stick.  This  of  course  will  create  an  unsatisfied  clientele  of 
financially constrained firms.  
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In  order  to  portray  a  better  picture  of  the  credit  rationing  argument  to  the  reader 
figures  4  and  5  have  been  included.  ρ  and 
* ρ  denote  the  expected  return  and 
maximum expected return of bank lending respectively while r and 
* r stand for the 
loan rate and the optimal loan rate. 
d L depicts loan demand and 
S L shows the loan 
supply curve. In figure 4 the reader can see that ρ  is an increasing function of r  up 
until the optimal rate 
* r ; from that point on it becomes a decreasing function of r . 
Hence, this is a visualisation of the Stiglitz and Weiss’s (1981) argument that there is 
a quadratic relationship between ρ  and r . This of course implies the existence of a 
backward  bent  supply  curve  of  bank  lending  which  can  be  seen  in  figure  5.  The 
authors state that the existence of this backward bent supply curve is due to the fact 
that adverse selection problems exist within the economy and the loan rate operates as 
a  screening  devise.  Therefore,  as  was  stated  earlier,  credit  is  rationed  and  an 
unsatisfied clientele exists and is depicted as ED in figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 4 
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Figure 5 
 
Further research examining the credit rationing argument has been conducted. On a 
theoretical  level  Amano  (1999)  stated  that  credit  rationing  exists  and  that  its 
magnitude  depends  on  the  banks’  information  cost  function  and  on  monetary 
conditions.  Hellmann  and  Stiglitz  (2000)  showed  that  credit  rationing  and  equity 
rationing exist and can occur either individually or simultaneously. Moreover recent 
studies  seem  to  acknowledge  the  existence  of  credit  rationing  and  support  its 
existence  with  their  results.  Nevertheless  the  empirical  verification  of  the  credit 
rationing argument has been difficult to prove for the past 20 years or so. As with the 
credit channels of monetary policy it is difficult to ascertain if the reduced credit is 
due to constraints of supply or demand by the use of aggregate data.  
 
Berger  and  Udell  (1992)  while  examining  a  large  number  of  US  loan  contracts 
observed that the amount of new loans issued under commitment does not increase 
during  periods of economic contraction;  according to credit  rationing  the  opposite 
should happen. Moreover, contradictory data comes from the Calomoiris’ et al. (1995) 
study of commercial paper. Commercial paper is an alternative form of finance to 
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bank loans; large and safe firms that are able to issue it are expected to do so during 
economic  downturns  according  to  credit  rationing.  This  is  indeed  verified  from 
Calomoiris et al. (1995), nevertheless while commercial paper issuance seems to be 
counter cyclical at the firm level it also appears to be pro cyclical at the aggregate 
level. 
 
Despite all this credit rationing seems to be gaining support throughout the years. 
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) incorporate the rationing argument into their study of 
capital structure and draw valuable insights on financial policy decisions. Shen (2002) 
using  Taiwan  bank  loans’  transaction  data  and  performing  a  qualitative  research 
during  the  Asian  crisis  was  able  to  document  the  existence  of  credit  rationing. 
Furthermore, Steijvers (2004) while using a panel data disequilibrium model finds 
that a large portion of Belgian SMEs is rationed of credit. It is clear that in recent 
years the existence of disequilibrium in the credit markets is more and more widely 
accepted by the scientific community.           
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2.3.3 Financial Constraints and Capital Structure 
 
As mentioned in section 2.3.1, the bank lending channel and the balance sheet channel 
state that monetary shocks can affect the supply of credit within the economy. The 
credit  rationing  theory  argues  that  disequilibrium  in  the  bank  loan  market  causes 
credit to become rationed. All three theories predict that a large number of firms at 
some point are likely to face financial constraints; it is easy to understand that these 
constraints would seriously affect any financial policy decisions. 
 
Several  studies  have  in  the  past  recorded  the  existence  of  financially  constrained 
firms.  Fazzari et al.  (1988)  investigated  why internal and external finance are  not 
perfect substitutes and how market imperfections affect corporate investment. Cantillo 
and Wright (2000), through cross-sectional probit regressions tried to find out what 
are  the  determinants  that  lead  firms  to  become  bond  or  commercial  paper  rated. 
Whited (1992) by estimating the Euler equation of an investment model, investigated 
the information asymmetry problems that financially unhealthy firms face in order to 
obtain external finance.  
 
All these studies were able to derive some important conclusions. Large and mature 
companies with high collateral values that can tap the credit markets face far less 
restrictions than smaller, younger firms that frequently have to rely on banks to obtain 
external finance. Furthermore  during  economic downturns  the financial constraints 
that smaller firms face become much more severe while larger firms seem to at least 
partially  mitigate  these  problems.  This  is  because  banks,  even  during  monetary 
tightenings and financial crises, will still be willing to provide credit to large firms 
with high collateral values. These firms will also be able to raise money easily by   82 
issuing public debt due to the fewer information asymmetry problems they face. On 
the contrary, smaller bank depended and low collateral valued firms will not be able 
to receive the much needed bank credit and will not have access to public markets. 
The only solution will be to issue equity, but even in this case the shareholders are 
likely to require a premium to purchase these shares. 
 
Several  studies  have  drawn  the  same  conclusions  by  indirectly  testing  for  the 
existence  of  financial  constraints.  Calomoiris  et  al.  (1995)  through  a  panel  data 
regression analysis found that large firms use commercial paper to finance inventory 
accumulation during economic downturns, while at the same time assist smaller firms 
by  providing  them  with  trade  credit,  thus  increasing  their  accounts  receivable. 
Moreover,  Kashyap  et  al.  (1994)  while  examining  the  movement  in  inventory 
investment, concluded, that firms without public credit access are severely liquidity 
constrained throughout monetary policy tightenings. Furthermore in a recent study 
Miyajima  and  Yafeh  (2007)  calculated  abnormal  stock  returns  of  Japanese  non-
financial firms. Their findings show that major events associated with the banking 
crisis of the 90’s disproportionately affected small firms with limited access to bond 
finance, high levels of leverage and low profits. 
 
Financial constraints are also recorded by studies on inventory investments. Carpenter 
et al. (1994) use quarterly panel data of US manufacturing firms to investigate the 
relationship between internal finance and inventory investment. They find that this 
relationship is much more significant for small firms during economic recessions. The 
same results are reported by Dimitrov and Tice (2006) who confirm that corporate 
diversification at least partially alleviates credit constraints for bank dependent firms.   83 
In the UK, Guariglia (1999, 2000) conducts two separate studies using both times 
annual firm balance sheet data. In 2000 she incorporates capital market imperfections 
in the classical linear quadratic inventory model and in 1999 she conducts a study 
using a GMM estimator in which inventories are split into work in progress and raw 
materials.  Both  papers  record  financial  constraints  for  firms  especially  during 
monetary tightenings. 
  
Direct tests for the existence of financial constraints are also available. Ogawa and 
Suzuki (1999) for the market of Japan and Atanasova and Wilson (2004) for the UK 
market derive a disequilibrium model for the bank credit markets using firm specific 
panel data that is able to classify firms as financially constrained or unconstrained.  
More specifically Atanasova and Wilson (2004) use a panel data set containing 6101 
UK firms years during the 1989-1999 period. They derive a bank lending model that 
consists of  a demand equation, a  supply equation and  a transaction equation.  The 
supply  and  demand  equations  include  vectors  that  contain  exogenous  variables: 
activity, size, substitutes and loan premium are included in the supply equation while 
collateral, risk and monetary conditions for the supply equation.  
 
The innovation of this methodology is that firms are classified endogenously rather 
than previous studies, such as that of Fazarri et al. (1988), that made this classification 
a priori. Ogawa and Suzuki (1999) find that the portion of constrained firms follows a 
similar trend with that of monetary policy. More specifically in 1980 60 % of the 
firms  were  facing  financial  constraints;  this  number  declined  along  with  the 
introduction of the bullish markets of the 80’s only to come up again in the early 90’s 
after the collapse of the land market. Atanasova and Wilson (2004) provide similar   84 
conclusions; on average a 42% of the sample is classified as borrowed constrained 
while this number is increasing during the 1990-1992 recession.  
 
Entirely different methods of examining financial constraints come from D’Espallier 
et al. (2008), Hovakimian (2009) and Hovakimian and Hovakimian (2009). It should 
be  stated  that  these  studies  as  well  as  those  of  Ogawa  and  Suzuki  (1999)  and 
Atanasova  and  Wilson  (2004)  do  not  include  any  ex-ante  criteria  of  classifying 
companies into financially constrained or unconstrained.  
 
Hovakimian  and  Hovakimian  (2009)  examine  the  relationship  between  cash  flow 
sensitivity and financial constraints. The authors state that traditional ex-ante financial 
constraint  indicators,  such  as  size  or  dividend  payout,  are  able  to  successfully 
distinguish  firms  that  face  financial  constraints.  Nevertheless  the  power  of  these 
indicators is weakened if they are used to distinguish between periods of light and 
relaxed  constraints.  Contrary  to  this  methodology  Hovakimian  and  Hovamikiam 
(2009) make no prior assumptions but instead empirically identify firms of high/low 
cash flow sensitivity and then investigate their investment and financing decisions 
across  the  cash  flow  cycle.  They  utilise  a  data  set  of  7176  US  firms,  excluding 
financial institutions, during the 1985-2003 period and conduct fixed effects panel 
regressions.  They  conclude  that  cash  flow  sensitive  companies  face  financial 
constraints in years of low cash flows while in years of high cash flows they are able 
to overinvest and build financial slack. 
 
In a similar fashion to Hovakimian and Hovakimian (2009), Hovakimian (2009) also 
investigates the determinants of cash flow sensitivity on a data set including 3445 of   85 
the largest US, manufacturing firms from 1985 to 2004. The author conducts firm 
level estimates of the cash flow sensitivity of investment and uses these estimates to 
classify  companies  into  groups  of  high,  low  and  negative  cash  flow  sensitivity. 
Hovakimian’s (2009) conclusions indicate that firms characterised as negative cash 
flow sensitive, have the lowest cash flows and the highest growth opportunities face 
the highest financial constraints. 
 
D’Espallier  et  al.  (2008)  investigate  the  ability  of  a  model  to  capture  financial 
constraints  and  focus  their  examination  in  Belgium  utilising  a  data  set  of  2,000 
manufacturing SMEs from  2000 to 2004. The authors compute two different firm 
specific  models  using  GMM  estimators:  the  cash  flow  sensitivity  of  investment 
(CFSI) and the cash flow sensitivity of cash (CFSC) model. D’Espallier et al.’s (2008) 
results indicate that the CFSI is superior to the CFSC model and that companies with 
high CFSI values face financial constraints. 
 
Financial constraints have also been recorded in studies, such as those of Li (2006) 
and Bond et al. (1999), that examinine other firm activities like employment, R&D 
expenditure, exporting behavior and growth in general. In any case, the evidence in 
support of credit market imperfections that make firms (mostly smaller ones) face 
severe problems in obtaining external finance, especially during economic downturns, 
is overwhelming. This should be incorporated by modern capital structure theories in 
order to provide a much better understanding of today’s financial policies decisions. 
In fact, several recently published papers seem to do exactly that, thus slowly starting 
to derive a new capital structure theory.  
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2.3.4 The Role of Trade Credit 
 
Trade credit, a company’s open account arrangements with its vendors, is an integral 
part  of  the  firms’  external  finance.  More  specifically  Rajan  and  Zingales  (1995) 
reported that in 1991 trade credit corresponded to 17.8% of the American firms’ total 
assets, 22% for the total assets of UK firms and approximately 25% of the total assets 
for the companies based in the major economies of continental Europe. Similar results 
were reported by Elliehausen and Wolken (1993) stating that for non-bank non-farm 
companies trade credit was equivalent to 20% of their total liabilities and 35% of their 
total assets. Finally, the more recent study of Kohler et al. (2000) showed that in the 
UK, trade credit accounted for 70% of the total short-term debt and 50% of the total 
credit the firms’ received.  
 
It  is  thus  surprising  how  little attention  trade  credit  has  received as  far as  capital 
structure research is concerned. Most studies hardly mention the role that trade credit 
plays and the implications it has on financial policy decisions. Nevertheless recent 
papers  have  started  examining  the  relationship  between  trade  credit  and  the 
predominant form of external finance, bank loans, as well as the effects that monetary 
policy has on trade credit. 
 
One of the first studies that examined the role of trade credit was that of Meltzer 
(1960).  He  reported  that  during  monetary  tightenings,  firms  expected  to  be  credit 
rationed receive trade credit from companies with large cash balances that step in to 
fill  the  gap  created  by  banks.  These  findings  conclude  that  this  intra-firm  credit 
channel, named as “trade credit channel”, at least partially mitigates the traditional 
credit channel. This is predominantly known as the financial assistance view.    87 
 
Meltzer’s (1960) results were also confirmed by a theoretical model developed in the 
more recent study of Repullo and Suarez (2000). In this paper the authors categorize 
companies, according to their wealth, into those that can receive bank credit and those 
that  cannot.  When  trade  credit  is  introduced  in  this  framework,  firms  with 
intermediate wealth can obtain funding for their projects  
 
2.3.4.1. US Evidence 
 
Several  papers  for  the  US  presented  supportive  evidence  towards  the  substitution 
hypothesis brought forward by Meltzer (1960). Brechling and Lipsey (1963) reported 
that  trade  credit  rises  during  monetary  tightenings.  Petersen  and  Rajan  (1997) 
gathered more detailed data than previous studies by using both the National Survey 
of Small Business Finance ( hereinafter NSSBF) and compustat. They used firm-level 
data and performed an OLS regression analysis suggesting that trade credit is more 
expensive than institutional finance, and that companies use more trade credit when 
private debt cannot be obtained. 
 
Danielson and Scott (2000) also provided support to Meltzer’s (1960) hypothesis by 
utilising firm-level data from the 1995 Credit, Banks and Small Business survey. The 
results indicated that credit rationing explains a portion of the demand for trade credit. 
Ng et al. (1999) took into consideration the effective price of a loan and stated that a 
company will choose to switch from institutional finance to trade credit only when the 
cost of the latter is lower. They state this is more likely to happen during an economic 
recession.     88 
 
Nilsen  (2002)  uses  aggregated  data  and  conducts  an  OLS  time  series  analysis  on 
accounts payable taking into consideration the existence of credit ratings. His findings 
document  an  increase  of  trade  credit  received  by  small  firms  or  firms  without 
sufficient  collateralised  assets,  assumed  to  face  credit  rationing,  during  monetary 
tightenings. Nevertheless Nilsen (2002) reports that size by itself does not tell the 
entire story since even large firms have to resort to using the more expensive trade 
credit. According to the author, the key indicator of credit rationing is not size but the 
existence of credit ratings since large companies with a credit rating are not forced 
into using trade credit during economic recessions. 
 
Further evidence towards the usage of trade credit by financially constrained firms 
comes from Choi and Kim (2003). The authors are the first to perform a panel data 
analysis  for  trade  credit  in  the  US  where  fixed  effects  estimators  are  used.  They 
construct  a  dataset  of  firms  listed  in  the  S&P  500  and  of  smaller  non-S&P  500 
companies. Their study revolves around key monetary policy contraction episodes, as 
those defined by Romer and Romer (1990), and examines accounts payable, accounts 
receivable and net trade credit.  The findings of this study reveal that the inter-firm 
liquidity  market  becomes  more  active  and  accounts  payable  and  receivable  rise 
significantly when a recession is occurring. This evidence supports the role of trade 
credit as a substitute of other forms of external finance. Nevertheless Choi and Kim 
(2003) also point out that there is no evidence of large firms extending more trade 
credit than small ones during an economic contraction. 
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Contrary  evidence  to  trade  credit  acting  solely  as  a  substitute  for  other  forms  of 
external finance are presented by Alphonse et al. (2003) who conduct research on 
small  US  businesses  by  using  data  from  the  NSSBF.  They  run  a  simultaneous 
equation model with the two stages least squares method and find that trade credit acts 
as a substitute and a supplement to bank debt. They report that even though credit 
constrained companies resort to trade credit, the more they use it the more indebted 
they become to banks. The authors conclude that trade credit also operates as a signal 
of the companies’ quality, lowering informational asymmetry problems. This reveals 
to  banks  private  information  which  results  to  them  being  willing  to  extend  bank 
credit. This is in accordance with the signalling theory of trade credit initially derived 
by Biais and Gollier (1997).  It should be stated though that the results of Alphonse et 
al. (2003), in contrast to similar studies, did not revolve around or include a period of 
monetary tightening. 
 
2.3.4.2 International Evidence 
 
Several papers examining the role of trade credit using international data have also 
been  published.  Kohler  et  al.  (2000)  investigate  the  existence  of  the  trade  credit 
channel  by  constructing  a  large  panel  data  set  of  UK  public  companies  by  using 
DataStream. The authors perform a regression analysis using fixed effects estimators. 
The  investigation  of  the  extended,  received  and  net  trade  credit  showed  that 
companies with access to capital markets help out bank dependent firms, during a 
monetary contraction, by extending trade credit.  
 
Supportive  results  come  from  Guariglia  and  Mateut  (2006)  who  conduct  an 
examination of inventory investment for a panel data set of UK firms. Their results   90 
indicate that the inventory investment of small firms with low usage of trade credit is 
much more sensitive to monetary shocks than other firms that do utilise trade credit.  
Mateut et al. (2006) confirm the role of trade credit as a substitute to bank debt. They 
construct a  large  panel  data  set  of  UK  manufacturing  firms and  by  running  fixed 
effects regression equations  find that  during monetary shocks the amount  of bank 
loans severely decreases while trade credit rises. This phenomenon is more apparent 
for small sized firms. 
 
Rodriguez (2006) examines SMEs in the Canary Islands by gathering a panel data set 
and performing a GMM estimation. Rodriguez (2006) uses a large set of explanatory 
variables  and  concludes  that  companies  that  are  of  a  small  size,  young  age,  low 
liquidity and belonging to the commerce branch of activity, are the ones that depend 
the  most  on trade  credit.  Furthermore,  the  results  indicate  that  trade  credit indeed 
helps mitigate informational asymmetries for informational opaque companies.   
 
Love et al. (2007) collect firm level data from six emerging economies and perform 
fixed effects regression analyses. Their study covers four major financial crises over 
the  globe  while  examining  accounts  payable,  receivable  and  net  trade  credit.  The 
conclusions drawn suggest that even though at the peak of an economic recession 
trade credit is increased, immediately after it suddenly collapses. Moreover they state 
that, in contrast to Rodriguez’s (2006) findings, companies with high liquidity extend 
more trade credit and receive less from their suppliers. 
 
Finally Valderrama (2003), conducts research based on Austrian companies for the 
period  1994-1999.  The  author  conducts  a  two  step  GMM  Arellano-Bond  (1991)   91 
analysis and its results suggest that if firms face a lower loan supply they will be able 
to circumvent around this credit squeeze through the use of trade credit. Valderrama 
(2003) supports Guariglia and Mateut’s (2006) findings by stating that trade credit can 
be  used  to  reduce  the  sensitivity  of  the  firms’  inventory  investment  if  used  as  a 
substitute of private debt. 
 
2.3.4.3 Evidence against the Trade Credit Channel 
 
Nevertheless  several  international  studies  report  evidence  against  the  financial 
assistance view of trade credit. Blasio (2003) investigates the role of trade credit in 
Italy which is described by the author as the perfect testing ground since Italian firms 
report very high levels of trade credit in their balance sheets. He uses a panel set of 
firm level data covering a period of 18 years that includes five monetary shocks. The 
fixed effects regression analysis reports results confirming that trade credit acts as a 
substitute to bank credit during economic recessions but its effect is quite modest. 
Another  Italian  based  study  by  Marotta  (1997)  also  revolving  around  monetary 
contractions contradicts the results of Meltzer (1960). As in previous studies, panel 
data are used and fixed effects estimators utilised. The results for trade credit and debt 
provide no support to the view that small, possibly credit constrained firms are able to 
shield themselves from monetary shocks by using trade credit. 
 
In the UK, Wilson et al. (2004) collected panel firm level data from the UK Credit 
Reference  Agency  database  and  employed  fixed  effects  estimators  to  conduct  the 
empirical analysis. Their conclusion was that even around monetary tightenings the 
effect of trade credit was minor. Small firms, even financially distressed ones, receive   92 
more trade credit during a recession but also extend more. The authors suggest that 
this  behaviour  could  be  one  of  the  reasons  that  small  firms  go  bankrupt  during 
monetary tightenings. 
 
Last but not least Fukuda et al. (2006) report findings from Japan. They employ a 
panel data analysis and investigate solely non-listed companies from the late 90s to 
the early 2000s covering the Japanese banking crisis of 98. Their results indicate that 
during financial turbulence the substitution hypothesis between trade credit and bank 
loans does not hold. This is rather surprising since it is during monetary tightenings 
that the trade credit channel should be more apparent. The authors state that both bank 
loans  and  trade  credit  contract  simultaneously  during  the  crisis.  Furthermore  they 
conclude that trade credit is a limited substitute to private debt due to the fact that it is 
tied to the purchase of goods and because the suppliers demand repayment within a 
short time period. 
 
 
2.3.4.4 Is Trade Credit Important? 
 
 
After reviewing the existing literature on trade credit it is made clear that trade credit 
is an important factor  in corporate finance. The  majority  of papers in this subject 
generally  agree  with  the  fact  that,  especially  during  economic  recessions,  a  trade 
credit  channel  exists.  In  other  words  during  monetary  contractions firms  of either 
small size or those lacking access to capital markets are financially constrained and 
use trade credit as a substitute for bank loans. Therefore it is strongly recommended 
that future capital structure studies should start taking into consideration trade credit 
when financial policy decisions are examined.   93 
 
Nevertheless this view for trade credit has received evidence against its validity. As 
Mateut (2005) states more research is still to be done if we are to fully understand the 
role of trade credit in relation to monetary conditions. Indeed an examination of the 
current credit crunch around the  globe could  provide  invaluable  results that  could 
finally  ascertain  the  role  of  trade  credit as  a  substitute  of  other forms  of  external 
finance during turbulent economic periods.   
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2.3.5 Towards a new Capital Structure Theory 
 
Bank  loan  supply  movements,  credit  market  imperfections  and  all  kinds  of  other 
financial  constraints  receive  attention  by  the  latest  capital  structure  studies.  The 
reasons  are  sound;  if  firms  are  indeed  facing  constraints  then  this  would  directly 
influence the financial policy decisions the CEOs make. If for example a small firm 
during an economic crisis is not able to receive a much needed bank loan it will have 
to  issue equity  instead. These  market imperfections  could  be the  missing piece in 
order to understand and solve the puzzle of capital structure. 
 
Faulkender  and  Petersen’s  (2006)  paper  was  one  of  the  first  that  attempted  to 
effectively  incorporate  credit  frictions  directly  into  capital  structure  research.  The 
authors performed a panel data leverage study taking into consideration if a firm has 
access to public bond markets or not. The results were striking; firms with access had 
on  average  35  %  higher  debt  levels  even  after  controlling  for  firm  specific 
characteristics that according to past research affect financial policy decisions. This 
according  to  the  authors  was  due  to  information  asymmetries  that  prevented  the 
smaller, informational opaque firms from tapping either the public markets or from 
receiving bank loans. The authors also pointed out that financial constraints could be 
the main cause behind the large number of firms that were found to be under levered 
according to Graham (2000). 
 
Moreover Kisgen (2006) extends Faulkender and Petersen’s (2006) paper by being 
the first study to directly investigate how an upgrade or a downgrade of a firm’s credit 
rating affects its capital structure. The author used pooled time-series cross-section 
regressions while using a dummy variable to distinguish firms that are approaching a   95 
change of rating. Kisgen’s (2006) findings show that companies that are near this 
change issue less debt instead relying on equity. It should also be mentioned that if the 
credit rating dummy variables are added to Shyam- Sunder and Myers (1999) trade-
off vs. pecking order models they remain statistically significant.  
 
For the market of Japan, Hosono (2003) with the use of a panel data regression model 
examined  the  movement  of  the  ratio  of  bank  loans  to  loans  and  bonds  for 
manufacturing firms. Moreover probit models that investigated the probability of a 
firm issuing a straight or an equity related bond were also utilised.  He found that high 
growth or high collateral firms rely mostly on equity rather than debt. Nevertheless 
should  companies  decide  to  issue  debt,  firms  with  many  investment  opportunities 
choose  bank  loans  and  well  collateralised  ones  depend  on  bonds.  Hosono  (2003) 
however, focused solely on the period 1990-1996 which was between the burst of the 
land  bubble  of  the  late  80s  and  the  banking  crisis  of  1998  onwards.  Excluding  a 
severe economic downturn Hosono (2003) has excluded two time periods in which 
financial constraints would be the most severe. 
 
Bougheas et al. (2006) conducted a regression analysis using UK firm level panel data 
and taking short term and total debt ratios as dependent variables. The authors used 
dummy  variables  for  each  year  of  their  data  sample;  they  found  that  monetary 
conditions  play  an  important  effect  in  debt  ratios  levels  and  that  young,  risky 
companies are affected the most. They reported the existence of a credit channel and 
concluded  that  firm  characteristics  can  result  in  the  magnifying,  or  lessening,  of 
monetary shocks.  
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Brav  (2004),  for  the  U.K.  market,  performed  a  capital  structure  study  that 
distinguished between privately and publicly traded firms. Using a firm specific panel 
data set, Brav (2004) concluded that private firms have much higher leverage levels 
than their public counterparts and also that they are much more sensitive to cash flow 
fluctuations.  Moreover  private  firms  are  less  likely  to  raise  any  kind  of  external 
finance and in the case that they do, they are most likely to choose debt. He states that 
these  differences  between  the  groups  of  firms  arise  due  to  transaction  costs  and 
market imperfections which namely include frictions in the supply of capital. 
 
Recently Leary (2009) a priori divides firms according to size into bank dependent 
and  non  bank  dependent  ones.  He  revolves  his  research  around  severe  financial 
incidents; the introduction of CDs which resulted in an economic boom and the credit 
crunch of 1966 which brought an economic downturn. Leary (2009) then performs 
panel data regression analyses on debt ratios, the mix of bank loans and public debt 
that firms have and finally on the firms’ choice of issuing debt or equity. His results 
show that bank dependent firms increase (decrease) their leverage ratios following an 
expansion (contraction) of bank credit. Furthermore when bank credit is scarce, non 
bank dependent firms issue public debt while bank dependent firms issue equity. He 
concluded  that  bank  loan  supply  frictions  are  important  especially  for  small  bank 
dependent companies. 
 
As a final note, and as discussed in section 2.3.4, recent studies have focused on the 
role of trade credit. The existing literature on capital structure has, for its most part, 
excluded trade credit as an important factor. Nevertheless studies such as those of 
Atanasova and  Wilson (2004),  Guariglia and Mateut  (2006),  Mateut et al.  (2006),   97 
Love et al. (2007) and Rodriguez (2006) have shown that trade credit is utilised by 
financially constrained firms as a substitute of bank credit, especially during monetary 
policy  contraction  episodes.  The  results  of  these  papers  clearly  indicate that  trade 
credit should be taken into consideration in future capital structure studies and will 
help improve our understanding of the field. 
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2.4.0 The Japanese Case 
 
This  study will focus  in the Japanese  market.  Japan, the world’s second strongest 
economy, is ideal as a natural experiment ground for the investigation of the effect 
that credit supply fluctuations have on firms’ capital structure. During the past 20 
years or so, two major economic events have occurred; the creation and burst of the 
‘land value bubble’ that started in the mid 80s and ended in the late 80s and the recent 
credit crunch that started during the Japanese banking crisis of 1998.  
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2.4.1 Economic Booms & Downturns 
 
During  the  late  1980s  Japan  was  witnessing  an  unprecedented  economic  boom. 
Japanese asset prices sky rocketed, real GDP growth had an average annual rate of 
4.74% while the Nikkei 225 index peaked at ¥ 38,916 on 29 December 1989. Land 
value prices also followed a similar course; in the end of 1989 the land value of Japan 
was worth four times the land value of the U.S. At the same time Japanese capital 
outflows increased at a tremendous rate. Several analysts were stating that in the late 
80s Japanese money seemed to flood the world. Well known examples include the 
purchase of the Rockefeller center and Columbia pictures by Japanese investors. Bank 
lending of course was no exception, it rose by an averaged 9% each year during the 
second half of the 80s.  
 
All this came to a stop when the ‘land value bubble’ burst near the end of 1989. As 
expected, when land values collapsed, the Nikkei index plummeted below ¥ 24,000 in 
1991 and reached ¥ 13,000 in June 2001. GDP growth during the 90’s averaged only 
1.26%. The money of the Japanese investors seemed to disappear. Within 3 years the 
bank lending growth had halted just above zero and remained so until the end of 1998. 
(Paker  &  Hodder    2002, Werner  2005,  pp  134-148).  This expansion  of  economic 
activity, its sudden halt and its immediate transformation into a recession is one of the 
most dramatic economic events recorded in the post world war two economic scene. 
 
Another important event that severely affected the supply of credit occurred in Japan 
during  the  late  90s.  The  accumulated  non  performing  real  estate  loans  and  other 
severe structural problems lead to a major Japanese banking crisis in 1998. Several   100 
Japanese banks, previously considered to be secure, were forced to merge with other 
banks  in  order  to  survive  bankruptcy.  The  bank  scene  in  Japan  after  1997  was 
significantly altered forever. Naturally the bank loans supply could not be unaffected 
by  this  crisis;  the  bank  lending  growth  that  was  already  near  zero  dropped  into 
negative levels from the end of 1998 until it reached negative record high values in 
mid 2003. A significant recovery took place in the years of 2006 and 2007 but with a 
worldwide credit crunch in full effect things for the Japanese economy did not look 
good.  
 
One of the most important factors examined in this study is of course changes in bank 
lending  and  how  this  affects  the  financial  policy  decisions  of  different  groups  of 
firms. The figure shown below depicts Japanese bank lending growth which of course 
is a very good indicator of economic conditions. 
Source: Profit Research Center Ltd, Tokyo 
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2.4.2 The Keiretsu factor 
 
Another  aspect  of  the  Japanese economy  that  could  have a  serious impact  on  the 
results of capital structure research is the Keiretsu factor. Keiretsu are horizontally 
connected  or  vertically integrated  groups  of firms  that are affiliated  through  cross 
holding  of  shares,  mutual  appointment  of  directors,  financing  and  intra  group 
transactions.  
 
The most well known and important Keiretsu are the horizontally connected ones. 
These  are  the  following  eight  major  groups:  Mitsubishi,  Mitsui,  Sumitomo,  Fuyo, 
DKB, Sanwa, Tokai and IBJ. As Hoshi et al. (1991) report, 89 of the top 200 Japanese 
firms belong to one of these eight groups. Furthermore, almost 40% to 55% of the 
country’s  total  sales  in  natural  resources,  primary  metal,  industrial  machinery, 
chemical and cement industries belong to Keiretsu affiliate firms. At the same time 
Keiretsu members do much of their buying and selling with other members of the 
same group. Hoshi et al. (1991) gave Gerlach’s (1987) example to show how extreme 
the  situation  can  be:  Mitsubishi  Aluminum  sold  75%  of its  output  to  other  group 
members and bought all its input from its own group firms. 
 
One of the characteristics is the existence of the share crossholding of firms within 
each  group.  For  example,  in  the  Mitsubishi  group,  shares  of  the  Mitsubishi 
Corporation are owned by the bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi, the Tokio Marine and Fire 
Insurance  and  so  on.  The  objective  of  this  is  to  protect  each  Keiretsu  affiliated 
company  from  outside  control  and  takeover  threats.  Nevertheless  the  role  of  the   102 
shares crossholding has been gradually declining during the past years due to changes 
in the Japanese market. 
 
Affiliation through personnel appointments is also evident in Keiretsu; major firms of 
each group send their managerial staff to other firm members in order to strengthen 
their ties. Moreover, support between Keiretsu members is provided when a firm is 
facing  financial  or  business  problems.  Finally  the  Presidents  of  the  leading  firms 
within each Keiretsu hold meetings in which they exchange information and have 
lectures on current topics. These Presidential Councils convene each month and are 
called ‘Shacho-Kai’. (Dodwell Marketing Consultants, 1996/7, pages 3-8). 
 
The most important characteristic that concerns this study is the intra group finance 
by the nucleus bank. Each Keiretsu has in its center a bank and usually other financial 
institutions extending significant amounts of credit to firms in the group. It has been 
evident in the past that if a fellow member is facing financial problems the nucleus 
bank will come to its rescue. Until recently, banks have come to own as much as 10% 
of the shares of other Keiretsu members and have placed several of their employees in 
key  managerial  positions  in  other  manufacturing  firms  of  their  group.  Since  the 
Keiretsu banks are both shareholders and debt holders of other firms in the group, 
information  asymmetry  and  agency  costs  are  likely  to  be  significantly  lower  for 
Keiretsu  members  than  for  non-affiliated  firms.  (Dodwell  Marketing  Consultants, 
1996/7, pp 8). 
 
This  could  have  severe  impacts  on  financial  policy  especially  during  periods  of 
economic  downturns.  While  several  firms  would  be  facing  financial  constraints   103 
Keiretsu members are likely to have a much easier time obtaining access to the much 
needed bank credit. This paper therefore includes Keiretsu membership as a factor in 
its empirical analysis since it is expected to play an important role. 
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2.4.3 Current Study’s focus 
 
 
This paper is going to examine financial policy decisions in the market of Japan. In 
the same spirit as previous studies, such as those of Faulkender and Petersen (2006), 
Kisgen (2006) and Bougheas et al. (2006), the firms’ access to credit will be taken 
into consideration by classifying firms into bank dependent and non bank dependent. 
Similar to Leary’s (2009) study, this analysis will revolve around two major monetary 
policy  episodes  in  the  market  of  Japan;  the  expansion  of  the  late  80s  and  the 
contraction of the late 90s, thus taking the supply of credit as an exogenous factor. 
 
Previous research on capital structure for the market of Japan such as that of Hirota 
(1999), Nishioka and Baba (2004) and Allen and Mizuno (1989) carried out only a 
classic demand side investigation of financial policy decisions. Furthermore, while 
Hosono (2003) has briefly touched on the matter of financial constraints, his study 
was based during the stagnant period of 1990-1996 thus excluding the two important 
monetary shocks that are likely to have affected the supply of credit. Finally Paker 
and Hodder (2002) in their leverage study, simply compared average ratios of debt to 
assets between keiretsu to non-keiretsu firms. Moreover, the authors used a relatively 
small sample of 361 firms and were not able to make a distinction between short-term 
debt instruments and did not include trade credit in their study. 
 
Taking financial constraints and changes in monetary conditions into consideration 
this paper will perform a horse race test between the trade-off and the pecking order 
theory. The methodology will closely follow that of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
and Frank and Goyal (2003). To the authors best knowledge this will be the first time   105 
that a horse race test between these two competitive theories will be performed for the 
market of Japan. 
 
Additionally this paper is going to examine the special role of trade credit in capital 
structure. Trade credit is going to be used as factor in the empirical analysis of chapter 
3 but a detailed investigation of the trade credit channel is also going to take place in 
chapter 5. This investigation is going to follow a similar methodology such as the one 
used by Mateut et al. (2006), Rodriguez (2006) and Love et al. (2007). Therefore the 
role of trade credit as a substitute of other forms of external finance, such as bank 
loans, will be examined taking into consideration the changes in Japanese monetary 
policy. 
 
The research that will be conducted on trade credit is expected to provide valuable 
insights  in  the area  of corporate  finance.  The only  other  study  of  the  trade credit 
channel in Japan has been made by Fukuda et al. (2006) and its results contradict the 
vast majority of existing trade credit studies. Fukuda et al. (2006) have focused solely 
on non-listed firms and only during the 1997-2002 period. This means that a large 
section  of  the  Japanese  sector  as  well  as  several  extremely  important  economic 
periods are excluded. The use of an improved methodology and an enriched dataset 
will  probably  provide  more  information  on  the  role  of  trade  credit  in  Japan  and 
possibly portray a different picture for the trade credit channel.  
 
This paper aims to provide more insight than the aforementioned studies due to the 
following reasons:   106 
1.  Firm’s financial statement data covering both the burst of the land bubble of 
the 80’s, the stagnant growth period of the 90s as well as the credit crunch 
starting from the end 90’s until the present day are going to be used. By 
searching  periods  where  fluctuations  of  credit  supply  were  more  severe, 
determinants of capital structure are more likely to be spotted. 
2.  Insert financial constraints as a factor in the analysis. 
3.  Instead of solely focusing on debt to assets ratios as the majority of studies 
have done, this paper will also examine the firm’s levels of private and public 
debt  in  addition  to  leverage.  Furthermore  the  driving  forces  behind  the 
probability of a firm issuing debt or equity will be investigated. 
4.   More detailed financial data are available. The data set utilised in this paper 
includes  in  detail  the  components  of  both  long  and  short-term  debt.  This 
could be a crucial factor since many of the previous studies were not able to 
distinguish between short term public and private debt.   
5.  The  majority  of  the  previous  studies  have  focused  solely  on  public 
companies. This paper has also included private  firms. In Japan there are 
1,200,000 companies out of which approximately 3,700 are public (source: 
Teikoku Databank).   
6.  It will be the first study to perform a horse race test between the trade-off and 
the pecking order theory for the market of Japan. 
7.  It will be the first study to examine the role of trade credit in the Japanese 
economy while using a dataset of both listed and non-listed firms covering a 
time period that includes all the major changes in modern Japanese monetary 
policy. 
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The goal of this study is threefold. First to record the effect that the supply of credit 
has  on  financial  policy  decisions  thus  verifying  the  results  of  studies  that  have 
recently began to surface. Second, to shed some new light on the existing theories of 
the  trade-off  and  the  pecking  order  model.  Third,  to  provide  some  insight  on  the 
financial  problems  that  corporations,  especially  small,  bank  dependent  ones,  face 
during monetary shocks.     
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Chapter 3: Empirical Analysis of Capital structure 
 
As was thoroughly discussed in chapters 1 and 2, the majority of previous studies in 
the area of capital structure have solely been based on the demand of credit. This has 
lead  to  inconclusive  results  as  to  what  the  driving  forces  behind  financial  policy 
decisions are. Nevertheless recent papers such as those of Faulkender and Petersen 
(2006),  Kisgen  (2006)  and  Bougheas  et  al.  (2006)  have  started  taking  into 
consideration the fluctuations in the supply of credit and other financial constraints 
that companies face, always in relation to their financial policy decisions. 
 
This  paper  follows  in  the  footsteps  of  these  recent  studies  furthering  our 
understanding of capital structure issues. This is due to the fact that: it will combine 
the methodology of the aforementioned studies; it will be the first study of its kind to 
based on the market of Japan and it will utilise a large and rich in information data set 
containing detailed financial statement data for a large number of public and private 
firms. 
 
In the next few pages, the data set and the estimators used to carry out the empirical 
analysis will be discussed. We continue with the regression models used to carry out 
the analysis and lastly the results and critical comment thereof will be provided.  
 
It should be stated that chapter 3 incorporates the most classic examination of capital 
structure. The majority of the set of factors that affect leverage have been used as in 
previous financial policy studies and could be considered as the standard approach of 
examining capital structure. Nevertheless, and as was mentioned in section 2.4.3, this   109 
paper has also included several new approaches such as the investigation of private 
and public debt, the employment of trade credit and internal finance as factors in the 
analysis,  as  well  as  taking  into  consideration  financial  constraints  and  monetary 
shocks in the Japanese economy. 
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3.1.0 Data Description 
 
To carry out the empirical analysis needed for this research, a sample comprised of 
financial statement items for a large number of Japanese firms and years had to be 
formed.  
 
This sample was created by obtaining data from the Nikkei Needs database, offered 
by the Nikkei group. Nihon Keizai Shimbun or more commonly known as Nikkei was 
founded on 1876 and is the primary source of business information for top executives 
and decision makers in Japan. In particular the Needs service is the premier Japanese 
Financial and Economic database covering corporate financial data, stock price, fixed 
income, derivative, commodities, and macroeconomic data. In short Nikkei Needs is 
the most respectable and extensive database for Japanese data with many universities 
such as the university Tokyo and Columbia University in the US using it as their main 
database. Several studies such as that of Miyajima and Yafeh (2007) have also utilised 
it.  
 
In  order  to  classify  the  firms  as  Keiretsu  members  and  thus  create  the  Keiretsu 
dummy variable, information was taken from the handbook ‘Industrial Groupings in 
Japan’  published  by  Dodwell  Marketing  Consultants.  Dodwell  Marketing 
Consultants’  handbooks  have  been  frequently  praised  for  their  accuracy  and  have 
been used in previous studies conducted in the market of Japan.   
 
This  study  used  financial  statement  data.  More  specifically,  the  data  set  created 
incorporated items from balance sheets and income statements on an annual basis. 
Items from the assets’ side of the balance sheets were used to provide information for   111 
the firms’ size, collateral values, inventory levels and trade credit. At the same time 
the  liabilities’  side  gave  the  much  needed  information  for  the  financial  policy 
decisions that corporations take, such as the issuance of short and long term private 
debt, public debt or the issuance of equity. Income statement items are also used as 
proxies  of  the  firms’  growth  opportunities,  profitability  levels,  taxes  and  interest 
expenses.  
  
Nikkei Needs has enabled this study to create three data sets. very large in size and 
rich in information. The first data set contains solely firms that were listed in any of 
the major stock market exchanges of the country: Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Sapporo 
and Jasdaq. The second set contains both public and private companies. The third data 
set included solely private companies. All data sets were divided into two separate 
files ranging from 1980 to 1997 (1458 public firms and 3241 private firms) and from 
1990 to 2007 (1548 public firms and 3698 private firms). Thus the investigation of 
capital structure in this study is restricted to two time periods. Firstly, the burst of the 
land  value  bubble and  secondly  to  the  credit  crunch from  1998  onwards.  Each  is 
analysed within its own data set. Details on the structure of the data sets used to carry 
out the empirical analysis of this chapter as well as chapters 4 and 5 can seen in 
Appendix B (tables 6-23). More specifically, detailed information is provided on the 
number of firms included in the data sets per year and per industry. Appendix B also 
includes definitions for the variables used in the entire study (tables 2-5). 
 
As in most other capital structure studies, (Faulkender and Petersen 2006, Bougheas 
et al. 2006, Gaud et al. 2005, Hosono 2003)  non- manufacturing firms such as banks, 
insurance, utility and railway companies were excluded from the sample. This is due   112 
to the fact that banks and insurance companies have balance sheets that are severely 
different from those of manufacturing firms. The rest of the firms that were dropped, 
such  as  utilities  and  railway  companies,  belonged  to  industries  that  are  highly 
regulated and thus have to comply with stringent legal requirements concerning their 
finance. 
 
It is important to mention that all data sets include firms that were de listed during this 
time  period;  this  is  a  major  advantage  over  most  similar  studies  that  are  usually 
plagued by survivorship bias. This of course resulted in an unbalanced data set. 
 
One  last  issue  needs  to  be  addressed.  Several  countries  such  as  the  UK  have  a 
standard end to the tax year for example, the end of March. In Japan this is not the 
case. Japanese firms can submit their annual financial statements whenever they want; 
this should of course be taken into consideration when examining capital structure 
since it could cause a serious bias to results. However even though Japanese firms are 
able to submit their financial statements at any time, the majority do so at the end of 
March. In the first dataset examining the burst of the land bubble around 68% of 
Japanese firms submit their financial statements at the end of March; this is even more 
impressive if we consider that the second most popular month is that of December and 
accounts only for 8% of the total observations. The gap between March and the rest of 
the months seems only to increase as the years pass by. In the second dataset which 
investigates  the  credit  crunch  of  1998,  March  is  selected  by  about  83%  of  the 
companies  for  submission  of  their  financial  statements;  December  selection 
percentage on the other hand is now down to 6%. 
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Given the fact that the vast majority of the Japanese firms select the end of March to 
close  their  tax  year  one  could  argue  that  it  would  be  safe  to  just  classify  firm 
observations to a specific year despite the month in which they select to submit their 
financial statements. Nevertheless, due to the possible bias this could cause especially 
to the dummy variables utilised to study the economic events, it was decided that a 
safer solution was to simply drop firms that did not end their tax year at the end of 
March from the original sample. 
 
It is believed that the significant cross sectional size of the sample will allow for the 
differences in financial policy decisions between small and large firms to be clearly 
shown. This is augmented by the fact that private firms are included since these small 
companies are likely to be more financially constrained than even the smallest size, 
public firms, due to information asymmetries.  
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3.2.0 Estimators Utilised & Post-Estimation Tests 
3.2.1 Panel Data 
 
Panel or longitudinal data are a combination of time series and cross sections. Even 
though previous capital structure studies, such as that of Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
and Allen and Mizuno (1989), have conducted cross sectional analyses, more recent 
studies such as that of Bougheas et al. (2006) and Faulkender and Petersen (2006), 
have started using panel data to carry out their research. 
 
This only verifies the view that panel data are superior to time series or cross sections, 
offering a great number of advantages to researchers. As Baltagi (1995, pages 3-6) 
states panel data: 
 
•  Control  for  individual  heterogeneity.  In  our  case  panel  data  allows  for  the 
firms to be heterogeneous thus permitting this study to draw conclusions of 
why capital structure decisions differ amongst companies. 
•  Give  more  informative  data,  more  variability,  less  co-linearity  among  the 
variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency. 
•  Are better able to study the dynamics of adjustment. Here it will be used to 
show how credit supply affects financial policy decisions, or in other words 
how firms invest during and after severe credit events. 
•  Are better able to justify and measure effects that are simply not detectable in 
pure cross sections or pure time series data. 
•  Allow  us  to  construct  and  test  complicated  behavioural  models  and  avoid 
biases that result from aggregation of firms or individuals.   115 
 
3.2.1.1 Random and Fixed Effects Estimators 
 
The sample created from Nikkei Needs enabled the use of a panel data analysis. Even 
with  this,  complications  do  arise  since  the  selection  of  consistent  and  efficient 
estimators is not without problems. First let us consider a regression model of the 
following form: 
 
it it i it x z a y ε β + ′ + ′ =  
Equation 9:Panel Data 1.0 
 
 
Where xit is a 1 x K matrix of explanatory variables that does not include a constant 
term and β is the vector of the evaluated parameters. zi is called the individual effect 
or individual heterogeneity effect and contains a constant term and a set of individual 
or  group  specific  characteristics  which  may  be  observed  or  unobserved.  It  is  this 
individual  effect  and  its  potential  correlation  with xit that  affects  the  selection  of 
estimators  and  is  of  interest  to  us.  There  are  three  general  cases  that  will  be 
mentioned. 
 
First, it could be the case that zi contains only a constant term and no unobserved 
effects. If this holds then Ordinary Least Squares (hereinafter OLS) are consistent and 
efficient and therefore should be used as if we had a time series of cross sectional data 
set. In other words, the assumption that the intercept and slope coefficients of the 
regression  are  constant  across  time  and  space  and  that  the  error  term  captures 
differences over time and individuals holds. Nevertheless if zi contains an unobserved 
effect then OLS are biased and inconsistent due to an omitted variable.   116 
 
 
it it i it x y ε β α + ′ + =  
Equation 10:Panel Data 1.1 
 
 
 
If zi contains unobserved effects and at the same time is correlated with xit the fixed 
effects approach should be used. In fixed effects the individual effect is taken as a 
group specific constant term in the regression model and thus treated as a parameter to 
be estimated for each cross sectional observation i. If we take another look at equation 
(9), adopting fixed effects estimators would mean that αi = ziα since this is now an 
estimable constant term and thus equation (9) is transformed into (10). More simply 
this means that in (10) we make the assumption that the slope coefficients are constant 
across  individuals,  in  our  case  firms,  where  as  we  let  the  intercept  vary  for  each 
company. 
 
 It should be noted that we cannot include time constant factors in xit since if zi is 
correlated with each element of xit there is no way of distinguishing the effects of time 
constant observables from the time constant unobservable zi. This could seem a big 
expense to bear but it should also be considered that zero correlation between xit and zi 
need not be assumed and this makes the fixed effect estimators an attractive choice. 
The only assumption required is that individual effect is treated as fixed (does not 
vary over time) and estimable.  
 
 If the individual heterogeneity can be assumed to be uncorrelated with the dependent 
variables then equation (10) can be transformed into:   117 
 
it i it it u x y ε β α + + ′ + =  
Equation 11:Panel Data 1.2 
 
 
Where α is the classic intercept term and ui is a group specific random element similar 
to  εit  except  that  for  each  group  there  is  a  single  draw  that  enters  the  regression 
identically  for  each  period.  Basically  what  we  are  saying  is  that  the  individuals 
included in our sample are a drawing from a much larger universe and that they have 
a common mean value for the intercept a. εit is the ‘usual’ residual that has the usual 
properties:  mean  equal  to  zero,  uncorrelated  with  itself,  uncorrelated  with  x, 
uncorrelated with ui and homoskedastic. This is the random effects approach taking its 
name from the fact that ui is treated as a random variable rather than a constant term. 
(Greene 2002, pages 284-285, Gujarati 2003 pages 636-655, Wooldridge 2002 pages 
247 – 278).  
 
Wooldridge (2002, pages 252) states that “with a large number of random draws from 
the cross section, it almost always makes sense to treat the unobserved effects ui as 
random draws from the population, along with xit and yit”. The key point according to 
the author is whether the individual effect will be assumed to be correlated or not, 
with the observable variables. 
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3.2.1.2 Derivation of Panel Data Estimators and Goodness of Fit Using 
STATA 
 
Having discussed the theory of panel data estimators it would be useful to provide the 
reader with some additional information regarding their derivation and also about the 
proper R
2 to be used when dealing with panel data. R
2 is after all a popular measure of 
how well the sample regression line fits a set of data. As a measure of goodness of fit, 
researchers  often  attribute  great  significance  to  the  values  that  R
2  receives.  When 
fixed  or  random effect estimators are  used  though,  three R
2’s are  reported  by  the 
statistical  software  programs estimating  the  results; R
2 within,  R
2  between  and  R
2 
overall.  What  kind  of  information  do  these  three  different  estimators  provide  and 
which one should be selected as the most appropriate one? 
 
It should be noted at this point that all empirical calculations were conducted with the 
use of STATA software. STATA has been a frequent tool of researchers in the field of 
finance and is considered to be one of the most reliable statistical software programs 
in the market. 
 
In order to answer the previous question posed we should revisit equation (11): 
 
it i it it u x y ε β α + + ′ + =  
 
As mentioned before xit is a matrix of explanatory variables with β being the vector of 
the estimated coefficients. The unit specific residual is ui, differing among units and 
its value is constant for any specific individual while εi is the standard residual with 
the usual properties; mean equal to zero, uncorrelated with itself, uncorrelated with x,   119 
uncorrelated  with  u  and  homoskedastic.  By  applying  basic  algebra  calculations  if 
equation 10 holds then so must equation 12: 
 
i i i i u x y ε β α + + ′ + =  
Equation 12:Panel Data 2.0 
 
 
Where ∑ =
t i it it T y y ,  ∑ =
t i it i T x x and ∑ Τ =
t it ι ιτ ε ε . Furthermore if we subtract 
(12) from (11) it should also hold that: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ι ε ε β − + − = − it i it i it x x y y  
Equation 13:Panel Data 2.1 
 
 
Equations (11), (12) and (13) are the basis for calculating β. In other words, when 
fixed effects   (within estimators)  are  utilised in STATA by  applying the xtreg,  fe 
command, OLS is used to estimate equation (13). The less known between estimators 
(xtreg,  be  command)  are  obtained  by  performing  OLS  on  equation  (12).  Finally 
random effects estimators are nothing more than a weighted average matrix of the 
estimates produced by the within and between estimators and are equal to running the 
following model: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { } i it i i it i it u x x y y ε θ ε θ β θ α θ θ − + − + − + − = − 1 1  
Equation 14:Panel Data 2.2 
 
Where θ is a function of 
2
u σ and
2
ε σ . If  0
2 = u σ then this means that  0 = i u  and 0 = θ  
or in other words that individuals do not differ and therefore we can estimate model 
(11)  directly  by  OLS.  In  the  case  that  0
2 = ε σ then  we  have  0 = ε u and  1 = θ ,  this   120 
means that fixed effect estimators will return all the information available thus the 
regression will have an R
2 equal to unity. Nevertheless it should be stated that both of 
these cases mentioned are rather extreme. 
 
Back to the original issue of R
2; xtreg command in STATA reports ‘R
 squares’ that 
correspond to the estimates of equations (11), (12) and (13) reported below.  
β α ˆ ˆ ˆ it it x y ′ + =  
β α ˆ ˆ ˆ i i x y ′ + =  
( ) ( )β ˆ ˆ ˆ i it i it x x y y − = −  
As we already know from OLS the ordinary properties of R
2 include it being equal to 
the  fraction  of  variance  in y explained  by y ˆ  as  seen  in  (15)  and also  equal  to  the 
squared correlations between  y and y ˆ . When the xtreg, be command is applied the 
estimates are obtained by performing OLS on (12) and therefore its R
2 between, is the 
ordinary  R
2.  Moreover  xtreg,  fe  command  performs  OLS  on  (13)  and  thus  the 
reported R
2 within, is the ordinary R
2. As stated earlier, the xtreg, re command is run 
by applying OLS on (14) and thus none of the R
2 directly applies to it [R
2 overall 
corresponds to (11), R
2 between to (12) and R
2 within to (13)] (STATA Longitudinal/ 
Panel Data manual 9, 2005, pp 287-290). It can therefore be concluded that when 
fixed effects estimators are utilised the appropriate R
2 is the R
2 within, while in the 
case of random effects none of the R
2 reported has the properties of the R
2 defined in 
equation 15. 
 
( )
( ) TSS
ESS
y y
y y
r
i
i =
−
−
=
∑
∑
2
2
2 ˆ
 
Equation 15:R
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3.2.1.3 Post Estimation Tests (Static Panel Estimators) 
 
The  problem  of  choosing  between  OLS,  random  and  fixed  effects  remains. 
Fortunately through the use of several tests such as the Breusch & Pagan Lagrange 
multiplier test, the Hausman and finally Wooldridge’s test, the use of efficient and 
consistent estimators can be assured. 
 
The  first  test  to  be  run  is  the  Breusch  &  Pagan  (1980)  Lagrange  multiplier  test 
(hereinafter  BP).  This  test  helps  detect  the  presence  of  an  unobserved  effect.  As 
mentioned in section 3.2.1.1, if unobserved effects are present, the use of OLS is 
deemed inappropriate. The BP has a χ
2 distribution with one degree freedom; if a p 
value of under 0.05 for the chi squared statistic is recorded then this means that the 
null hypothesis for no unobserved effects can be rejected. 
 
If the BP test indicates the rejection of OLS then the Hausman (1978) test is run to 
help us choose between random and fixed effects. More specifically the Hausman test, 
as Wooldridge (2002, pp 288-289) states, is based on the difference between the fixed 
and  the  random  effects  estimates.  Since  fixed  effects  are  consistent  when  the 
individual effect and the observable variables are correlated while random effects are 
not,  a  statistical  difference  is  interpreted  as  evidence  against  random  effects.  The 
Hausman test has a χ
2 distribution; if values of over 0.05 are recorded then the null 
hypothesis that the two estimates do not differ significantly cannot be rejected and 
random effects are preferred. It should be stated though that in the case that the model 
fitted on these data fails to meet the asymptotic assumptions then the Hausman test 
fails.    122 
 
As  in  most  papers  that  conduct  regression  analyses  other  more  traditional  tests 
irrelevant to the panel form of the data set should be carried out. The possible problem 
of autocorrelation can de detected by using the Wooldridge (2002, pages 274-275) 
test applied in STATA by Drukker (2003) with the xtserial command. If the null 
hypothesis of no first order auto correlation cannot be rejected then the command 
xtregar of STATA which can accommodate regression models in which first order 
autocorrelation exists, is utilised (STATA Longitudinal/ Panel Data manual 9, 2005, 
pages 282-326). 
 
Furthermore, countermeasures for the existence of heteroskedasticity have also been 
utilised. In a panel data set with such a large number of cross sectional individual 
observations,  heteroskedasticity  is  likely  to  be  present.  In  order  to  take 
heteroskedasticity into account the option robust has been added in every regression 
to which was applicable. With the robust option, the White (1980) heteroskedasticity 
robust  standard  errors,  that  are  asymptotically  valid  in  the  presence  of  any  kind 
heteroskedasticity, are used. 
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3.2.1.4. GMM Estimators 
 
As shown in sections 3.2.1.2-3.2.1.4 static panel data models require pooled OLS, 
fixed effects or random effects estimators. The regression models used in this thesis’ 
main empirical analysis section (3.4.2 and 3.5.2) are indeed of a static nature as no 
lagged dependent variable is present (Baltagi 1995, page 125). These estimators are 
therefore considered the appropriate choice and are selected according to the results of 
the relevant post estimation tests. 
 
Nevertheless the use of dynamic panel data models has its rewards since, as Roodman 
(2006) reports, these models are specifically designed to deal with: 
 
1.  The existence of a panel data set with few time periods and many individuals. 
2.  A linear functional relationship. 
3.  A single, left hand side variable that is dynamic, depending on its own past 
realisations. 
4.  The inclusion of independent variables that are not strictly exogenous. In other 
words independent variables that are correlated with past and possibly current 
realisations of the error. 
5.  The presence of fixed individual effects. 
6.  The existence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals but 
not across them. 
 
The advantages of using dynamic panel data models on the data set of this thesis are 
evident. As can be seen in Appendix B the structure of the data set is such that the   124 
number of individuals is far greater than the number of years. The use of dynamic 
panel data models in cases such as this is advisable since, as reported by Bond (2002) 
and  Sarafidis  et  al.  (2006),  they  are  able  to  control  for  dynamic  panel  bias. 
Furthermore as can be seen in the regression models depicted in sections 3.4.2 and 
3.5.2  it  is  likely  that  some  of  the  independent variables are endogenous.  In  other 
words a loop of causality possibly exists between these independent variables and the 
dependent  variable  of  the  model.  Finally  the  inclusion  of  a  lag  of  the  dependent 
variable on the right hand side of the main regression models would also allow us to 
examine if our results hold when dynamic specifications are estimated. 
 
For all the reasons mentioned above it was deemed useful to include and run dynamic 
panel data models in sections 3.4.2.5 and 3.5.2.5. These dynamic panel data models 
will essentially operate as robustness tests and will compliment and verify the results 
of the main empirical analysis.  
 
After taking the decision of incorporating dynamic panel data models the next step is 
to select the proper estimators that should be deployed. The inclusion of a lagged 
dependent  variable  on the right hand side  of a  model (equation  16) automatically 
makes us reject both the fixed and random estimators. This is because the lagged 
dependent  variable  is  correlated  with  the  compound  disturbance  since  the  same 
i u .enters the equation for every observation in group i (Greene 2002, pages 307-308).  
 
it i it t i it u x y y ε β γ + + ′ + = −1 ,  
Equation 16:Dynamic Panel Model 1.0 
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Two main econometric problems exist when estimating equation (16). The possibility 
that some or all the explanatory variables are endogenous and that the unit-specific 
effect  i u  may be correlated with some of the explanatory variables. It is possible to 
circumvent around these two problems by first-differencing equation (16) into: 
 
) ( ) ( ) ( 1 , , 1 , , 2 , 1 , 1 , , − − − − − − + − ′ + − = − t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i X X y y y y ε ε β α  
Equation 17:Dynamic Panel Data Model 2.0 
 
As can be seen, due to its time-invariant nature, the unit-specific effect  i u  is now 
removed. If it is assumed that  it ε  is not serially correlated and that the explanatory 
variables  are  weakly  exogenous  then  equation  (17)  can  be  estimated  using  the 
following moment conditions:  
0 )] ( [ 1 , , , = − Ε − − t i t i s t i y ε ε   for s ≥ 2; t=3,…,T 
 
0 )] ( [ 1 , , , = − Ε − − t i t i s t i X ε ε   for s ≥ 2; t=3,…,T 
Equation 18:Moment Conditions (Regression in Differences) 
 
 
The GMM estimator based on these conditions is called the Arellano and Bond (1991) 
“Difference GMM” estimator and is able to efficiently estimate dynamic panel data 
models (Levine et al. 2000, pages 51-52).  
 
Nevertheless there are cases, mentioned in detail in the next page, when the lagged 
levels of the regressors are poor instruments for the first-differenced regressors. For 
these instances the Arellano and Bover (1995)/Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator, 
commonly  known  as  ‘System  GMM’,  is  the  recommended  choice.  The  “System 
GMM” estimator essentially combines in a system a regression in differences with a   126 
regression in levels. The instruments for the regression in differences are identical to 
those used in “Difference GMM”. The instruments for the regression in levels are the 
lagged  differences  of the corresponded  variables;  the  moment conditions  used  are 
shown in equation (19). These are appropriate instruments as long as the assumption 
that the first differences of the instrument variables are uncorrelated with the unit-
specific effect  i u  holds (Roodman 2006, page 1; Levine et al. 2000, pages 51-52).  
 
0 )] )( [ , 1 , , = + − Ε − − − t i i s t i s t i u y y ε   for s=1 
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Equation 19:Moment Conditions (Regression in Levels) 
 
As in the case of the static panel data models, a selection of the most appropriate 
method of estimating must be made. In this paper it was decided that using System 
GMM was more appropriate for the reasons mentioned below: 
 
1.  System GMM generally provides more efficient and precise estimates and also 
reduces the finite sample bias (Baltagi 1995, page 132). 
2.  The difference GMM performs poorly when variables that are, or are close to 
be,  random  walk  variables  are  included  in  the  relevant  model.  Since  the 
models of this thesis include financial and economic variables the presence of 
random walk variables is quite likely. (Roodman 2006, page 29). 
3.  If difference GMM estimators are applied then time invariant regressors will 
disappear due to the differencing of variables within groups (Roodman 2006, 
page 31). As will be explained in section 3.3.2.3 the variable Keiretsu is time 
invariant and therefore will be lost if difference GMM is applied.   127 
4.  In the case of an unbalanced data set it is better to avoid difference GMM 
since it has the weakness of magnifying gaps (Roodman 2006, page 20). The 
data  set  of  this  thesis  is  clearly  unbalanced  and  therefore  a  system  GMM 
should be preferred. 
 
3.2.1.5 Post Estimation Tests (Dynamic Panel Estimators) 
  
As in the case of the static panel data models, a range of post estimation tests must be 
applied to verify the validity of the results. By default the xtabond2 command (the 
STATA command used to apply the System GMM estimators) reports the three most 
important post estimation tests: AR(1), AR(2) and the Sargan test. In the Sargan test 
the  hypothesis  being  tested  is  that  the  instruments  as  a  group  are  exogenous  and 
therefore  they  are  acceptable,  healthy,  instruments.  If  the  null  hypothesis  is  not 
rejected (p-value higher than 0.05) the instruments pass the test and thus they are 
valid.  
 
The AR(1) and AR(2) Arellano and Bond (1991) tests have a null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation and are applied to the differenced individuals. According to Arellano 
and Bond (1991) the GMM estimator requires that there is first order autocorrelation, 
AR(1), but there is no second order autocorrelation, AR(2).  
 
In this study the instrument set is initially restricted to 2 lags but if serial correlation 
of the second order  is present , or if the Sargan test fails, then lags of the third order 
are set.    128 
3.3.0 Methodology 
 
 
In this section we look at the regression models used to conduct the analysis. The 
dependent and independent variables and the reasons for using them as proxies for the 
determinants of financial policy decisions, will be discussed. 
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3.3.1 Dependent Variables 
 
In order to investigate as many aspects of capital structure as possible and therefore 
provide a better explanation of how firms take their financial policy decisions, four 
different regression models will be used. The four different dependent variables are 
discussed below. 
 
3.3.1.1 Leverage 
 
Fluctuations in the supply of credit (in our case both the burst of the land bubble of 
1990 and  the Japanese credit  crunch  of  1998) are expected  to  severely affect  the 
firms’ capital structures and therefore their leverage levels. As expected, financial 
leverage is the first and perhaps most crucial factor that will be examined. 
 
Financial leverage can probably be given more different definitions than any other 
term in finance. Here we use total debt to total assets. This definition has been used by 
the majority of studies (Frank and Goyal (2004), Gaud et al. (2005) and Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) ). The creation of total debt in Nikkei Needs terms was achieved by 
calculating the sum of short-term borrowings (NFINANCIAL’FB074), commercial 
paper  (NFINANCIAL’FB075),  long-term  debt  and  maturities  within  one  year 
(NFINANCIAL’FB076),  short-term  corporate  and  convertible  bonds 
(NFINANCIAL’FB077),  long-term  corporate  and  convertible  bonds 
(NFINANCIAL’FB098)  and  long-term  debt  (NFINANCIAL’FB101).  In  the 
denominator of the ratio, the item of total assets (NFINANCIAL’FB067) was used. 
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To study the role of leverage better in capital structure a distinction between short and 
long-term leverage was made. Short-term leverage is defined as the sum of short-term 
borrowings, commercial paper, long-term debt and maturities within one year and 
short-term  corporate  and  convertible  bonds  divided  by  total  assets.  Long-term 
leverage is defined as the sum of long-term corporate and convertible bonds and long-
term debt divided by total assets. 
 
3.3.1.2 Private debt 
 
The second regression model investigates the firms’ private debt levels. As discussed 
in chapter 2 one of the aims of this paper is to examine if changes in the supply of 
bank loans affect disproportionally smaller rather than larger firms. 
 
The ratio of bank loans to total liabilities has been chosen to be used as a dependent 
variable.  Bank  loans  are  defined  as  the  sum  of  short-term  borrowings 
(NFINANCIAL’FB074),  long-term  debt  and  maturities  within  one  year 
(NFINANCIAL’FB076)  and  long-term  debt  (NFINANCIAL’FB101).  The 
denominator is total liabilities (NFINANCIAL’FB121).  
 
Furthermore  a  distinction  between  short  and  long-term  private  debt  is  made.  As 
suggested by existing literature, smaller firms are expected to be more dependent on 
short-term  instruments  of  debt.  This  should  shed  more  light  on  the  differences 
between these two groups. Private short-term debt is defined as the sum of short-term 
borrowings, long-term debt and maturities within one year, divided by total liabilities.   131 
The definition of private long-term debt utilised is the ratio of long-term debt to total 
liabilities.  
 
3.3.1.3 Public debt 
 
In conjunction to the private debt model an investigation of the public debt levels of 
Japanese firms also takes place. Usually large and more mature firms are able to issue 
public debt, this being corporate bonds or commercial paper. It is expected that during 
times of scarce debt these large firms will replace private to public debt and try to 
retain their leverage levels. 
 
Similar to the private debt case, the ratio of public debt to total liabilities is used. 
Where public debt is equal to the sum of short-term corporate and convertible bonds 
(NFINANCIAL’FB077),  long-term  corporate  and  convertible  bonds 
(NFINANCIAL’FB098)  and  commercial  paper  (NFINANCIAL’FB075)  divided  to 
total liabilities (NFINANCIAL’FB121). 
 
A distinction between short and long-term public debt is made to see if similar results 
to those of the private debt investigation could be drawn. Short-term public debt is 
defined as commercial paper plus short-term corporate and convertible bonds divided 
by  total  liabilities.  Long-term  public  debt  is  calculated  as  a  sum  of  long-term 
corporate and convertible bonds divided by total liabilities.  
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3.3.1.4 Debt vs. Equity 
 
The most straightforward measure is the direct investigation of the factors that affect 
the  probability  of  equity  vs.  debt  issuance.  Contrary  to  the  previous  panel  data 
regression  models,  three  logit  and  probit  models  are  used  to  examine  the  choice 
between debt or equity. 
 
Initially the probability of a firm issuing debt is investigated; the dependent variable 
receives the value of 1 if the net increase in total debt outstanding is greater than 1% 
of that year’s book assets and 0 if it is not. Similarly in the case of the issuance of 
equity the dependent variable receives the value of 1 if the net increase of common 
shares is in excess of 1% of that year’s book assets. The definitions of debt and equity 
issuance are the same as Leary’s (2009). Finally, in the last logit model a direct test 
between debt vs. equity is run in which, according to the previous definitions, the 
dependent variable took the value of 1 if equity had been issued and 0 if debt issuance 
had taken place; cases of dual equity and debt issuances are excluded. Firms that do 
not issue debt or equity are recorded as missing observations (as Leary, 2009). In the 
public firms dataset the number of firms that issued both equity and debt in the same 
year is 1,095; in the private firms dataset this number is 349.  
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3.3.2 Independent Variables 
 
Similarly to previous studies, a careful selection of proxies for the determinants of 
capital  structure  is  made.  The  basic  regression  model  of  this  study  includes  two 
dummy variables, one for bank dependency and the other for the effects of monetary 
policy. A dummy variable accounting for Keiretsu membership has been included as 
well. Finally the addition of factors that measure size, tangibility of assets, the firms’ 
collateral values, profitability, trade credit and tax shields has been made; this is in 
accordance with the majority of previous studies in capital structure.   
 
3.3.2.1 Bank dependency 
 
Small size, high risk, informational opaque firms usually do not have access to public 
debt. As reported by Myers & Majluf (1984) an equity issuance would be costly due 
to  information  asymmetries.  Therefore  small  firms  are  expected  to  be  mainly 
dependent on bank loans in order to obtain the much needed leverage whereas larger 
firms are able to substitute it with public debt.  
 
In order to investigate how the fluctuations of credit supply affect the firms that rely 
on bank loans, a bank dependency dummy variable has been added. This variable 
takes the value of 1 if the firm, regardless of its industry classification, is categorised 
as  bank  dependent  and  zero  if  it  is  not.  In  order  to  classify  the  firms’  as  bank 
dependent or not, for every year of the sample the observations are ranked according 
to  their  total  assets.  The  highest  30%  is classified  as  bank  independent  while  the   134 
lowest 30% of firms’ is bank dependent. This methodology is similar to that used by 
Leary (2009), Carpenter et al. (1994) and Gertler & Gilchrist (1993).  
 
Faulkender & Petersen (2006) use a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
firm has received a credit rating and 0 if it has not. This is a more direct measure of 
whether a firm has access to alternative forms of leverage such as public debt. Nikkei 
Needs does not provide credit ratings data; therefore this alternative method of bank 
dependency is left for a future study. 
 
Even  if  such  data  were  obtained  though,  other  complications  would  arise.  More 
specifically due to the strict regulation of the Japanese market up until the 80s a very 
small number of firms were allowed to issue public debt and these were mainly utility 
companies  and  firms  that  belong  to  the  motor  industry.  This  would  render  credit 
ratings an inefficient measure to monitor bank dependency at least up until the mid 
80s  (Hoshi  et  al.  1991).  Of  course  even  during  late  80s  and  90s,  where  the 
deregulation of the Japanese economy had taken place, a relatively small number of 
companies in the bank dominated market of Japan had received a credit rating; at least 
in comparison to other more liberalised economies such as the US or the UK.  Thus 
the small number of firms that would be classified as bank independent could produce 
inefficient or even biased results in this analysis. 
 
3.3.2.2 Land Value Bubble and Credit Crunch 
 
Data published by the bank of Japan shows that the supply of credit rapidly increased 
during  1980-1989; this was of course related to  the  land  value bubble.  When  the   135 
bubble burst, bank lending growth dramatically dropped to just above 0 and remained 
at this level up to the point where the East-Asian crisis took place in 1998. The East-
Asian crisis dealt the final blow to the already troubled Japanese bank sector. As a 
direct result bank lending dropped to negative record levels up until 2007(Chapter 2, 
page 103). 
 
The burst of the land bubble and the credit crunch are both economic events of great 
significance.  They  represent  a  very  good  testing  ground  for  the  investigation  of 
financial policy decisions when credit is plenty and when it becomes scarce. It is 
expected that before the burst of the land value bubble and before the credit crunch 
firms will generally have higher leverage levels and the same goes for private debt. 
Furthermore at least after 1990 it is expected that large firms will try and substitute 
bank credit with public debt. 
 
As was stated earlier, the analysis has been split into two data sets; one covering the 
land value bubble and the other investigating the credit crunch. In the first file the 
dummy variable will be equal to 1 during 1980-1989 and 0 during 1990-1999. For the 
second file it will have a value of 1 during 2000-2007 when the credit crunch was in 
full effect and 0 during 1990-1999, since the bank lending growth had not been yet 
affected by the Japanese banking crisis. 
 
3.3.2.3 Keiretsu Factor 
 
Relevant to this study is the existence of the nucleus bank which extends credit to 
other fellow Keiretsu members; thus only horizontal Keiretsu will be included in this   136 
survey. Hodder and Paker (2002) similarly make the same exclusion. It could be the 
case,  that  Keiretsu  affiliated  firms  have  easier  access  to  bank  credit.  Information 
asymmetries are mitigated by the free flow of information amongst Keiretsu members 
and from the cross share holding phenomenon which is evident in Japan’s industrial 
groupings.  
 
The Keiretsu dummy variables takes the value of 1 if the firm is a member and 0 if it 
is not. The data were taken by the 1996/97 version of the ‘Industrial Groupings in 
Japan’ handbook. A more recent volume could not be found but hopefully this will 
not affect the results since stability is a part of the Keiretsu nature. The introduction of 
new  members  or  exclusions  of  old  ones  are  extremely  rare  events,  therefore  the 
validity of the data set should hold. This will also result in the Keiretsu variable being 
time invariant and therefore will not be possible to be included if within estimators are 
used.  
 
3.3.2.4 Size 
 
Every capital structure study uses size as a variable, although definitions vary. At the 
same time they record a positive relationship between it and leverage; in accordance 
to the trade-off theory. Huang and Song (2006) support the idea that this positive 
relationship  is  due  to  the  fact  that  size  can  be  used  as  a  proxy  for  information 
asymmetries; the larger the firm the more information is provided to outside investors. 
Alternatively Rajan and Zingales (1995) have stated that size is likely to have an 
inverse relationship with the probability of default, thus enabling large firms to obtain 
larger amounts of leverage.   137 
 
Whichever  explanation  holds  we  would  expect  a  positive  relationship  between 
leverage and size and also between public debt levels and size since larger firms are 
able to issue corporate bonds and commercial paper. The proxy chosen to measure 
size is the natural logarithm of Sales and Operating Revenue (NFINANCIAL’FC001), 
a factor used by the majority of studies in capital structure such as that of Rajan and 
Zingales  (1995),  Huang  and  Song  (2006),  Booth  et  al.  (2001) and  Hirota  (1999). 
Following the methodology of Qian et al. (2009) the natural logarithm of sales, the 
only factor in this study which is not a ratio, was not deflated. 
 
As discussed earlier, the dummy variable of bank dependency was generated through 
the use of the firms’ total assets values. One question that could arise is why total 
assets were used as a measure of bank dependency and the natural logarithm of sales 
was used to account for size. The answer is quite simple. As shown in Leary (2009), 
Carpenter et al. (1994) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) total assets is considered to be 
a robust indicator of financial constraints. In the absence of a more direct indicator the 
selection of total assets was a natural choice. If total assets  were also selected to 
account  for  size  this  study  would  likely  face  the  problem  of  multicollinearity. 
Therefore the natural logarithm of sales, the second most commonly used variable to 
account for the factor of size, was selected. 
 
3.3.2.5 Asset Tangibility 
 
The independent variable measuring the firms’ asset tangibility is almost always used 
in  financial  policy  papers.  The  rational  is  that  firms  with  tangible  assets  will  be   138 
subject  to  less  information  asymmetries  since  they  have  a  greater  value  than 
intangible assets in cases of bankruptcy, thereby reducing the agency costs of debt. A 
positive relationship between asset tangibility and leverage is thus expected and has 
been recorded in Booth et al. (2001), Titman & Wessels (1988), Rajan & Zingales 
(1995)  and  Gaud  et  al.  (2005).  The  ratio  of  Total  Tangible  Fixed  Assets 
(NFINANCIAL’FB032)  to  Total  Assets  (NFINANCIAL’FB067),  is  used  as  a 
definition of asset tangibility. 
 
3.3.2.6 Profitability 
 
Another very important factor is that of profitability. The trade-off model states that 
more profitable firms would have a greater amount of income to shield, thus they are 
expected to use debt as a tax shield and therefore have higher levels of leverage. The 
pecking order hypothesis states that financial managers will always prefer the use of 
internal to external finance and thus more profitable firms should use their retained 
earnings to finance their projects. Nevertheless, almost every one of the empirical 
studies  mentioned  in  the  literature  review  found  a  negative  relationship  between 
profitability and leverage. 
 
Hirota (1999), Frank and Goyal (2004) and Titman and Wessels (1988) used the ratio 
of operating income to total assets while Gaud et al. (2005) and Huang and Song 
(2006) used earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. In the present 
study  we  use  EBIT  (NFINANCIAL’FP01105)  to  Total  Assets 
(NFINANCIAL’FB067).  Results  however  remain  the  same  no  matter  which 
definition is used.   139 
 
An alternative and more direct measure of internal finance would be the Retained 
Earnings.  Even  though  retained  earnings  are  not  commonly  used  in  the  existing 
literature, several studies examining the validity of the pecking order hypothesis have 
used  internal  finance  as  a  proxy  for  their  analysis.  The  utilisation  of  Retained 
Earnings  is  likely  to  aid  this  study’s  conclusions  and  is  therefore  included  in 
conjunction with the standard term of profitability. Their estimation was made by 
calculating the sum of Profit Reserves (NFINANCIAL’FB132), Various Voluntary 
Reserves  (NFINANCIAL’FB136)  and  Retained  Earnings  Carried  Forward 
(NFINANCIAL’FB138). 
 
3.3.2.7 Non-debt Tax Shields 
 
The effect of tax shields on the firms’ financial policy decision is of the outmost 
importance when the validity of the trade-off theory is investigated. As mentioned in 
chapter 2 due to existence of tax shields, companies with plenty of income to shield 
are expected to have high leverage ratios. This reasoning led many studies focusing 
on capital structure to used a definition of non-debt tax shields. Non-debt tax shields 
are expected according to  the trade-off theory to  have a negative  correlation with 
leverage ratios. Taub (1975), Bradley et al. (1984), Titman & Wessels (1988),  Allen 
and Mizuno (1989), Hirota (1999) and Huang and Song (2006) are examples. 
 
Researchers have expressed tax shields in various ways. Huang and Song (2006) and 
Brandley et al. (1984) define non-debt tax shields as depreciation and amortisation. 
Hirota (1999) calculates non-debt tax shields as:   140 
 
( ) 5 . 0
T PROFIT NDTSE − =  
Equation 20:Non-Debt Tax Shields 1.0 
 
 
Where  PROFIT  signifies  net  profits  before  tax,  T  is  observed  corporate  tax 
payments and 0.5 is the assumed corporate tax rate. The assumption that the corporate 
tax rate was 50% was derived using reports from the Ministry of Finance Statistics 
Monthly of Japan. These reports stated that the tax rate for Japanese firms was on 
average 50% during 1970-1990. A similar definition used by Titman and Wessels 
(1988) who derived the following: 
 
 
48 . 0
T i OI NDTSE − − =  
Equation 21:Non-Debt-Tax-Shields 1.1 
 
 
Where OI  is operating income, i  signifies interest  payments, T  stands for income 
tax  payments  and  48%  accounts  for  the  corporate  tax  rate.  The  difference  of  the 
magnitude of the corporate tax rate between these two studies lies in the fact that 
Titman & Wessels (1988) carry out their investigation in the US whereas Allen and 
Mizuno (1989) conducted theirs Japan but used the same definition as Titman and 
Wessels (1988) only scaled by EBIT. 
 
This  study  used  Hirota’s  (1999)  definition  for  non-debt  tax  shields,  since  he  has 
carried out the most recent research in Japan. Our present definition is Current Income 
before Taxes and Other Miscellaneous Adjustments (NFINANCIAL’FC051) minus   141 
the  ratio  of  Total  of  Corporation  Tax,  Inhabitance  Tax  and  Enterprise  Tax 
(NFINANCIAL’FC052) divided by 50% which accounts for the corporate tax rate. 
The  sum  of  the  above  mentioned  components  has  been  divided  by  Total  Assets 
(NFINANCIAL’FB067). 
 
3.3.2.8 Trade Credit 
 
The last independent variable that is included in the regression models is trade credit. 
This factor is not traditionally used in capital structure studies but its presence helps 
derive interesting results. The studies of Atanasova and Wilson (2004) and Steijvers 
(2004) have used trade credit in their investigation for the existence of financially 
constrained firms. 
 
Deloof and Jegers’ (1999) findings indicate that trade credit is considered to be an 
alternative  form  of  finance  to  private  or  public  held  debt.  This  was  verified  by 
Atanasova  and  Wilson  (2004)  and  Steijvers  (2004)  who  found  trade  credit  to  be 
inversely related with leverage. An alternative perspective is offered by Biais and 
Gollier (1997) in which the presence of trade credit signals the quality of the firm thus 
reducing the adverse selection problem. This could lead firms that use trade credit to 
obtain higher levels of leverage. The effects of trade credit are likely to be even more 
evident  in  Japan  where  strong  intra-firm  ties  exist  due  to  the  increased  cross-
shareholding levels. 
 
In  both  aforementioned  studies  the  proxy  used  to  account  for  trade  credit  was 
accounts payable. In this paper accounts payable is calculated by scaling the item   142 
Notes  Payable  and  Accounts  Payable  (NFINANCIAL’FB069)  with  Total  Assets 
(NFINANCIAL’FB067). 
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3.3.3 Regression Models 
 
Having described the dataset and the dependent and independent variables, we now 
move on to a formal depiction of the regression models that are utilised. The general 
form of the models is: 
 
it t i it it v u x y ε β α + + + ′ + =  
Equation 22:Panel Data 3.0 
 
 
Where  it x  is the vector of firm and time specific control independent variables, α is 
the constant term,  it u  the individual error,  it ε  the classical error term and  t v  a time-
specific component of the error term (in other words time dummies were added to 
account for business cycles effects). The independent variable vector includes, proxies 
for size, asset tangibility, profitability, internal finance, tax shields and trade credit.  
 
Table 24, Appendix C, depicts the expected signs of these proxies according to past 
theories of capital structure. At the same time it shows the definitions of these proxies 
that were chosen for this analysis. 
 
After replacing the vector  it x  with the aforementioned determinants and adding the 
bank  dependency,  monetary  policy  and  Keiretsu  dummy  variables,  the  regression 
model (22) became: 
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Equation 23:General Regression Model 
 
  
 
Taking (23) into consideration, the regression models that examine financial leverage 
and  the  percentage  of  private  and  public  debt  can  be  easily  constructed.  The 
definitions of the dependent variables are Total Debt to Total Assets, Private Debt to 
Total Liabilities and Public Debt to Total Liabilities respectively. Finally in the case 
of  the  logit  models  the  equations  remain  the  same  with  the  difference  that  the 
dependent variables are now of categorical nature depicting the issuance of debt or 
equity. 
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3.4.0 Results for Public Firms 
 
Descriptive  statistics  for  the  utilised  variables  are  discussed  in  this  section  and 
accompanied by graphs and references to tables. Secondly the public firms’ regression 
analysis results are reported.  
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3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
For the data set describing the burst of the land bubble, table 31 (Appendix D) depicts 
detailed descriptive statistics giving an overall view. Table 32 (Appendix D) shows 
the significant differences between bank and non-bank dependent firms specifically 
considering  the  mean  and  median.  Finally,  table  33  (Appendix  D),  shows  the 
differences between the mean and median of the variables used in the analysis, during 
and  after  the  credit  crunch.  Tables  34,  35  and  36  (Appendix  D)  cover  the  credit 
crunch period. In conjunction with the tables, graphs have been used to provide a 
clearer picture of the Japanese economy and uncover time series dynamics between 
the two groups of firms which are not evident in the tables. The differences  in mean 
values between the vast majority of the groups examined (bank dependent vs. non-
bank  dependent,  pre  vs.  post  land  value  bubble/credit  crunch)  are  all  statistically 
significant at the 1% level as can be seen in tables 32-33 and 35-36 (Appendix D). 
 
Initially though, correlation matrices for both data sets are reported. Tables 25 and 26 
(Appendix D) show correlation values between the variables utilised along with their 
significance  levels  (*,  **,  ***  denote  significance  at  the  10%,  5%  and  1%  level 
respectively). Fortunately in both tables, correlation values are in low levels and no 
perfect  correlations  are  reported  thus  multicollinearity  is  not  likely  to  plague  the 
regression results.  
 
In accordance with previous financial policy studies, the natural logarithm of sales 
and  the  tangibility  of  assets  are  positively  correlated  with  leverage.  Moreover 
indicators  of  profitability  and  internal  finance,  as  expected,  have  an  inverse 
relationship with debt to assets ratios. Results are mixed though for trade debt and tax   147 
shields.  Interestingly  enough,  Keiretsu  membership  is  positively  correlated  to 
leverage.   148 
3.4.1.1 Leverage 
 
Concerning leverage, it can be seen that in the land value bubble data set non-bank 
dependent  firms  are  significantly  more  levered  than  their  depended  counterparts 
having a debt to assets ratio mean of 0.29 as opposed to 0.26 (table 32, Appendix D). 
This is due to the fact that, large and safe firms are able and willing to receive more 
credit than their smaller sized counterparts that are likely to face financial constraints 
and thus not be able to maintain similar levels of debt.  
 
This continues to be the case during the credit crunch, where the respective means of 
bank and non-bank dependent companies are 0.25 and 0.26   (table 35, Appendix D). 
Graphs 1-2 visualise the story told by the reported descriptive statistics. As shown by 
both the tables and graphs the gap between the two groups in terms of leverage has 
declined during the most recent years. This is accompanied by a general reduction in 
leverage caused by the credit crunch. Very interesting is the fact that in the more 
recent years both groups of firms appear to face similar difficulties in raising debt. It 
seems that when credit becomes extremely scarce both groups of firms face similar 
difficulties in maintaining their leverage levels.   149 
 
 
Graph 1:Leverage, Land Value Bubble 
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Graph 2:Leverage, Credit Crunch 
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Another conclusion is that bank dependent firms rely more on short-term debt while 
non-bank dependent companies choose long term debt. Differences in short and long-
term debt levels between these two groups are quite large. During the burst of the land 
bubble, bank dependent companies have a significantly higher short term debt ratio 
mean of 0.17 compared to 0.14 for non-bank dependent firms (table 32, Appendix D).  
Moreover, it is the non-bank dependent firms that seem to prefer long-term debt, thus 
having a 0.15 ratio mean; at the same time the mean ratio of dependent companies is 
0.10 (all table 32, Appendix D). This impressive phenomenon depicted in graph 4 
remains stable throughout the entire sample period.  
 
 
Graph 3:Short-Term Leverage, Land Value Bubble 
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Graph 4:Long-Term Leverage, Land Value Bubble  
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A similar story is told by the credit crunch data set. The gap between bank and non-
bank dependent firms has remained the same in terms of long-term debt ratios, with 
the former exhibiting a mean of 0.09 and the latter a mean of 0.14 (table 35, Appendix 
D).  On  the  other  hand  the  analysis  of  short-term  debt  shows  that  the  difference 
between the two groups has increased. The value of the short-term debt mean for bank 
dependent companies has remained stable at 0.16 but for non-bank dependent ones, 
has dropped to 0.12 (graph 5, table 35, Appendix D). As in the land value bubble 
these differences are statistically significant (table 35, Appendix D). These results are 
not surprising. It is only natural that large and trustworthy firms with a low probability 
of defaulting on their obligations will be able to receive the more desirable long-term 
debt (time value of money creates more flexible liquidity ratios etc.). On the other   152 
hand smaller corporations are excluded from long-term debt and thus have to ‘settle’ 
with short-term debt.  
 
Graphs 5 and 6 clearly indicate a downward trend of leverage as time passes and the 
effects of the credit crunch become more evident. A monetary contraction reduces the 
supply of credit and that causes, up to a certain extent, companies to become credit 
rationed. The only exception is the bank dependent firms’ short-term leverage levels. 
It appears that during the mid 90s bank dependent companies decided or were forced 
to swap long-term debt for short. As the credit crunch progressed bank dependent 
firms were not able to sustain these higher short-term debt ratio levels.  
 
Graph 5:Short-Term Leverage, Credit Crunch 
0
.
0
5
.
1
.
1
5
.
2
S
h
o
r
t
 
T
e
r
m
 
D
e
b
t
 
t
o
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
A
s
s
e
t
s
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Credit Crunch
by Bank Dependency
Short Term Leverage Levels
Bank Dependent Non Bank Dependent
   153 
 
Graph 6:Long-Term Leverage, Credit Crunch 
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It is also evident that the two economic events examined have severe effects on the 
firms’ leverage levels. Both events are followed by an immediate decline in leverage. 
This is much more significant in the case of the credit crunch where the mean value of 
the debt to assets ratio drops from 0.27 to 0.22 (table 36, Appendix D). In graph 8, the 
decline from 2000 on is impressive. Admittedly, the steep drop in leverage from 1989 
onwards that was expected does not appear in the data; an explanation for this will be 
given shortly. Nevertheless a significant decline is evident, especially in 1990 and 
1991 as seen in graph 7.  
 
The drop of leverage in the late 80s is mainly due to a steep decline in short-term 
debt, with the ratio dropping from 0.17 to 0.14 (graph 3, table 33, Appendix D) is also 
interesting.  During the credit crunch  though long-term debt seems to be the main   154 
driving force behind the reduction of leverage; declining from 0.12 to 0.09 (graph 6, 
table 36, Appendix D), despite a significant decrease in short-term debt taking place 
from 2004 onwards.  
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 7:Total Leverage, Land Value Bubble 
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Graph 8:Total Leverage, Credit Crunch 
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3.4.1.2 Private Debt 
 
Private debt examination shows that its levels drop slightly from one data set to the 
other.  This  is  not  surprising  as  Japan,  experienced  severe  deregulation  and 
liberalisation during the 80s and 90s. From the late 80s onwards, firms were able to 
issue public  debt much more easily and therefore  be less  dependent on banks for 
obtaining  the  much  needed  credit.  Nevertheless  even  today  private  debt  is  the 
predominant choice when companies seek external finance. Private debt ratios in both 
data sets are approximately three times the size of public debt, 0.30 vs. 0.10 and 0.28 
vs. 0.10 respectively (tables 31 and 34, Appendix D). 
 
During the land bubble bank dependent companies have a private debt mean of 0.35 
while non-dependent have a mean of 0.26 (table 32, Appendix D). In Graph 9 shows   156 
that non-bank dependent companies from the early 80s start to consistently reduce the 
amount of private debt they hold while simultaneously dependent firms’ levels seem 
to increase slightly, until the market crash. From the late 80s onwards, dependent 
firms exhibit higher private debt to total liabilities ratios than their larger counterparts. 
This trend is of course significantly accelerated by the burst of the land bubble as 
shown in graph 9 from 1990 onwards. Graph 10 evidences that bank dependent firms 
continue to have consistently higher levels of private debt throughout the sample. As 
we move towards the last year of the sample, the values of the two groups of firms 
tend to converge.  
 
The analysis from the descriptive statistics as well as the graphs, in conjunction with 
the  conclusions  drawn  in  section  3.1.4.3,  leads  us  to  believe  that  when  non-bank 
dependent firms were given the opportunity they chose public over private debt. This 
is  in  accordance  with  the  pecking  order  hypothesis  since  large  firms  with  low 
information asymmetry and low probability of default will consider public debt the 
safest to issue.   157 
 
Graph 9:Private Debt, Land Value Bubble 
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Graph 10:Private Debt, Credit Crunch 
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When  total  private  debt  is  split  into  short-term  and  long-term  it  evidences  the 
difference in the values of private debt ratios between the groups of companies. Bank 
dependent firms have a short-term private debt mean value of 0.23 while non-bank 
dependent firms have a 0.17 value (table 32, Appendix D). Graph 11 shows that the 
results  were  severely  influenced  by  the  burst  of  the  land  bubble  and  the  market 
liberalisation;  from  1990  onwards  the  difference  between  groups  of  companies  is 
more apparent. It appears that when non-bank dependent corporations were given the 
chance they chose public over private debt, at least up to a certain level. Graph 12 
shows a similar story for long-term debt with bank dependent firms having higher 
levels of long-term private debt than non-bank dependent ones; specifically, a mean of 
0.11  and  0.09  respectively  (table  32,  Appendix  D).  Dependent  and  non-bank 
dependent companies alike depend heavily on short-term borrowing with it occupying 
two thirds of their entire private debt. 
 
 
Graph 11:Short-Term Private Debt, Land Value Bubble 
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Graph 12:Long-Term Private Debt, Land Value Bubble  
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Dependent firms continue to rely more on bank loans during the credit crunch and not 
the  gap  between  bank  and  non-bank  dependent  firms  is  now  even  bigger.  Bank 
dependent firms have a 0.23 mean for short-term private debt and non-bank dependent 
firms have a mean value of 0.14 (table 35, Appendix D). Results concerning long-
term private debt remain the same as those of the previous data set even though while 
the credit crunch is in progress small companies appear to feel financial pressure. 
From 2004 onwards large corporations have substantially higher long-term private 
debt levels. One possible explanation is that, as the credit crunch progresses larger, 
safer  companies  are  more  desirable  borrowers  than  their  smaller  counterparts. 
Therefore non-bank dependent firms are selected to receive long-term bank loans at 
the expense of bank dependent companies (graphs 13-14). 
   160 
Graph 13:Short-Term Private Debt, Credit Crunch 
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Graph 14:Long-Term Private Debt, Credit Crunch 
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In graph 15, it appears that the burst of the land bubble clearly affects private debt. 
After the burst of the bubble, the companies’ private debt to total liabilities means 
drop from 0.32 to 0.28, this being underlined by a statistically significant decrease of 
short-term private debt. Specifically short-term private debt ratios drop from 0.22 to 
0.19 (all table 33, Appendix D). From the late 90s onwards the firms’ private debt 
levels seem to decline especially after 2003 (graph 16). It seems unlikely however that 
this decrease is able to fully explain the dramatic decline in leverage during the credit 
crunch. 
 
 
Graph 15:Total Private Debt, Land Value Bubble 
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Graph 16:Total Private Debt, Credit Crunch 
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3.4.1.3 Public Debt 
 
A key component for capital structure in Japan is public debt which is probably the 
reason that the land bubble effect did not alter the firms’ leverage levels as much as 
expected. Furthermore public debt played an important role during the recent credit 
crunch. Firstly a small discussion about public debt and firm size is made. 
 
Public  debt,  or  in  other  words  the  amount  of  corporate,  convertible  bonds  and 
commercial  paper  a  firm  issues,  is  generally  expected  to  be  issued  by  large, 
trustworthy companies. Japan is no exception to this which can be seen clearly in both 
samples. The difference between companies is even more severe for public debt than 
private. The mean of the public debt ratio for bank dependent small firms in the first   163 
sample is a mere 0.04 while for their larger counterparts reaches 0.17 (graph 17, table 
32, Appendix D). This is increased during the credit crunch and is more severe for 
long-term public debt, the largest part of public debt. 
 
 
 
Graph 17:Public Debt, Land Value Bubble 
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Graph 18:Public Debt, Credit Crunch 
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Of more interest are the fluctuations of public debt in relation to the economic events 
investigated in this paper. The mean value of public debt ratios has more than doubled 
after the burst of the land bubble, going from 0.06 to 0.13 (table 33, Appendix D). The 
reasoning  behind  this  is  that  large  firms  with  access  to  public  debt  are  able  to 
substitute bank loans with corporate bonds and commercial paper thus maintaining 
their desirable capital structure. It is also possible that from the moment corporations 
have access to public debt they prefer it over private debt.  This could be due to the 
fact that, public debt is likely to be considered a safer security to issue than private 
debt according to the pecking order hypothesis. The increased usage of public debt by 
non-bank dependent firms could be a possible explanation of why the debt to assets 
ratios did  not decline as  much as many analysts would  have  expected  from 1990 
onwards.    165 
 
During the credit crunch non-bank dependent firms are apparently unable to issue 
public debt and therefore are experiencing a steep decline in their leverage levels. The 
public debt to total liabilities ratios, having their long-term components as the driving 
force, are approximately halved from 0.13 to 0.07 (graph 18, table 36, Appendix D). 
This, in conjunction with a decrease of private debt, is responsible for the drastic 
decrease of firms’ leverage ratios during the credit crunch. The assumption of public 
debt being a perfect substitute of private debt does not hold. When a credit crunch 
occurs and bank lending growth drops to negative levels, firms are unable to issue 
corporate bonds and raise external finance.  
 
3.4.1.4 Other Factors 
 
 We now turn to the independent variables. Extremely interesting results are given by 
the joint investigation of the EBIT and retained earnings ratios. First of all it should be 
stated that non-bank dependent firms appear to have higher EBIT to total assets ratios, 
albeit only slightly, than their bank dependent counterparts. What is of importance 
though is that the recession of the 90s and the East Asian banking crisis seems to not 
only have affected the Japanese economy as a whole but also the profitability of the 
manufacturing corporate sector. The mean values of the EBIT to assets ratios drop 
from 0.08 to 0.05 after the burst of the land bubble and from 0.05 to 0.04 during the 
credit crunch (graphs 19-20, tables 33 and 36, Appendix D). 
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Graph 19:EBIT to Assets, Land Value Bubble 
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Graph 20:EBIT to Assets, Credit Crunch 
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Most researchers would state that this was of course to be expected. An economic 
recession is bound to affect the profitability of companies. Nevertheless if retained 
earnings  movements  are  taken  into  consideration  the  information  taken  by 
investigating the EBIT to total assets ratios takes a whole new meaning. 
 
Graphs 21-22 show that despite decreasing profits the levels of retained earnings for 
non-bank  dependent  firms  keep  on  rising.  Firms  decide  to  keep  an  increasing 
percentage  of  their  profits  as  retained  earnings.  It  seems  that  the  majority  of 
companies were indeed facing difficulties in raising external finance. Therefore many 
had to resort to internal finance in order to be able to finance new projects, R&D and 
so  on.  This,  in  conjunction  with  the  obvious  drop  in  leverage  levels  during  both 
events, is another strong indication towards accepting the assumption that firms were 
and  are  facing  financial  constraints  that  severely  affect  their  financial  policy 
decisions.  
 
Bank dependent firms on the other hand, after 1992 have declining retained earnings 
following their pattern of profitability. A sharp decline in retained earnings after 1999 
suggests  that  bank  dependent  firms  found  it  difficult  to  raise  external  as  well  as 
internal finance. 
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Graph 21:Retained Earnings to Assets, Land Value Bubble 
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Graph 22:Retained Earnings to Assets, Credit Crunch 
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The rest of the dependent variables reported do not seem to provide any particularly 
useful information by their descriptive statistics alone. The natural logarithm of sales 
seems unaffected by monetary policy tightenings and is, as expected, higher for the 
larger non-bank dependent firms. Asset tangibility increases after the burst of the land 
bubble but then decreases as soon as the credit crunch is in effect. It is expected that 
these  explanatory  variables  will  provide  useful insights  in  terms  of the regression 
analysis and thus further investigation will be left for the next part of this paper. 
 
3.4.1.5 Conclusions 
 
Summarising this section the following points should be mentioned: 
1.  Leverage levels significantly drop after the burst of the land value bubble and 
during the credit crunch after the Japanese banking crisis of 1998. This is a 
strong indicator that financial constraints affect the firms’ capital structure. 
2.  Short-term debt radically decreased from 1990 onwards and is thus identified 
as the driving force behind the reduction of leverage. 
3.  Bank dependent companies depend more on short-term debt while non-bank 
dependent ones on long-term debt. 
4.  Private debt, especially short-term, is the main reason behind the reduction of 
debt to assets ratios during the burst of the  land  bubble. It also played an 
important role in the more recent credit crunch. 
5.  Small bank dependent firms heavily rely on bank loans, mainly short-term, 
probably due to informational asymmetries.   170 
6.  Japan is a bank centralised economy and this is verified by the fact that private 
debt  is  approximately  three  times  the  size  of  public  debt  throughout  the 
sample. 
7.  Despite this, public debt is an important factor on firms’ leverage levels. Its 
steep reduction from 1998  onwards, followed by  a smaller drop in private 
debt, drastically reduced companies’ debt to assets ratios. The credit crunch 
led to a much larger reduction in leverage than the land bubble burst did. 
8.  Large non-bank dependent companies were able to use public debt to at least 
partially mitigate the effect of the financial constraints introduced by the burst 
of the land value bubble.     171 
3.4.2 Regression Analysis 
 
As stated in section 3.2.0, the selection of the proper estimators when analysing panel 
data is of great importance. In order to correctly identify the BLUE estimators, several 
post-estimation tests were necessarily conducted. Even though section 3.2.0 presented 
the  methodology  used,  this  section  presents  several  statistical  comments  on  the 
application  of  that  methodology.  The  reader  is  advised  to  keep  the  statistical 
comments depicted below in mind as they will apply for the entire part of this study. 
 
Initially the BP test was run. If the  p  value obtained by the BP was under 0.05 then 
the null hypothesis of no unobserved effects was rejected, therefore the use of OLS 
was deemed inappropriate. Considering the restrictive assumptions that should hold 
for OLS not being biased and inconsistent when using panel data, it should not be a 
surprise that in the vast majority of regressions run in this study the BP indicated the 
rejection of OLS. 
 
When OLS were rejected the Hausman test was carried out to make the selection 
between fixed or random effects estimators. If the  p  value estimated was under 0.05 
then fixed effect estimators were utilised. In a few cases, as was predicted in section 
3.2.2, the negative Chi
2 reported led to a Hausman failure. These cases though were 
few and the guidance of the Hausman test was present in this analysis. 
 
In  these cases  of  Hausman failures,  the  choice  between  fixed  and  random effects 
estimators was considerably harder since the Hausman test was not able to provide 
assistance. Fixed effects had the advantage of not requiring the assumption of no zero   172 
correlation between  ui and  the  vector of explanatory  variables.  On  the other hand 
fixed effects did not allow the inclusion of the Keiretsu non time variant variable, an 
important term of this study. Finally, fixed effects were chosen due to the fact that 
they were deemed the safest choice of the two.  
 
First order autocorrelation was also likely to be present and up to a certain extent 
provide further validity to the fact that severe monetary policy episodes affect capital 
structure. The xtserial test was utilised and again in every case the null hypothesis of 
no first order autocorrelation was rejected. Therefore the classic xtreg command used 
by STATA to accommodate a panel data analysis was replaced with xtregar which 
allows first order autocorrelation.  
 
The  problem  arising  in  this  case  was  that  the  STATA  xtregar  command  despite 
allowing the presence of first order autocorrelation did not allow the use of the robust 
option  allowing  the  presence  of  heteroskedasticity.  There  is  no  solution  for  this 
problem.  
 
Nevertheless it should be stated that alternating estimators did not seriously alter the 
results  of the regression  analysis. Furthermore when fixed effects estimators were 
selected R
2 values reported are actually R
2 within. When random effects estimators 
are used then no R
2 values are reported as explained in section 3.2.1.2.  
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3.4.2.1 Debt to Assets Ratio 
 
Having  previously  made  econometrical  clarifications  we  should  now  move  on  to 
present the first regression model examined. This equation investigates the total debt 
to total assets ratio and its final form is depicted below while the results are shown in 
tables 12-13 (Appendix B). 
 
it t i
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
v u s Totalasset
y Accountspa
s Totalasset
Shields NonDebtTax
s Totalasset
tearnings
s Totalasset
EBIT
s Totalasset
Tangassets Logsales Keiretsu a licy MonetaryPo a Bankdep a a
s Totalasset
Totaldebt
ε β β β β
β β
+ + + + + +
+ + + + + =
+ 6 5 4 3
2 1 3 2 1
Re
 
Equation 24:Total Debt to Total Assets Regression Model 
 
 
One of the two most crucial points of this study is how small and large firms are 
affected during changes of monetary policy. The dummy variable accounting for this 
factor  (bankdep,  table  49,  Appendix  E)  shows  that  during  a  monetary  policy 
expansion, bank dependent firms have higher levels of total and short term leverage. 
More specifically if a company is bank dependent then on average this leads to an 
increase of its total leverage levels by 0.0162 and its shot-term leverage by 0.0385.   
As discussed in the descriptive statistics section, small bank dependent firms have an 
easier than usual time in accessing credit during a period of economic expansion and 
therefore appear more levered than their larger counterparts.  
 
When total leverage is examined bank dependency has an elasticity (calculated as 
coefficient on x*(mean of x/mean of y); hereinafter E) of 0.03. Elasticity measures the 
relative  response  of  one  variable  to  changes  in  another  variable;  in  this  case  the 
response  of  total  leverage  in  bank  dependency.  If  1 0 < < E  then  y is  relatively   174 
inelastic with respect to x; in other words relatively large changes of x will cause 
relatively small changes in y .  If  ∞ < < E 1  then  y is relatively elastic with respect to 
x, in other words relatively small changes of x will cause relatively large changes 
in y . In this case total leverage is relatively inelastic in response to bank dependency 
which  means  that  bank  dependency  has  a  small  impact  on  total  leverage.  This 
reasoning  is  the  same  throughout  the  thesis  in  connection  with  each  variable 
discussed. 
 
However  this  phenomenon  is  reversed  when  it  comes  to  long-term  debt.  If  a 
corporation is classified as bank dependent then this leads to a decrease of its leverage 
levels by 0.03067(E:0.043). This only verifies the fact that the more desirable long-
term debt is received mainly by the larger, safer firms whereas small firms mostly rely 
on short-term debt.  
 
The relationship between bank dependency and leverage is reversed during the credit 
crunch of the late 90s (table 50, Appendix E). Large firms have higher values of debt 
to assets ratios not only in total but also in terms of long-term debt. More specifically 
if  a  firm  is  classified  as  bank  dependent  then  this  leads  to  a  0.021(E:0.026)  and 
0.0366(E:0.10) decrease of its total and long-term leverage levels respectively. The 
bank dependency coefficient for short-term leverage was not statistically significant 
and thus no robust conclusions could be drawn.   
 
The second key implication that this study is trying to bring forth is that economic 
conditions affect the supply of credit and ultimately capital structure. Both the burst of 
the land value bubble of the 80s and the credit crunch taking place in the 90s are 
followed by severe reductions  in leverage  (bubble, table  49 and crunch, table  50,   175 
Appendix E). When the bubble bursts, total leverage is drastically reduced (a 0.0389 
reduction occurs, E:0.064); this is underlined by a similar drop of short-term debt (a 
reduction of 0.0337 is observed; E:0.099). On the other hand, all forms of leverage 
experience a steep decline  during  the  credit crunch  (reductions  of 0.078(E:0.142), 
0.0155(E:0.051) and 0.0707(E:0.29) are witnessed for total, short-term and long-term 
leverage respectively). This proves our hypothesis that a decrease in the supply of 
credit will have a similar impact on the firms’ capital structures. 
 
Encouraging for the results of the dummy variables is the fact that in the majority of 
cases the bank dependency and monetary policy indicators are statistically significant 
and most times at the 1% significance level. 
 
Moving on to explanatory variables used more frequently in capital structure studies, 
the  reader  will  find  out  that  results  in  general  support  the  findings  of  previous 
published  papers.  The  tangibility  of  assets  factor  is  positively  correlated  with 
leverage, one standard deviation (hereinafter s.d.) increase in the tangible fixed assets 
to  total  assets  ratio  leads  to  a  0.0494(E:0.067)  increase  of  total  leverage,  and  is 
statistically significant (tangfassets, tables 49-50, Appendix E).  This is in accordance 
with previous studies, such as those of Booth et al. (2001) and Titman and Wessels 
(1988), stating that high collateral values are perceived by banks as a signal that the 
firm is less likely to default on its obligations. The only exception to this rule is the 
short-term leverage regression during the land value bubble. In this case an increase 
of one s.d. of tangible assets leads to decrease of 0.0388(E:0.093) to the short-term 
debt to total assets ratio. This could be explained by the many small corporations that 
would normally be credit rationed had access to short-term debt during the economic   176 
expansion  of  the  80s.  This  of  course  is  in  turn  reflected  in  the  asset  tangibility 
variable. 
The natural logarithm of sales factor (logsales, tables 12-13, Appendix B) in general 
indicates that firms with higher financial activity are more levered. Nevertheless the 
results of this variable in most cases are statistically insignificant. 
 
In accordance with the pecking order hypothesis the terms depicting profitability and 
internal finance  (EBIT and  Retearnings,  tables 49-50,  Appendix E) are negatively 
related to leverage, this relationship being significant and stable for both data sets. As 
the particular theory suggests, firms indeed seem to prefer internal to external finance. 
More specifically, in the land value bubble data set an increase of one s.d. in the EBIT 
variable leads to a decrease of 0.1545(E:0.033) in total leverage and that an increase 
of one s.d. in the Retearnings variable results in a 0.7034(E:0.467) decrease of total 
leverage. These results confirm the majority of papers based either in Japan (Hirota 
1999, Allen and Mizuno 1989) or worldwide (Rajan and Zingales 1995).  
 
The evidence though, does not seem to be supportive of the trade-off theory. Non-debt 
tax shields (NDTS, tables 49-50, Appendix E) should have a negative relationship 
with debt to assets ratios. The results even if significant are mixed, with the specific 
variables having different signs in both data sets. This does not allow this study to 
draw a conclusion for the validity of the trade-off theory. 
 
Results reported for trade credit, accountspay, are shown in tables 49-50 (Appendix 
E). During the 80s when credit was still plenty, trade credit seems to play the role of a 
debt substitute as has been reported by Deloof and Jegers (1999). It has a negative 
sign  no  matter  which  definition  of  leverage  is  examined.  An  example  is  that  an   177 
increase of one s.d. in accountspay leads to a decrease of 0.6406(E:0.502) in total 
leverage. During the credit crunch regression analysis though, where it has already 
been shown that credit is likely to be rationed, trade credit has a different role. In this 
data  set,  with  the  exception  of  long-term  leverage,  trade  credit  seems  to  provide 
signals  for  the  firms’  quality  levels,  thereby  reducing  information  asymmetry 
problems. More specifically an increase of one s.d. leads to a 1.2761(E:0.92) increase 
to total leverage. This is more in line with Biais & Gollier’s (1997) theory. This seems 
to be the explanation of why accounts payable are positively related with leverage in 
the credit crunch. 
 
A general comment on the regression results that should be stated is that in every 
regression  run,  the  Woolridge  test  indicated  the  existence  of  first  order 
autocorrelation.  As  expected  the  BP  test  indicated  towards  the  rejection  of  OLS. 
Furthermore  the  Hausman  test  pointed  towards  the  acceptance  of  fixed  effect 
estimators. The R
2 results indicate a good fit for the model created, especially for the 
credit  crunch  data  set,  though  the  reader  should  keep  in  mind  that  regressions 
investigating  capital  structure  and  using  panel  data  tend  to  report  low  R
2  values. 
Despite  this,  it  appears  that  the  regression  examining  long-term  leverage  has  a 
particularly low R
2.
 This is a phenomenon observed not only in this regression but 
also in all the subsequent regressions investigating long-term debt components. This 
is likely affected by the fact that approximately 18.5% of the total observations in this 
data set report long-term debt ratios that have the value of 0. Alternatively it could be 
the case that  there are one  or more factors that  affect long-term debt and are not 
included in this, and all the previous, analyses. 
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3.4.2.2 Bank Loans to Total Liabilities 
 
The methodology used here is identical to the one used in the previous section with 
the only difference being the change of the dependent variable from leverage to that 
of bank loans to total liabilities. The regression model run is of the following form: 
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Equation 25:Private Debt to Total Liabilities Regression Model 
 
 
 
The  results  in  tables  51-52  (Appendix  E)  are  again  generally  according  to 
expectations. The dummy variable of bank dependency indicates that for small firms, 
bank loans occupy a larger portion of their total liabilities. This applies for both time 
periods and as an example we see that if a firm is bank dependent then this leads into 
a 0.1087(E:0.184) and a 0.0676(E:0.072) increase in its total private debt ratios during 
the land value bubble and credit crunch data set respectively. It is likely that, due to 
information asymmetries, smaller companies have to rely almost exclusively on bank 
loans without having the option of issuing public debt or equity. 
 
Of particular interest is also the fact that for both data sets when long-term private 
debt is examined, the size of the bank dependency coefficient is significantly lower 
(tables 51-52, Appendix E). More specifically a corporation being bank dependent 
results in an average 0.0234(E:0.041) and 0.0145(E:0.046) increase to its private debt 
ratio during the land value bubble and the credit crunch respectively.  This could be   179 
due to smaller companies mainly relying on short-term bank loans that are granted 
more easily. On the other hand, due to informational asymmetries, long-term loans are 
much harder to be obtained by small firms especially due to the competition from 
their larger and more trustworthy counterparts.  
 
Tables 51 and 52 (Appendix E), show that the bubble and crunch dummy variables 
again indicate that the two examined economic events severely affect the supply of 
credit. During the late 80s we see private debt to total liabilities ratios, especially 
those  of short-term debt, significantly higher before the recession  of the 90s took 
place.  During  the  land  bubble  the  firms’  private  debt  levels  are  increased  by 
0.1087(E:0.164)  Similarly  private  debt  levels  drop  significantly  during  the  credit 
crunch (total private debt is decreased by 0.0474; E:0.074). It is clearly evident that 
when the banks decrease their loan supply this is immediately shown in the firms’ 
capital structure.  
 
The  explanatory  variables  investigating  profitability  and  internal  finance  have  an 
inverse relationship with private debt for both periods, again indicating that internal 
finance is used as a substitute of bank credit. This in accordance with the pecking 
order theory stating that firms will prefer internal to external finance. As an example it 
will be mentioned that in the land value bubble data set an increase of one s.d. in the 
EBIT variable leads to a decrease of 0.1827(E:0.036) in total private debt and that an 
increase of one s.d. in the Retearnings variable results in a 0.440(E:0.267) decrease of 
total private debt. It should be stated though that retained earnings are not statistically 
significant during the credit crunch (tables 51-52, Appendix E).  
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Another substitute of bank credit can be found in accounts payable (tables 51-52, 
Appendix E). Trade credit, this time consistently for both data sets, has a negative 
sign  and  is  statistically  significant.  It  appears  that  corporations  that  are  unable  to 
receive the cheaper and more desirable bank credit have to resort to using trade credit 
(a detailed investigation is held in chapter 5). As an example an increase of 1 s.d. in 
the land value bubble data set leads to a decrease of 0.5949(E:0.426) in total private 
debt. An increase of 1 s.d. in the credit crunch data set results in a 0.2680(E:0.168) 
decrease of total private debt.  The magnitude of the coefficient has of course halved 
from the late 90s onwards but it still remains quite large. 
 
Other  useful  conclusions  can  be  drawn  by  the  examination  of  tables  51  and  52 
(Appendix  E).Tangibility  of  assets  in  every  regression  run  has  again  a  positive 
relationship with debt thereby verifying the common knowledge that banks regard 
firms’ tangible assets as collateral when issuing a loan. More specifically in the land 
value  bubble  data  set  a  one  s.d.  increase  in  the  tangfassets  variable  leads  to  a 
0.2333(E:0.288) increase of total private debt.  
 
The  natural  logarithm  of  sales  reports  a  negative  relationship  with  private  debt 
indicating that the smaller the size of the financial transactions of a firm the higher its 
private debt to total liabilities ratio will be (tables 51-52, Appendix E). For example in 
the land value bubble data set a one s.d. increase in the logsales variable leads to a 
0.0082(E:0.297) decrease of total private debt. This only confirms the conclusions 
drawn by the bank dependency and asset tangibility factors. Last but not least, non-
debt  tax  shields  disappoint  yet  again  as  they  present  a  positive  sign  and  are 
statistically significant, contrary to what the trade-off theory states.   181 
3.4.2.3 Public Debt to Long Term Debt 
 
Next in this analysis comes the investigation of the public to long-term debt ratio. 
Once again the methodology remains the same and the regression formula turns into: 
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Equation 26:Public Debt to Total Liabilities Regression Model 
 
 
 
 
Based on the descriptive statistics reported in section 3.4.1.3 it we expected to find 
results indicating that non-bank dependent companies issue public debt as a substitute 
to private debt. Such a conclusion can indeed be drawn by the results shown in tables 
53 and 54 (Appendix E). As an example if a company is classified as bank dependent 
then this leads to a 0.0871(E:0.43) decrease to its public debt to total liabilities ratio in 
the land value bubble data set and a 0.1229(E:0.592) decrease in the credit crunch 
data  set.  The  natural  logarithm  of  sales  confirms  this  by  indicating  that  larger 
companies  issue  larger  amounts  of  public  debt  despite  that  in  some  cases  its 
coefficients are not statistically significant.  
 
The results reported by the bubble and crunch variables in tables 54 and 55 (Appendix 
E) help us to understand further the role that public debt has as far as capital structure 
is concerned. As it appears the issuance of public debt dramatically increases after 
1990 as shown by a negative relationship between the bubble variable and public debt   182 
(the burst of the land value bubble leads to a 0.0864 decrease of total public debt; 
E:0.378).  This  means  that  indeed  public  debt  is  used  by  firms as a  substitute  for 
private debt. During the credit crunch the same does not happen. The coefficient of 
the crunch factor has a negative sign indicating that during the credit crunch public 
debt is reduced (it leads to a 0.0734 decrease of total public debt; E:0.314). It appears 
that when the banking sector face severe problems, companies are not able to utilise 
capital markets and obtain external finance through the issuance of corporate bonds or 
commercial paper. 
 
As in the case of leverage and private debt regressions EBIT have a negative and 
significant relationship with public debt issuance (in the land value bubble a one s.d. 
increase of the ebit to total assets ratio results in a 0.1370 decrease of total public debt 
levels; E:0.078; similarly in the credit crunch data set a one s.d. increase of the EBIT 
factor leads to a 0.1778 decrease of total public debt; E:0.077). The same holds for 
retained earnings with the exception of some cases in the credit crunch data set for 
which  the  results for  long-term  public  debt are  not statistically  significant.  As an 
example it will be mentioned that in the land value bubble data set an increase of one 
s.d. in the retained earnings variable leads to a decrease of 0.0937(E:0.165) in total 
public  debt  and  during  the  credit  crunch  an  increase  of  one  s.d.  results  in  a 
0.0035(E:0.006)  decrease  of  total  public  debt.      Summing  up  the  results  of  the 
profitability  and  internal  finance  factors  it  seems  that  the  main  principal  of  the 
pecking  order  hypothesis  can  be  safely  accepted;  firms  prefer  internal  to  external 
finance. The same statement cannot be made for the trade-off theory whose non-debt 
tax shields yet again fail to report the expected sign. (tables 53-54, Appendix E). 
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The results of the asset tangibility factor, as shown in tables 53 and 54 (Appendix E), 
are rather intriguing. In every regression run asset tangibility has presented an inverse 
relationship  with  public  debt  even  though  in  some  cases  this  is  not  statistically 
significant (in the land value bubble a one s.d. increase of the tangible assets ratio 
results in a 0.1347 decrease of total public debt levels; E:0.484). The exact opposite 
was expected due to the  fact that the majority of corporate bond and commercial 
paper issuers are large trustworthy companies that are likely to have high collateral 
values. Apparently large, non-bank dependent firms with high intangible assets and 
low profitability will prefer to issue public debt.   184 
3.4.2.4 Debt vs. Equity 
 
 
Concluding this part of the analysis the probability of a firm issuing debt or equity is 
going to be investigated. Three separate regression models are run, their difference 
being changes in the dependent variable. In the first model the dummy dependent 
variable takes the value of 1 if the firm issues equity and 0 if it does not. Likewise in 
the second model the dependent variable will depict a debt issuance again taking the 
value of 1 if a company decides to issue debt and 0 if it does not. Finally in the last 
regression the probability of a firm issuing equity or debt is going to be examined. In 
this case the dependent variable will take the value of 1 if the firm chooses to issue 
equity and 0 if it decides to issue debt; dual issuances are excluded. An equity or debt 
issuance is defined as an increase of a company’s capital or total debt equivalently in 
excess of 1% of its value of book assets. An example of the type of regression model 
used is: 
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Equation 27:Probability of Equity Issuance Regression Model 
 
 
 
In probability regression analysis researchers have to choose between logit or probit 
estimators to carry out their analysis. As Gujarati (2003, pages 614-615) states, the 
main difference between the two models is that the logit cumulative distribution has 
slightly fatter tails than probit. For this paper, the more frequently used panel logit   185 
estimators were selected. The results of this logit analysis can be seen in tables 55 and 
56 (Appendix E). 
 
For the land bubble data set the results for the bank dependency variable were not 
statistically significant with the exception of the debt issuance examination and thus 
robust conclusions could not be drawn. As far as the debt issuance is concerned bank 
dependent companies are shown to be more likely to issue debt (if a firms is bank 
dependent then there is an increase of 0.4339 to its probability of issuing debt). This 
means that smaller firms are more dependent on bank credit and are thus likelier to 
seek  a  bank  loan  than  non-bank  dependent  companies  that  have  other  options 
available such as equity.  
 
Nevertheless during the credit crunch it is clearly shown that non-bank dependent 
firms are more likely to issue equity or debt than their bank dependent counterparts 
(bank dependency leads to a 0.2886 and 0.4194 decrease to the probability of the firm 
issuing  equity  or  debt).  These  results  are  clearly  influenced  by  the  credit  crunch. 
When  a  major  economic  contraction  takes  place  then  only  the  large,  trustworthy 
companies are going to be likely candidates of issuing either equity or debt. 
 
The burst of the land bubble leads to an increase in the probability of a company 
issuing  equity.  More  specifically  the  burst  of  the  land  bubble  results  in  a  1.9023 
increase in the probability of the company issuing equity. This is not surprising given 
the fact that the severe reduction in the supply of bank credit made the firms search 
for other alternatives of credit. 
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During the credit crunch it is shown that companies are less likely to issue equity or 
debt  (table  56,  Appendix  E).  The  credit  crunch  results  in  a  0.2886  and  0.4194 
decrease in the probability of a company issuing equity and debt respectively. This is 
an expected result because during a period where a credit crunch takes place and fear 
is the major sentiment plaguing the financial markets, companies are likely to face 
severe  difficulties  in  obtaining  any  kind  of  external  finance.  Results  from  the 
examination of the probability of a firm issuing debt versus equity are not statistically 
significant and therefore robust conclusions cannot be drawn. 
 
Tables  55  and  56  (Appendix  E)  show  the tangibility  of assets  variable  producing 
results that do not allow any robust conclusions to be drawn. This is because the 
tangfassets factor reports  mixed signs and  in many  cases coefficients that are not 
statistically significant. It appears that the higher the collateral value of a firm the less 
likely it is to proceed to an issuance of either debt or equity; even though the absolute 
value of the coefficient is much larger for the case of an increase in equity. Therefore 
high collateral values are proven to help mitigate information asymmetries between 
informational opaque firms and financial intermediaries.  
 
Internal finance as depicted by retained earnings to assets, and in accordance to the 
existence of a pecking order, also has an inverse relationship with either a debt or an 
equity increase. This is also true for trade credit which again has the role of substitute 
for equity as well as debt (tables 55-56, Appendix E). As an example, in the land 
value bubble data set, a one s.d. increase in Retearnings and Accountspay leads to a 
1.0073 and a 3.0267 decrease respectively to the probability of a company issuing 
debt.   187 
 
In tables 55 and 56 (Appendix E) show a different EBIT variable story to the previous 
sections of the regression analysis. In this logit investigation EBIT retain their classic 
role as an indicator of internal finance and therefore as a substitute of debt. When it 
comes down to equity issuance though EBIT seem to lower information asymmetries 
and help companies go through an equity issuance. It is only logical after all that 
profitable firms will appear attractive to potential investors. As an example in the land 
value bubble data set, a one s.d. increase in EBIT  leads to a 8.5099 increase to the 
probability of a firm issuing  equity and  a 5.7016 decrease  to the probability  of a 
company issuing debt. 
 
Non-debt  tax  shields  present  a  negative  signed  coefficient  when  debt  issuance  is 
examined during the land value bubble. They also exhibit an inverse relationship with 
equity  during  the  credit  crunch.  Nevertheless  the  factor  of  non-debt  tax  shields 
produces  statistically  insignificant  results  for  half  the  regressions  (tables  55-56, 
Appendix E).   188 
3.4.2.5 Robustness Tests 
 
In order to validate the findings of sections 4.2.1-4.2.4 it has been deemed necessary 
that a series of robustness test should be run.  
 
The  first  round  of  the  robustness  tests  conducted  is  essentially  a  re-run  of  the 
regression models of sections 3.4.2.1-3.4.2.3. The only difference is that this time 
‘system  GMM’  estimators  are  used.  ‘System  GMM’  estimators  possess  several 
advantages over the fixed effects estimators, as can be seen in section 3.2.1.4, but 
perhaps  the  most  important  of  them  all  is  their  ability  to  deal  with  the  potential 
existence of endogeneity. In order to save space and not tire the reader the short and 
long term components of leverage, private debt and public debt are not examined (this 
will be the case for all the robustness tests of this section). The results of the GMM 
robustness tests are shown in tables 57 and 58 (Appendix E). 
 
In  general  the  results  from  the  tables  support  the  findings  from  sections  3.4.2.1-
3.4.2.3. Almost all the variables have the expected signs even though in some cases 
the results are statistically insignificant. Companies are more levered during the land 
value bubble while during the credit crunch they are forced to reduce their leverage 
levels (during the land bubble period an increase of 0.0156 and 0.0140 is observed in 
total leverage and private debt respectively). Furthermore smaller sized companies 
rely mostly on private debt and generally appear to face significant problems during 
the credit crunch (bank dependent companies receive on average a 0.0140 and 0.5383 
increase to its private debt levels during the land bubble and the credit crunch). On the 
whole  this  conclusion  is  verified  by  the  results  brought  forward  by  the  logsales   189 
variable.  As  predicted,  the  profitability  factor  has  a  negative  relationship  with  all 
forms of external finance and is almost in every case statistically significant. On the 
other hand the variable of collateral values is in most cases statistically insignificant 
and therefore no robust conclusions can be drawn.  The non debt tax shields factor 
continues to provide mixed and statistically insignificant results confirming the results 
of  the  main  empirical  analysis.  Finally,  even  if  in  some  cases  statistically 
insignificant, the results coming from the internal finance and trade credit variables 
are in accordance with those of sections 3.4.2.1-3.4.2.3. 
 
Of great interest is the keiretsu dummy variable which due to its time invariant nature 
was  not  included  in  the  previous  sections  of  this chapter.  It  appears  that  keiretsu 
members have easier access to private credit during the land value bubble (keiretsu 
membership leads to a 0.014 increase to private debt). These results though reverse in 
the credit crunch data set where a negative relationship is recorded between keiretsu 
members and private debt (keiretsu membership leads to a 0.0152 decrease to private 
debt). This reversal could be due to the weakening of the keiretsu ties caused by the 
deregulation of the Japanese economy during the late 80s and early 90s.  
 
As a final note for the GMM robustness tests it should be stated that the results of 
tables  57  and  58  (Appendix  E)  did  not  show  any  major  problems  as  far  as 
overidentifying restrictions and serial correlations are concerned. The J statistic test 
was consistently larger than 0.05 as was the m2 test for second order serial correlation.  
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As was mentioned in section 3.1.0, no outliers from the panel data set were removed. 
This was because the author did not want to tamper with the data. Nevertheless the 
author recognises the fact that the majority of studies in the area of corporate finance, 
but also finance in general, omit outliers by removing the 1% tails of the distribution 
of  all  regression  variables.  This  procedure  was  applied  in  the  second  round  of 
robustness tests in order to see if the results of the main empirical analysis are valid 
even after the removal of outliers. 
 
The results of these robustness tests are evident in tables 59 and 60 (Appendix E) and 
on the whole re-affirm the conclusions of sections 3.4.2.1-3.4.2.3. Bank dependent 
companies are more levered during the land value bubble but this is reversed during 
the  credit  crunch.  Bank  dependent  firms  issue  more  private  debt  while  non-bank 
dependent firms issue more public debt. A reduction of total and private debt occurs 
after the burst of the bubble while a general decrease of all forms of debt is evident 
during the credit crunch. The natural logarithm of sales is in accordance with the bank 
dependency  dummy  variable.  The  internal  finance,  profitability  and  trade  credit 
factors are negatively related with all forms of external finance. Non-debt tax shields 
continue to produce mixed and in most cases statistically insignificant results and thus 
fail once more to support the trade-off theory.  
 
The only difference with the results of the main empirical analysis is that trade credit 
operates  as  a  substitute  of  leverage  during  the  credit  crunch  period  (exactly  the 
opposite is recorded in section 3.4.2.1.). More specifically a one s.d. increase in the 
accounts payable to total assets leads to a 0.5649 decrease in leverage. It should be 
stated though that the other robustness tests do not confirm this.   191 
 
As an additional robustness test manufacturing companies that did not submit their 
financial statements in the end of March were added to the original sample. It should 
be stated that the number of firm-observations added in this case is much larger than 
the  number  of  firm-observations  removed  when  outliers  are  removed  from  the 
original sample. The findings of this test are evident in tables 61 and 62 (Appendix E) 
and again are in accordance with those of the main empirical analysis. The only cases 
that this does not happen is in the examination of leverage in the land value bubble 
data set where the factors of bank dependency and asset tangibility are not statistically 
significant.  Furthermore  the  retearnings  variable  also  appears  to  be  statistically 
insignificant in most cases in the credit crunch data set.  
 
As  it  can  be  understood  the  results  of  the  bank  dependency  dummy  variable  are 
extremely important in order to support the validity of this thesis’ theory. Therefore 
robustness  tests  were  applied  to  examine  if  the  results  of  the  bank  dependency 
variables  in  the  main  empirical  analysis  are  valid.  These  robustness  tests  used  a 
different  cut-off  point  to  classify  companies  as  bank  dependent  and  non-bank 
dependent. Every year the firms were ranked according to their total assets levels and 
the  lowest  20%  (the  percentage  in  the  main  empirical  analysis  was  30%)  were 
classified as bank dependent and vice versa for the non-bank dependent firms. The 
results of these robustness tests are evident in tables 63 and 64 (Appendix E) and 
confirm those of sections 3.4.2.1-3.4.2.3 even though in the examination of leverage 
the bank dependency dummy variables are statistically insignificant. 
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Additional  robustness  tests  for  the  validity  of  the  bank  dependency  results  were 
applied. In this instance a different indicator for bank dependency was used and thus 
total assets were replaced by sales. This alternative measure of bank dependency is a 
natural choice since many capital structure studies such as those of Huang and Song 
(2006), Rajan and Zingales (1995) have used sales as a measure of size. In order to 
further ensure the robustness of this thesis results different cut-off points were utilised 
yet again.  
 
Therefore every year the firms were ranked according to their sales levels and the 
lowest 30% (or 20%) were classified as bank dependent and vice versa for the non-
bank dependent firms. The results of the robustness tests with a 30% cut-off points 
can be seen in tables 65 and 66 (Appendix E) and the results of the tests utilising 20% 
cut-off points can be seen in tables 67 and 68 (Appendix E).  The evidence indicate 
that no matter what definition is used the results coming from the bank dependency 
variable are reliable. Nevertheless as in the case of the previous tests, during the land 
value bubble examination of total leverage the coefficients of the bank dependency 
dummy variable are not statistically significant. Furthermore during the credit crunch 
it is shown that bank dependent firms have higher leverage levels. 
 
A  similar  practise  was  followed  for  the  equally  important  dummy  variables 
accounting  for  the  effects  of  the  land  value  bubble  and  credit  crunch.  Slightly 
different definitions were used in order to ensure the validity of the main empirical 
analysis’ results. More specifically the land value bubble dummy variable received 
the value of 1 during the 1980-88 period and 0 during the 1989-98 period. Since the 
burst of the land bubble occurred in the last quarter of 1989 this alternative definition   193 
will reveal if that particular year has caused any distortion to the thesis’ findings. In a 
similar fashion 2007 was excluded from the credit crunch dummy variable. This was 
the  year  the  global  credit  crunch  commenced,  not  directly  associated  with  the 
Japanese  economy,  taking  place.  Therefore  the  credit  crunch  dummy  variable 
received the value of 0 during the 1990-98 period and 1 during the 1999-2006 period. 
The findings shown in tables 69 and 70 (Appendix E) are in accordance with those 
seen in sections 3.4.2.1-3.4.2.3. This prove that even if certain years suspected of 
disproportionately  affecting  the  results  are  excluded  the  main  findings  remain  the 
same. 
 
It  was  also  deemed  worthy  to  examine  the  possibility  that  the  dummy  variables 
deployed  affect  the  left  hand  side  variables  indirectly.  In  order  to  conduct  this 
investigation  interaction  variables  between  the  bankdep,  bubble/crunch  dummy 
variables and the continuous independent variables were constructed.   
 
The interaction variables of the bank dependency factor (tables 75-76, Appendix E) 
show that indeed in most cases the bankdep dummy variable has a differential impact 
on  the  dependent  variable.  During  both  periods  and  all  forms  of  external  finance 
examined bank dependent firms have an increase in asset tangibility, retained earnings 
or accounts payable also leading to an external finance increase. The bankdep*EBIT 
factor also has a positive relationship with leverage during the land value bubble but 
this is reversed during the credit crunch. These results are a clear indication that small 
firms face financial constraints due to informational asymmetries while on the other 
hand  non-bank  dependent  companies  are  free  to  follow  a  pecking  order  capital 
structure. Moreover within the group of small firms, the  companies with the best   194 
looking  balance  sheets  are  able  to  lower  the  information  asymmetry  barrier  and 
receive external finance.  
 
The results from the interaction variables between the bubble/crunch variables and the 
other independent factors (tables 77-78, Appendix E) tell a similar story. Specifically 
it  is  shown  that  when  a  monetary  policy  contraction  occurs  the  most  desirable 
candidates  (companies  with  high  collateral  values,  retained  earnings  and  accounts 
payable) are going to be viewed as trustworthy borrowers and thus receive external 
finance. It is also shown that, especially during the credit crunch and in accordance 
with the pecking order hypothesis, companies with high EBIT to assets ratios will 
choose to use internal rather than external finance. 
 
Another method used to ensure the validity of this thesis’ results was the inclusion of 
dynamic specifications (tables 71-72, Appendix E). Despite the addition of lagged 
dependent  variables  the  majority  of  the  coefficients  reported  are  statistically 
significant, as are the coefficients of the lagged dependent variables themselves, and 
confirm the results of the main empirical analysis. 
 
The final robustness tests revolve around the non-debt tax shields variable. As was 
seen  in  sections  3.4.2.1-3.4.2.3,  as  well  as  previous  robustness  tests,  the  variable 
accounting for the effect of non-debt tax shields on capital structure produced results 
not consistent with the trade-off theory. In order to ensure that this is indeed the case a 
slightly different definition for the non-debt tax shields was used. More specifically it 
was decided to use Huang and Song’s (2006) and Bradley et al.’s (1984) definition of 
non-debt  tax  shields:  depreciation  and  amortisation.  Therefore  in  this  study  the   195 
alternative  definition  of  non-debt  tax  shields  was  Depreciation  and  Amortisation 
Expenses  (NFINANCIAL.NKCODE'FE088)  scaled  by  Total  Assets 
(NFINANCIAL’FB067). 
 
The results of this robustness test are shown in tables 73 and 74 (Appendix E) and as 
can be seen the NDTS, even if statistically insignificant in some cases, clearly has an 
inverse relationship with external debt. For example during the land value bubble one 
s.d. increase of NDTS leads to a 0.6355 decrease of total leverage. These findings of 
this different definition for non-debt tax shields provide at least partial support to the 
trade-off theory. Of course the systematic failure of the main definition of non-debt 
tax shields cannot be ignored.  
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3.5.0 Results for Public and Private Firms 
 
In this section we look at the regression analysis’ results for the public and private 
firms data set. Firstly, descriptive statistics for the utilised variables will be depicted 
along with related graphs. We then continue with the results of the regression models 
in their tables along with their respective comments. 
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3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Tables 79 and 80 (Appendix F) include correlation matrices for the land bubble and 
the credit crunch periods respectively. Table 91 (Appendix F) gives an overall view of 
the 1980–1997 period, table 92 (Appendix F) makes a distinction between listed and 
not-listed firms while table 93 (Appendix F) divides the data set relevantly to the burst 
of the land bubble. The same logic has been applied to the credit crunch set and tables 
94-96 (Appendix F). 
 
With regard to the correlation matrices, results in general seem to be in accordance 
with those of the data set of public firms. Variables depicting profitability, retained 
earnings, tangibility of assets and trade credit have the expected signs. In these data 
sets, as well as  the ones used in section 3.4.1., correlation levels  of the variables 
utilised in the analysis do not have values that cause suspicion for the existence of 
multicollinearity. 
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3.5.1.1 Leverage 
 
An  initial  analysis  can  be  conducted  by  the  careful  examination  of  the  above 
mentioned tables. This provides useful initial insights regarding differences in  the 
capital structure of public and private firms in relation to macroeconomic conditions. 
Again graphs have been added for a much clearer depiction of the corporate financial 
markets. The vast majority of the numerical differences mentioned, are statistically 
significant at the 1% level as can be seen in tables 92 and 93 and 95 and 96 (Appendix 
F). 
 
The analysis of the descriptive statistics will start with leverage. As seen in graph 23, 
during the 1980-1997 period (especially before the burst of the land bubble) private 
firms are consistently more levered than public firms. More specifically in table 92 
(Appendix F) we can see that listed companies have a debt to assets mean of 0.27 
while unlisted ones have a mean of 0.31 (this difference is statistically significant at 
the 1% level). The same applies for the credit crunch period where listed corporations 
continue to be under levered having a mean of 0.25 in comparison to that of a 0.29 
which unlisted firms have (graph 24, table 95, Appendix F). 
 
In  section  3.4  it  was  shown  that  size  was  an  important  factor  to  firms’  capital 
structures. It was proved that large non-bank dependent firms, at least during turbulent 
economic conditions,  had  higher  debt to assets ratios.  Nevertheless  these findings 
indicate  that  size  does  not  tell  the  entire  story  behind  capital  structure  decisions. 
Listed  firms  in  both  data  sets  are  significantly  larger  in  size  than  their  unlisted 
counterparts and despite this, have lower leverage ratios. In detail, during the land   199 
bubble data set the average natural logarithm of sales in listed firms is 10.7 while that 
of unlisted ones is 8.9 (table 92, Appendix F). The same case applies for the credit 
crunch file in which the sales’ levels for unlisted and listed companies lie at 9.05 and 
10.7 respectively (table 95, Appendix F). 
 
We could assume that large public companies have access to forms of leverage that 
are not captured by the total debt to total assets ratio. In section 3.5.2 it will be shown 
that this is indeed the case.  
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 23:Leverage, Land Value Bubble 
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
T
o
t
a
l
 
D
e
b
t
 
t
o
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
A
s
s
e
t
s
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97
Burst of the Land Value Bubble
by Listed Info
Leverage Levels
Listed Non Listed
 
   200 
 
Graph 24:Leverage, Credit Crunch 
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The phenomenon of the increased total debt to total assets ratios of unlisted firms in 
relation to those of listed ones can also be seen in the graphs 25 and 26 that follow 
and make a distinction between short and long-term debt. As can be seen in table 92 
(Appendix F), listed firms have a short and long-term leverage ratio means of 0.15 
and 0.12 respectively. On the other hand the equivalent values of private companies 
are 0.18 and 0.13. As in section 3.4.1, the difference between the two groups of firms 
is larger when short-term leverage is examined and smaller in long-term leverage. It 
appears that private firms contrary to public firms rely more on the much easier to 
obtain  short-term  leverage  rather  than  the  harder  to  get,  but  cheaper  and  more 
desirable, long-term debt.  
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It  should  be  noted  though  that  this  gap,  at  least  for  long-term  leverage  ratios, 
decreases after that burst of the land bubble. It seems that the burst of the land bubble 
causes more financial problems to the smaller, private companies than their larger 
public counterparts. 
 
 
 
 
Graph 25:Short-Term Leverage, Land Value Bubble 
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Graph 26:Long-Term Leverage, Land Value Bubble 
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In the credit crunch data set a general decrease of leverage for both groups of firms is 
apparent (graphs 27-28, table 96, Appendix F). In long-term leverage levels listed 
firms have a mean of 0.11 and non-listed ones of 0.12 while short-term debt ratios are 
0.14 for listed and 0.17 for non-listed companies (table 95, Appendix F). The analogy 
of ratios between firms has generally remained the same. 
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Graph 27:Short-Term Leverage, Credit Crunch 
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Graph 28:Long-Term Leverage, Credit Crunch 
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As  far  as  the  burst  of  the  land  value  bubble  and  the  credit  crunch  effects  are 
concerned,  corporate  leverage  levels  are  clearly  affected  by  them.  In  relation  to 
section 3.4.1 general leverage values are increased due to the inclusion of unlisted 
corporations which, as stated, are more levered than listed ones. As seen by graphs 29 
and 30 there is a significant decline of total debt to total assets firm ratios after 1989 
and 2000. They show that when a monetary contraction occurs both public and private 
firms are, up to a certain extent, credit rationed. Of course the decline is much steeper 
in  the credit crunch during which, severe problems plagued the  Japanese  banking 
sector and leverage became much scarcer. 
 
In numerical values debt ratios dropped from 0.30 to 0.28 when the land bubble burst 
while during the credit crunch a decrease from 0.28 to 0.24 was recorded (tables 93 
and 96, Appendix F). These two data sets, as those analysed in section 3.4.1, indicate 
that short-term debt was the driving force behind the leverage drop in the early 90s. 
Both kinds of debt, albeit mostly long-term debt, were responsible for the leverage 
reduction  in  the  credit  crunch.  More  specifically  during  1980-1997  short-term 
leverage dropped significantly from 0.18 to 0.16 while long-term leverage actually 
remained at almost the same level. During the credit crunch, short-term debt ratios 
marginally decreased from 0.16 to 0.15 and long-term leverage dropped from 0.13 to 
0.10.   
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Graph 29:Total Leverage, Land Value Bubble 
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Graph 30:Total Leverage, Credit Crunch 
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3.5.1.2 Private Debt 
 
 
Financial theory suggests that unlisted firms due to information asymmetry problems 
should be more dependent on private debt than larger listed companies. The empirical 
data confirm the theoretical suggestions. Tables 92 and 95 (Appendix F) and graphs 
31 and 32, show that unlisted corporations have higher private debt levels. During the 
burst of the land bubble, unlisted firms have a 0.37 mean of private debt to total 
liabilities ratio while listed ones a mere 0.30 (table 92, Appendix F). Results from the 
credit crunch are similar. The differences between the two groups of firms remain at 
approximately the same levels but both of them have lower values at 0.36 and 0.28 
(table 95, Appendix F). This of course depicts the decrease in the supply of bank loans 
during the credit crunch. 
 
It should be pointed out that, as in the case of bank vs. non-bank dependent listed 
firms, during the later years of the credit crunch the private debt levels of the two 
groups tend to converge. The picture drawn by the relevant tables and graphs leads us 
to believe that when monetary conditions tighten, private firms appear to be facing 
greater difficulties receiving bank loans. 
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Graph 31:Private Debt, Land Value Bubble 
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Graph 32:Private Debt, Credit Crunch 
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Results remain the same even when private debt is split into short and long-term. The 
mixture of long to short-term private debt remains at the same levels as those seen in 
section 3.4.1. Short-term private debt is almost twice the size of long-term private 
debt.  
 
As seen in table 92 (Appendix F), during the 80s to mid 90s, listed firms have a long-
term private debt mean of 0.09 while non-listed 0.15; in terms of short-term private 
debt their respective values are 0.20 and 0.22 (graphs 33-34). Credit crunch data are 
not different; non-listed companies have still higher private debt values. In table 95 
(Appendix F) the reader can see that the ratio means remain almost unchanged at 0.09 
and 0.14 for long-term private debt and 0.19 and 0.22 for short-term private debt 
(graphs 35-36). 
 
As was stated in the beginning of this section private companies are more dependent 
on private debt than publicly listed firms. Nevertheless it is also quite obvious from 
the analysis of the descriptive statistics that this is much more evident when long-term 
private debt is examined. It appears that long-term private debt is by far the most 
common component of long-term debt for  private companies. Public firms on the 
other hand are likely to have other long-term debt substitutes to private debt. This is 
verified in section 3.5.1.3.   209 
 
Graph 33:Short-Term Private Debt, Land Value Bubble 
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Graph 34:Long Term Private Debt, Land Value Bubble 
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Graph 35:Short-Term Private Debt, Credit Crunch 
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Graph 36:Long-Term Private Debt, Credit Crunch 
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The effect of a decreased bank loan supply on firms’ capital structures is also verified 
by  tables  93-96  (Appendix  F)  that  depict  bank  loans  to  total  liabilities.  More 
specifically, the reader can see that before the burst of the land bubble the mean of 
private debt levels was 0.35 and after its burst it drops significantly to 0.32. The steep 
drop can also be seen in graph 37.  
 
A similar decrease takes place when the credit crunch occurs. From 2000 and on the 
firms’ levels of private debt start to fall and keep doing so for the next years. Again 
this phenomenon is accelerated during the last few years of the data set, when the 
crunch is in full effect (graph 38). This is verified by the results of table 96 (Appendix 
F) where it can be seen that in the pre crunch period private debt levels have a 0.32 
mean but during the crunch this falls to 0.31.  
 
 
Graph 37:Private Debt, Land Value Bubble 
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Graph 38:Private Debt, Credit Crunch 
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3.5.1.3 Public Debt 
 
The deregulation of the Japanese financial markets during the 80s allowed companies 
to substitute the traditional bank debt with corporate bonds and commercial paper. 
This of course was applied mostly by the larger public firms facing fewer information 
asymmetry problems rather than their smaller private counterparts (graph 39). In table 
92 (Appendix F), the reader can see that listed companies have a mean of 0.10 and 
non-listed a mere 0.008. During the 90s it seems that listed firms, able to issue public 
debt, do so in order to keep their leverage levels stable.  
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Graph 39:Public Debt, Land Value Bubble 
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The trend of the 80s to mid 90s for listed firms is reversed during the credit crunch as 
can be seen in graph 40. The lack of confidence by the investors in the financial 
markets due to the credit crunch could be a possible explanation behind the steep drop 
of public debt levels by listed firms. As was stated in section 3.4.1 when the banking 
sector faces severe problems, public debt loses its role as a substitute of private debt. 
Nevertheless, private companies appear to slightly increase their issuance of public 
debt during the later years of the crunch possibly in an effort to raise much needed 
funds.  The mean ratios of public  debt are  0.10 and 0.01 for listed and non-listed 
companies respectively during the credit crunch as can be seen in table 96 (Appendix 
F).  
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Graph 40:Public Debt, Credit Crunch 
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3.5.1.4 Other Factors 
 
The thorough investigation of leverage and its components, private and public debt, 
had as its purpose to explain why firms choose specific debt instruments and at the 
same time reveal any limitations they are facing. Of course firms always have the 
choice of choosing between external and internal financing. As happened in section 
3.4.1,  a  brief  examination  of  internal  financing  was  deemed  necessary.  Thus 
profitability and retained earnings data is analysed. 
 
As far as profitability was concerned, EBIT to total assets ratios were not substantially 
different between the two groups of firms examined either during the burst of the land 
bubble or the credit crunch. Nevertheless it is quite clear that the two major economic 
events examined in this study affected the companies’ profitability levels. First of all, 
shortly after the burst of the land bubble a sharp decline in EBIT ratios take place thus 
means fell from 0.07 to 0.05 (table 93, Appendix F) which of course can also be seen 
in graph 41. Even by simply comparing profitability ratios between the two data sets 
the reader can spot a significant difference; the mean of EBIT to total assets ratio in 
the bubble data set is 0.06 while in the credit crunch data set it falls to 0.045 (tables 91 
& 94, Appendix F). 
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Graph 41:EBIT to Assets, Land Value Bubble 
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Graph 42:EBIT to Assets, Credit Crunch 
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As  in  section  3.4.1  the  really  interesting  results  come  from  examining  retained 
earnings  levels.  Despite  declining  levels  of  profitability,  companies,  public  and 
private,  increase  their  retained  earnings  levels.  As  can  be  seen  in  graphs  43-44, 
retained earnings to total assets ratios steadily increase from 1980 reaching record 
values at 2007. Numbers also tell the same story, tables 91 & 94 (Appendix F) inform 
the reader that retained earnings ratios means are increased from 0.17 in the land 
bubble set to 0.19 in the credit crunch one. 
 
Interestingly enough during the 80s public firms have higher retained earnings levels 
than their private counterparts but this rapidly changes through time. Especially after 
the  burst  of  the  bubble,  when  monetary  conditions  tighten,  non-listed  companies’ 
retained  earnings  levels  increase  drastically.  By  1998,  when  the  troubles  in  the 
Japanese  banking  sector  initialise  the  credit  crunch,  non-listed  corporations  levels 
surpass  those of listed ones and the gap  keeps on increasing as the credit  crunch 
comes in full effect.    218 
 
Graph 43:Retained Earnings to Assets, Land Value Bubble 
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Graph 44:Retained Earnings to Assets, Credit Crunch 
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3.5.1.5. Conclusions 
 
In general the story told by the data in section 3.4.1, using a data set of only public 
firms in comparison to the story narrated in this section where a data set comprised by 
public and private firms alike is used, is not that different. Leverage levels generally 
decline, both in the case of the land bubble burst and that of the credit crunch with the 
drop in the latter being more significant. Short-term leverage is the main driving force 
behind the land bubble burst while during the credit crunch mainly long-term leverage 
affects the total levels. Again it seems that financial constraints do appear to affect 
corporal financial policy decisions. 
 
Contradictory evidence to section 3.4.1 comes though from leverage level data. In 
section 3.4.1 it was shown that, at least when monetary conditions are tight, small 
bank dependent companies have lower debt to assets ratios in comparison to large 
firms. In the current data set though, the opposite takes place. Non-listed firms that are 
significantly  smaller  in  size  are  highly  more  levered  than  listed  corporations 
throughout the entire sample. On a first glance this is in contradiction to the results of 
the listed firms’ data set but as the reader will be able to see in section 3.5.2, a careful 
empirical analysis might show otherwise. The definition of leverage used in this study 
was total debt to total assets. Nevertheless a firm is also able to obtain finance through 
issuing equity, by definition this would not be included in leverage values.   
 
Private  debt  levels,  in  other  words  bank  loans  received  by  firms,  also  decrease. 
Especially immediately after the burst of the bubble and in the later years of the credit 
crunch, when already weakened Japanese banks are extremely hesitant in extending   220 
credit to corporations. Again, short-term private debt seems to be main reason behind 
the drop of private debt during the burst of the bubble. It could be the case that when 
the initial troubles for Japanese financial institutions arise the first reaction is to cut 
down short-term loans. 
 
Listed firms from the mid 80s onwards, issue corporate bonds and commercial paper 
to  raise  substantial  amounts  of  money.  This  helps  listed  companies  to  partially 
mitigate the effects of the land bubble burst in relation to their non-listed counterparts. 
Non-listed firms do not seem able to do that. Data also suggest that during the credit 
crunch the sharp decline of companies’ public debt worked along the drop in private 
debt levels to result in the steep decrease of total leverage. It should be noted though 
that even for listed large companies’ public debt is still a supplement to private debt. 
Private debt to liabilities ratios are approximately three times the size of the respective 
public debt values even for the largest corporations in the data set. 
 
Both  groups  of  companies  seem  to  increase  their  retained  earnings  levels  as  the 
financial market conditions worsen despite the fact that a similar increase in their 
profitability does not take place. Since firms cannot get external financing as easily as 
they did in the past, they increase their retained earnings in order to substitute external 
to internal financing. 
 
After  this brief summary of  the  descriptive  statistics results,  section 3.4.2 follows 
containing the regression analysis.  
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3.5.2 Regression Analysis 
 
The methodology followed in this empirical analysis is identical to the one used in 
section 3.4.2. The post estimation analysis of course included the standard tests. The 
Woolridge test examined the presence of first order autocorrelation and the BP test 
pointed towards the rejection of OLS or random effects.  
 
The  problem  in  this  part  of  the  study  is  that  as  well  as  the  dummy  variable  of 
Keiretsu, being time invariant, so is the listed factor. This meant that both of these 
variables had to be dropped if fixed effects were chosen. Since the importance of 
these two variables, especially the dummy variable indicating whether a firm is listed 
in the stock exchange, was too great it was decided to use random effects. 
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3.5.2.1 Debt to Assets Ratio 
 
Equation 28 that is used (shown below) is mainly the same with equation 24.  The 
sole difference is that the bank dependency variable is replaced with another dummy 
variable showing if a company is traded in a Japanese stock market or not.  
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Equation 28:Total Debt to Total Assets Regression Model 
 
 
 
Tables 127-128 (Appendix G) present the results of the regression analysis for the 
burst of the land bubble and the credit crunch respectively. Interestingly enough, as 
was mentioned in the descriptive statistics examination, the Listed dummy variable 
produces  partially  contradictory  results from those  that  were formed  in  section  4.  
According to this, small sized, informational opaque companies have higher total debt 
to total assets ratios consistently from 1980 to 2007 (as an example, during the land 
value bubble if a firm is not listed in a stock exchange leads to an increase of 0.0849 
to its total leverage levels; E:0.154); that is, during both economic booms and busts. 
Short and long term regression analyses’ conclusions are the same. More light on the 
reason for these unexpected results will be shed in section 3.5.2.2. 
 
Despite the aforementioned findings, the second dummy variable measuring the effect 
of monetary conditions provides support to both theoretical predictions and previous   223 
empirical results. After the burst of the land value bubble and during the credit crunch 
a severe decrease in all forms of leverage is recorded (bubble table 127, crunch table 
128, Appendix G). It should be stated that the burst of the land value bubble results to 
an  decrease  of  0.0152(E:0.024)  to  total  leverage  while  the  credit  crunch causes a 
0.0974(E:0.155) decrease to total leverage. Financial conditions do affect the financial 
policy decisions of both groups; a decrease in the supply of credit leads to a decrease 
of the firms’ leverage levels. 
 
Keiretsu members indeed seem to be more levered than other Japanese companies. 
With the exception of long-term leverage during the burst of the bubble period, the 
Keiretsu dummy variable is positively related to debt to assets (Keiretsu tables 127-
128, Appendix G). This is reasonably more apparent during the credit crunch (being a 
keiretsu  member  during  the  credit  crunch  leads  to  an  increase  of  0.0176  to  total 
leverage; E:0.013). During turbulent economic times when a large number of firms 
are not deemed creditworthy enough to receive a bank loan, Keiretsu members are 
able to get the much needed credit from their nucleus bank. Despite this, leverage by 
definition  takes  into  account  all  sorts  of  debt  including  public  debt,  therefore  the 
examination of private debt that follows in the next section will provide more robust 
conclusions about the effect of Keiretsu membership on capital structure. 
 
Regarding  the  tangibility  of  assets  factor,  results  are  generally  in  accordance  to 
previous capital structure studies. The tangfassets variables as shown in tables 127-
128 (Appendix G) receive positive signs except in the case of short-term leverage 
during the 1980-1997 period. As an example, during the land value bubble a one s.d. 
in tangfassets results in an increase of 0.0969(E:0.117) to total leverage.   224 
 
The negative sign of the assets tangibility factor regarding short-term leverage during 
the bubble period is not surprising. As can be easily understood due to the expansion 
of  the  economy  at  that  period,  the  supply  of  short-term  debt  also  witnessed  an 
increase. Since a large percentage of the clientele for short-term debt are fast-growing 
companies with high valued intangible assets and low valued tangible fixed assets the 
negative sign of the variable accounting for collateral values was expected.  This of 
course, along with the Keiretsu factor, remains to be validated by the private debt 
analysis in this section.  
 
Profitability  and  internal  finance  variables  (EBIT  &  Retearnings  tables  127-128, 
Appendix G) provide supporting results towards the pecking order hypothesis and are 
in accordance to those found in section 3.4.2.1. Both of the aforementioned factors are 
negatively related to all forms of leverage as predicted by theory in both data sets. 
More specifically a one s.d. increase of EBIT or Retearnings causes a decrease of 
0.2186(E:0.045) and 0.7393(E:0.433) to total leverage respectively.  
 
On the other hand the mixed results coming from the non-debt tax shields variable 
conflict  with  the  trade-off  theory.  The  non  debt  tax  shields  factors’  coefficients, 
according to the theory, should have a negative sign regarding leverage. Nevertheless 
at least during the burst of the land bubble no such relationship is recorded (NDTS 
tables 127-128, Appendix G) even though more supportive results arise during the 
credit crunch.  
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Interesting results are also drawn from the examination of the natural logarithm of 
sales  (logsales  tables  127-128,  Appendix  G).  The  coefficient  of  sales  presents  a 
positive signed coefficient in every case indicating that, similar to section 3.4.2, larger 
firms are also more levered. In the land value bubble period a one s.d. increase in 
logsales  results  in  an  increase  of  0.0072(E:0.246)  in  leverage.  This  deepens  the 
suspicions that  there is more  than  meets the eye in the listed results (this will be 
explored in more detail in section 3.5.2.4). 
 
Finally trade credit (Accountspay table 127-128, Appendix G), as was also found in 
section  3.4.2,  is  used  by  companies  to  substitute  leverage  (one  s.d.  increase  of 
Accountspay leads to a 0.6460 decrease to total leverage during the 1980-1999 period; 
E:0.554)).  Nevertheless  the  magnitude  of  the  reported  coefficients  is  significantly 
reduced during the credit crunch. 
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3.5.2.2 Bank Loans to Total Liabilities 
 
After having discussed the analysis regarding total debt to total assets ratios, a private 
debt  examination  will  follow  in  order  to  form  a  more  complete  picture  for  the 
companies’  financial  policy  decisions  during  different  monetary  conditions.  As 
occurred in the case of leverage, equation 29 that follows is identical to equation 25 
that was used in section 3.4.2.2. The difference is that the bank dependency dummy 
variable is replaced with one that indicated if a particular firm is listed in any stock 
exchange in Japan. 
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Equation 29:Private Debt to Total Liabilities Regression Model 
 
 
According to the results depicted in tables 131-132 (Appendix G), public firms have 
lower private debt to liabilities ratios than their private counterparts despite what form 
of private debt or what time period is examined. The values of the Listed coefficient 
are even higher than in the case of leverage (as an example, during the land value 
bubble if a firm is not listed in a stock exchange leads to an increase of 0.1084 to its 
private debt levels; E:0.171). This of course was expected, since smaller non-listed 
firms are more dependent to bank loans and are generally not able to raise money 
easily by issuing corporate bonds or commercial paper. The natural logarithm of sales 
verifies the results of the Listed factor by also having a consistently negative sign   227 
(during the land value bubble one s.d. increase in logsales causes 0.0073 decrease to 
private debt; E:0.217). 
 
The bubble and crunch dummy variable results shown in tables 131-132 (Appendix 
G) respectively, point towards a reduction of the firms’ private debt levels after the 
burst  of  the  land  bubble  and  during  the credit  crunch  (during  the credit  crunch a 
0.0698 decrease on average occurs to private debt; E:0.093). This of course verifies 
the findings of section 3.4.2.2.  
 
The analysis of private debt also reveals results that favour the Keiretsu theory (with 
the  exception  of  long  term  private  debt  during  the  1980-1999  period).  Keiretsu 
members are said to have an easier access to bank loans since they are able to receive 
it from their nucleus banks. The Keiretsu factor has a significant positive sign in both 
data sets (as an example a keiretsu member during the 1990-2007 period has increased 
private debt levels by 0.0244; E:0.015). This states that Keiretsu members have higher 
private debt to liabilities ratios than the rest of the firms in the sample (tables 131-132, 
Appendix G). 
 
Moreover, as shown in tables 131-132 (Appendix G), the results of the regression 
analysis attribute a positive sign to the asset tangibility variable for total and long-
term private debt (during the land value period one s.d. increase in tangfassets leads to 
a 0.2249 increase of private debt; E:0.235). This is in accordance with the view that 
high collateral values mitigate information asymmetry issues and increase the lenders’ 
confidence to borrowers. Nevertheless when short term private debt is examined, asset 
tangibility  has  an  inverse  relationship  with  it  in  both  data  sets.  This  helps  us   228 
understand that small firms with low valued tangible assets mainly focus on short 
term borrowings or rather that banks are willing to extend short term credit to clients 
with low collateral values. Additionally this proves that the negative sign of the asset 
tangibility factor while examining short-term leverage was not a fluke. 
 
As far as the two predominant theories of interpreting capital structure are concerned, 
evidence reported in table 131-132 (Appendix G) continue to favour the pecking order 
hypothesis.  Profitability  and  retained  earnings  factors  appear  to  have  an  inverse 
relationship with private debt throughout both samples. As an example it should be 
stated that during the 1980-1999 period a one s.d. increase in EBIT or retearnings 
results in a 0.2799(E:0.05) and a 0.3405(E:0.173) decrease of private debt. At the 
same time the positive sign of non-debt tax shields as was also mentioned in section 
3.4.2.2  is  contrary  to  what  the  trade-off  theory  dictates.  Furthermore  trade  credit 
reports an inverse relationship with all kinds of private debt and therefore confirms its 
role as a substitute of private debt. 
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3.5.2.3 Public Debt to Long Term Debt 
 
Next in this study comes the investigation of the public debt to total liabilities ratio. 
Once again the methodology remains the same and the regression formula this time is: 
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Equation 30:Public Debt to Total Liabilities Regression Model 
 
 
 
 
According to  expectations,  listed and  therefore large  firms are more able  to  issue 
public  debt  and  receive  this  alternative  form  of  external  finance.  Private, 
informational  opaque  companies  on  the  other  hand  find  issue  public  debt  more 
difficult.  Thus  the  Listed  dummy  variable  and  Sales  variable  have  a  positive 
relationship with public debt (tables 135-136, Appendix G).  If a company during the 
land value bubble period is listed then this leads to a 0.0493(E:0.45) increase to its 
public debt levels. During the same period a one s.d. increase to logsales results in an 
increase of 0.0172(E:2.957) to its public debt ratio. 
 
As was described in the descriptive statistics analysis of section 3.5.1, public debt was 
used as a form of private debt substitute by listed firms after the burst of the land 
bubble. This is verified by the negatively signed bubble dummy variable in table 135 
(Appendix G). More specifically the burst of the bubble leads to a 0.0580(E:0.529) 
increase to public debt levels.   230 
 
Nevertheless, as was discussed in sections 3.4.1, 3.4.2.3 and 3.5.1, this stopped being 
the  case  during  the  credit  crunch.  Public  debt  levels  dropped  significantly  and 
contributed to the general decline of leverage during that period. Of course this seems 
unlikely to be a choice of the Japanese corporations; during a period of monetary 
tightening a firm is bound to be looking for debt. Therefore one possible explanation 
for this phenomenon is that when the Japanese banking sector experienced severe 
problems  in  its  operation,  corporate  bond  and  commercial  paper  markets  were 
affected as well. The negative sign of the crunch variable in table 136 (Appendix G) 
can be taken as evidence for this. 
 
Keiretsu  membership  results  during  the  1980-1999  period,  with  the  exception  of 
short-term public debt, are in most cases statistically insignificant and therefore robust 
conclusions  cannot  be  drawn  (table  135,  Appendix  G).  During  the  credit  crunch 
however  the  Keiretsu  appear  to  be  positively  related  to  public  debt  (table  136, 
Appendix G). Being a Keiretsu member during the 1990-2007 period results in an 
increase of 0.0160(E:0.052) to public debt ratios. One would imagine the opposite to 
take  place  since  Keiretsu  affiliated  companies  are  not  likely  to  face  problems 
receiving  bank  loans.  Nevertheless  it  could  also  be  the  case  that  the  severely 
problematic Japanese banks were not able or willing to extend significant amounts of 
bank loans even to their closest affiliated manufacturing firms. If this indeed was the 
case,  then  large  in  size  members  of  the  Keiretsu  were  likely  to  be  seen  as  more 
trustworthy than other competitive firms and thus raise public held funds more easily. 
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As far as profitability, internal finance and non-debt tax shields are concerned the 
results concerning public debt are the same as those in the previous two sections. 
EBIT and Retearnings coefficients have both an inverse relationship with public debt 
and  are  therefore  characterised  as  substitutes.  For  example,  during  the  1980-1999 
period,  a  one  s.d.  increase  in  EBIT  or  Retearnings  results  in  a  decrease  of 
0.1068(E:0.11) and 0.0395(E:0.116) to public debt respectively.  Non-debt tax shields 
continue to have a positive coefficient contrary to what the trade-off theory dictates. 
 
Similarly to section 3.4.2.3, the results coming from the asset tangibility variable are 
not  what  they  were  expected  to  be.  This  is  because  the  factors’  coefficients  are 
attributed negative signs regardless of the time period examined. More specifically 
during the credit crunch a one s.d. increase of tangfassets leads to a 0.0567(E:0.343) 
decrease to public debt. This means that companies with low valued fixed assets have 
higher  levels  of  public  debt.  The  opposite  would  be  expected  to  happen  since 
companies with high collateral values are predicted by theory to find it easier to issue 
corporate bonds or commercial paper.  
 
Finally trade credit yet again reports a inverse relationship with public debt and once 
more confirms its role as a substitute of any kind of external debt, whether this is 
private or public. As an example during the 1980-1999 period a one s.d. to trade credit 
causes a 0.1620(E:0.70) decrease to public debt. 
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3.5.2.4 Debt vs. Equity 
 
According to the results presented in section 3.5.2, smaller non-listed firms are more 
levered  in  relation  to  larger  listed  ones.  A  regression  analysis  investigating  the 
probability of a company issuing debt or equity could help in correctly interpreting 
these results. 
 
To achieve this, three probability regression models similar to those constructed in 
section 3.4.2.4 are created. The dependent variables used are equity issuance, debt 
issuance and finally debt vs. equity issuance. In the case of equity issuance 1 was 
attributed to companies that issued equity during a specific year and 0 to those that did 
not. Debt issuance was similarly constructed. While examining the issuance of equity 
vs. debt the dependent variable received the value of 1 if a firm issued equity and 0 if 
it  issued  debt.  Observations  of  dual  equity  and  debt  issuances  were  deleted.  An 
example of the regression run to examine the issuance of equity is given in equation 
31  shown  below.  It  should  also  be  mentioned  that  for  calculation  purposes  logit 
estimators are used, even though results using probit estimators do not substantially 
differ.   
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Equation 31:Probability of Equity Issuance Regression Model 
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Interestingly enough, public companies are much more likely to  issue equity than 
private firms that are inclined towards debt issuance. If equity vs. debt is examined, 
the results remain the same. The same story is told in both data sets (Listed tables 139-
140, Appendix G). It should be stated that during the 1980-1999 period if a company 
is classified at stock exchange listed then there a decrease of 0.1463 to its probability 
of issuing debt and an increase of 1.5988 and 1.7783 to the probability of it issuing 
equity or the probability of issuing equity over debt respectively. This is yet another 
indication that different groups of firms face different information asymmetry barriers 
and thus have access to different kinds of external finance. 
 
It is also shown that the probability of firms’ issuing debt during the land value bubble 
(table 139, Appendix G) is much higher than after its burst (an increase of 0.5667 on 
average takes place). It seems that during a period of monetary expansion, such as that 
of the land bubble in Japan, companies find it easy to issue debt since the banking 
sector  is  blooming.  Results  that  come  from  the  investigation  of  equity  are  not 
statistically significant. 
 
In table 140 (Appendix G) though the reader can see that during the credit crunch 
period the probability of a firm issuing debt is severely decreased. This is of course 
because of the bad state of the banking system at that period. The probability of equity 
issues is increased and when equity vs. debt is examined the results are similar. This 
shows that companies not able to obtain a bank loan will have to resort to capital 
markets to obtain the much needed credit. 
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Other useful results can also be drawn from the regression analysis’ tables 139-140 
(Appendix G). Keiretsu members, as theory predicts, are less prone on issuing equity. 
According to sales, large companies prefer issuing equity while smaller ones prefer 
debt (during the credit crunch this is not statistically significant). The more profitable 
a firm is, the more likely it will be to issue equity. Less profitable corporations will 
choose debt as shown by the EBIT factor coefficient. Lastly, internal finance and trade 
credit have inverse relationships with the probability of issuing either debt or equity. 
Thus their role as substitutes to external forms of finance is confirmed. These findings 
are valid regardless the time period examined. 
 
Probably the most interesting result of this section is that listed larger firms have a 
higher  probability  of  issuing  equity  than  non-listed  ones.  This  means  that  the 
conclusions drawn in section 3.5.1 and 3.5.2.1 are at best incomplete. The definition 
of leverage used in this study, and in the majority of other papers investigating capital 
structure decisions, is a debt to total assets ratio. This means however that equity as a 
form of external finance is disregarded. In other words, it could be the case that listed 
firms appear to be less levered simply because they prefer equity to debt when they 
decide to raise external finance. 
 
For the previous statement to be valid of course, empirical analysis must prove that 
public firms are not only more likely to issue equity than other firms but also that they 
raise greater amounts of money by doing so. This can be achieved by deploying a 
regression model using the ratio of equity divided by total assets as the dependent 
variable. This is an alternative, and less frequently used, definition of leverage but at 
this particular point the equity to total assets ratio will suit this study perfectly.   235 
 
Equation 32 is the regression model used as a supplement to this section’s probability 
models and as the reader can see, it is identical with the model used in section 5.2.1 to 
investigate  the  total  debt  to  assets  ratio.  The  only  difference  is  that  this  time  the 
dependent variable is defined as total equity to total assets. 
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Equation 32:Equity to Total Assets Regression Model 
 
 
 
Table 141 (Appendix G) shows the results of the regression analysis for both the burst 
of the land bubble and the credit crunch. The results from most independent variables 
are in accordance to findings from previous sections and thus any further comment on 
them is not needed. 
 
The factor of interest is the dummy variable indicating that a particular company is 
public  or  not.  In  both  data  sets  Listed  has  a  positively  signed  coefficient  thus 
validating the theory predicting that listed companies prefer issuing equity as a way 
for  raising  additional  external  finance  while  private  firms  focus  mostly  on  the 
issuance of debt. More specifically if a company is classified as listed, during the 
1980-1999 period, then this leads to a 0.0536 increase of its equity to assets ratio. 
Furthermore the bubble and listed dummy variables indicate  that equity is  mostly 
issued after the burst of the land bubble and during the credit crunch. This confirms   236 
that, in accordance to the pecking order hypothesis, companies turn to equity only 
when bank loans become scarce. 
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3.5.2.5. Examination of Bank Dependency Among Private Firms. 
 
As was seen in section 3.4.1 a classification of public firms into bank dependent and 
non-bank  dependent  yielded  several interesting findings.  Therefore  it  was  deemed 
worthwhile  to  classify  private  companies  into  similar  categories  with  the  hope  of 
reaching further interesting conclusions. 
 
In a similar fashion to section 3.4.1, for every year of the sample private firms were 
ranked  according  to  their  total  assets.  The  highest  30%  was  classified  as  bank 
independent while the lowest 30% of firms’ was characterized as bank dependent. The 
equations that were used were identical to equation 24 with the dependent variable 
changing  to  private  debt  to  total  liabilities  and  public  debt  to  total  liabilities. 
Furthermore the probability of private firms issuing debt vs. equity is also examined. 
Since in the vast majority of cases the results of the independent factors, excluding the 
dummy  variable  of  bank  dependency,  were  similar  to  those  reported  in  sections 
3.5.2.2–3.5.2.4  any  additional  comments  for  them  will  not  made  unless  any 
unexpected findings are brought forward. 
 
In the examination of leverage (tables 129 & 130, Appendix G) the results are in 
accordance with those of section 3.4.1. During the economic expansion of the land 
value bubble bank dependent firms have higher levels of long-term leverage (total and 
short term leverage results  are statistically  insignificant). During the credit crunch 
where credit becomes scarce, small, informational opaque, bank dependent companies 
appear  to  have  difficulty  raising  external finance.  More  specifically  if,  during  the 
1990-2007 period, a firm is bank dependent then this leads to a 0.0246(E:0.027) and a   238 
0.0172(E:0.05) decrease to its total and long term leverage respectively (short term 
leverage results are statistically insignificant).   
 
In  the  private  debt  examination  no  safe  conclusions  can  be  drawn  on  the  bank 
dependency  dummy  variable  due  to  the  fact  that  every  single  coefficient  is  not 
statistically significant (tables 133-134, Appendix G). It should be stated though that 
according  to  the  logsales  factor  larger  firms  during  the  land  bubble  secure  larger 
amount of  bank credit. This leads to the reasonable conclusion that  larger private 
firms, with difficulties in raising public debt or issue equity, are able to secure more 
easily bank loans than their smaller counterparts. 
 
The  results  coming  from  public  debt  were  unsurprising.  The  bank  dependency 
variable showed that larger, non-bank dependent companies are able to issue more 
public debt. As shown in tables 137-138 (Appendix G), during the credit crunch if a 
firm is classified as bank dependent then on average this results in a 0.0092 decrease 
on  its  public  debt  levels.  Similar  findings  are  reported  all  the  other  public  debt 
specifications. Despite the small size of the estimates coefficients all results, with the 
exception  of  short-term  public  debt  in  the  land  bubble  data  set,  are  statistically 
significant. Also quite interesting are the results coming from the asset tangibility 
factor. This is the first time the aforementioned factors record a positive association 
with public debt. It appears that only the larger, most profitable private companies 
with high collateral values are able to issue corporate bonds.  
 
Finally the examination of the probability of a private firms issuing debt or equity 
allows us to draw robust conclusions only during the land bubble period since the   239 
results from the credit crunch data set are statistically insignificant. In tables 142-143 
(Appendix G) it is shown that during the 1980-1999 period bank dependent firms are 
on  average  less  likely  to  issue  debt  or  equity  than  their  non-bank  dependent 
counterparts.  More  specifically  bank  dependency  leads  to  a  0.4040  and  0.3871 
decrease of a company issuing debt or equity respectively. This is a clear indication 
that the smallest firms in the Japanese market face a certain extent of credit rationing. 
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3.5.2.6 Robustness Tests 
 
As  in  section  3.4.2.5,  it  has  been  deemed  necessary  that  in  order  to  validate  the 
findings reported in sections 3.5.2.1-3.5.2.4 a series of robustness tests have to be run.   
 
Initially a re-estimation of the equations evident in sections 3.5.2.2-3.5.2.5 was made 
but this time ‘System GMM’ estimators were applied. As was mentioned in section 
3.2.1.4,  as  well  as  section  3.4.2.5,  ‘System  GMM’  estimators  possess  several 
advantages over the random effects estimators, utilised in the main empirical analysis 
of  this  section,  including  the  ability  of  dealing  with  the  potential  problem  of 
endogeneity. The disaggregation of leverage, private and public debt into their long 
and short-term components was also omitted in order not to tire the reader and save 
space. 
 
As is evident in tables 144-147 (Appendix G) the robustness tests’ results, in cases 
that they are statistically significant, support the findings shown in sections 3.5.2.1-
3.5.2.5. In all regressions run, private companies appear to have lower public debt 
levels than their public counterparts. As an example it should be stated that if a firm is 
public during the credit crunch then a 0.1070 increase is recorded to its public debt 
ratio.  When  total  leverage  or  private  debt  is  examined  the  listed  factor  is  not 
statistically significant. The same occurs for the bank dependency dummy variable 
when only private firms are included (tables 144-147, Appendix G).   
 
As far as the supply of credit is concerned the findings are similar to those reported in 
this chapter’s main empirical analysis. Higher leverage and private debt levels are   241 
recorded  during  the  period  of  the land  value  bubble  while a  general  reduction  of 
external finance is recorded during the credit crunch. During the 1980-1999 period an 
increase of 0.01 is recorded on total leverage while during the credit crunch a decrease 
of 0.0432 is evident (tables 144-145, Appendix G). The bubble / crunch results are not 
statistically significant in the data set containing solely private firms (tables 146-147, 
Appendix G).  
 
The results reported from the remaining independent variables shown in tables 144-
147 (Appendix G) are also consistent with the findings of the main empirical analysis 
even though in some cases, especially when only private firms are included in the 
sample, they are statistically insignificant. The only exception to this is the retained 
earnings  factor  in  the  leverage  regression  during  the  credit  crunch.  In  this  case 
retained earnings have a positively signed coefficient; more specifically one s.d. of 
retearnings leads to a 0.7140 increase to leverage.   
 
The results of the post-estimation tests shown in tables 144-147 (Appendix G) did not 
show any major problems as far as overidentifying restrictions are concerned since the 
J statistic test was consistently larger than 0.05. On the other hand the m2 test for 
second  order  serial  correlation  reported  a  couple  of  cases  where  second  order 
correlation was evident. More specifically in the specifications regarding leverage and 
public debt in table 144,  private and public debt in table 145 and finally leverage and 
private debt in table 147, the m2 test had a value below 0.05. Nevertheless it should be 
stated that in most cases the problem of second order serial correlation is mild. 
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In the second round of robustness tests we had the chance to examine if the removal 
of outliers has an effect on our findings. Outliers were omitted by removing the 1% 
tails of the distribution of all regression variables. This process was applied in both 
the private firms data set and the public and private firms data set. The results are 
shown in tables 148 and 151 (Appendix G) and in every case verify the results of the 
main  empirical analysis  and  are  statistically  significant,  with  the exception  of  the 
keiretsu  variable.  The  data  that  contains  only  private  firms  also  verifies  the 
conclusions drawn in section 3.5.2.5. with the sole difference that while examining 
private  debt  during  the  credit  crunch  the  bank  dependency  dummy  variable  is 
significant  and  has  a  positive  association  with  private  debt.  Specifically  bank 
dependency causes an increase of 0.0236 to private debt. This shows that smaller, 
bank  dependent, private firms rely more on  private debt in comparison  with their 
larger counterparts that have more options.  
 
Another robustness test was the addition of manufacturing companies that did not 
submit their financial statements in  the end of March in the original  sample.  The 
findings  as  shown  in  tables  152  &  155  (Appendix  G)  verify  the  conclusions  of 
sections 3.5.2.1-3.5.2.3. The only contradictory results come during the credit crunch 
period while examining leverage. More specifically logsales is negatively related to 
leverage (one s.d. increase of logsales leads to a 0.0040 decrease to leverage). This is 
a conclusion that is likely to be in accordance with the results from the listed variable 
since private firms are also smaller in size than public firms. Furthermore a one s.d. 
increase to trade credit causes on average a 0.1852 increase to leverage. A similar 
conclusion  was  drawn  in  section  3.4.1.2  when  leverage  was  examined  during  the 
credit crunch. This casts further doubt on the role of trade credit when a monetary   243 
contraction occurs: does it operate as a signal for the quality of the firm or is it a 
substitute for external debt? The answer to this question is given in chapter 5. 
 
The  next  series  of  robustness  tests  were  focused  on  verifying  the  conclusions  of 
section  3.5.2.5.  More  specifically  focus  was  given  on  the  definition  of  the  bank 
dependency variable used to classify private firms into bank and non-bank dependent. 
Therefore different cut off points as well as different indicators were used. 
 
In tables 156-157 the reader can see the results when the cut-off point was changed 
from 30% to 20%. Therefore every year the firms were ranked according to their total 
assets levels and the lowest 20% (the percentage in the main empirical analysis was 
30%) were classified as bank dependent and vice versa for the non-bank dependent 
firms. This alternative definition of bank dependency did not make an impact to the 
conclusions drawn. As in section  3.5.2.5 the bank dependency dummy variable is 
statistically insignificant except in the examination of public debt. Even when public 
debt is examined the conclusion remains the same. Bank dependent companies on 
average issue less public debt than non-bank dependent firms.  
 
Moreover,  a  different  indicator  was  used  for  further  robustness  tests.  Instead  of 
ranking companies according to their total assets levels, sales were used. Thus every 
year the firms of the data set were ranked according  to their  sales levels and  the 
lowest 30%, or 20%, were classified as bank dependent; the opposite procedure was 
followed for the non-bank dependent firms. As is evident in tables 158-161 (Appendix 
G)  this  alternative  definition  of  bank  dependency  produced  some  very  interesting 
results.  First  and  foremost  it  should  be  stated  that  the  coefficients  of  the  bank   244 
dependency variable, in most cases, are now statistically significant. Furthermore, no 
matter what cut-off points are used, bank dependent companies have higher leverage 
and private debt levels while non-bank dependent companies issue more public debt. 
This complements the results of section 3.5.2.5 and leads us to believe that a similar 
relationship to that of public and private firms exists between bank dependent and 
non-bank  dependent  private  firms.  Smaller,  informational  opaque  companies  rely 
more on bank credit, and at least in some cases appear more levered, while their larger 
counterparts are able to rely on other substitutes of bank credit such as public debt. 
 
As an additional test for the validity of the results of the main empirical analysis 
dynamic specifications were run for both data sets, the one including all firms and the 
one including solely private companies. The results can be seen in tables 162-165 
(Appendix G) and as the reader can see the addition of the lagged dependent variables 
has not altered significantly the results. The only difference with the main empirical 
analysis is that logsales has a negative signed coefficient when leverage is examined 
during the land bubble. So far in many of the robustness tests conducted the natural 
logarithm of sales factor has either been statistically  insignificant or has  provided 
mixed results. It is therefore likely that, at least as far as information asymmetries are 
concerned, whether a firm is public or private is more important that its actual size. In 
the data set that contains solely private firms no notable differences are evident. In 
most cases the lagged dependent variables have a, statistically significant, positive 
sign. 
 
Robustness tests that will help to ensure the validity of the land bubble/credit crunch 
dummy variable results have also been run. As in section 3.4.2.6. the dummy variable   245 
bubble received the value of 1 during the 1980-1988 period and 0 during the 1989-
1998 period while the crunch dummy variable was equal to 0 from 1990-1998 and 1 
from 1999-2006. This definitions allowed us to exclude the year 2007 and therefore 
any possible effects from the recent financial crisis.  
 
The  results  shown  in  tables  166-169  (Appendix  G)  support  on  the  whole  the 
conclusions drawn before. First and foremost the credit crunch dummy variable has in 
every case, no matter if public or private firms are examined, an inverse relationship 
with any form of external debt. The land bubble once more is positively related to 
leverage and negatively associated public debt. Only two controversial results appear: 
Firstly when private debt is examined in the data set including both public and private 
firms and secondly when leverage is examined in the data set containing private firms. 
More specifically in the first case it appears that the land value bubble leads to a 
decrease of 0.0678 to private debt and in the second case that it results in a 0.0162 s.d. 
decrease to leverage. These results are most likely caused by the exclusion of the 
observations  of  1989.  A  more  robust  definition  of  the  land  value  bubble  period 
probably includes 1989 since the land bubble burst or started bursting only during its 
final 3 months.  
 
The next series of robustness tests, in a similar fashion to section 3.4.2.6., examines if 
the  dummy  variables  used  in  the  main  empirical  analysis  affect  indirectly  the 
dependent  variables  and  investigates  in  greater  detail  specific  sub-groups  of 
observations.  In  order  to  conduct  this  analysis  interaction  variables  between  the 
listed/bankdep, bubble/crunch and the other independent factors were created. 
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Initially the bubble/crunch interaction variables are examined and indeed it is proven 
that monetary conditions have a differential impact on the empirical results (tables 
174-177,  Appendix  G).  Despite  which  group  of  firms  is  investigated  a  monetary 
policy contraction leads to an increase of leverage or private debt for companies with 
high collateral values, retained earnings and accounts payable. Moreover it is also 
shown that after the burst of the land bubble or during the credit crunch companies 
with high ebit to assets ratios will choose to use internal rather than external finance. 
These  findings  indicate  that  when  economic  conditions  worsen,  the  firms  able  to 
mitigate information asymmetries receive more credit. On the other hand it is also 
shown that firms able to substitute external with internal finance choose to do so, 
especially if the economic conditions are not favourable. 
 
The next factor examined is the listed dummy variable (tables 178-179, Appendix G). 
One important finding is that public firms of small size with high trade credit received 
and retained earnings have higher levels of leverage and private debt but lower levels 
of public debt. Once more it appears that different groups of firms have alternative 
access to external finance; smaller public companies with good connections with their 
suppliers will be able to mitigate informational asymmetries and receive bank credit 
while their larger counterparts will seek public debt. Results from the other listed 
interaction  variables  produce  mixed  signs  or  are  statistically  insignificant  and 
therefore definite conclusions cannot be drawn. The lack of statistically significant 
results from the bankdep interaction variables also makes the interpretation of the 
results  shown  in  tables  180-181  (Appendix  G)  a  difficult  task.  Perhaps  the  most 
interesting  and  robust  finding  is  that  bank  dependent  private  firms  with  higher 
retained earnings receive more bank credit. Therefore it is shown that for larger firms   247 
financial slack is used as a substitute for external finance but for the smallest, and 
most informational opaque of firms it is used as a tool in order to receive bank credit.  
 
The final robustness test of this section includes an alternative definition of the non-
debt  tax  shield  variable.  The  NDTS  in  this  section  as  well  as  section  3.4.1.  has 
provided mixed results and were not able to produce robust conclusions. Despite this 
the alternative definition of non-debt tax shields used in section 3.4.2.6 was able to 
produce consistent results with the trade-off theory. Therefore in this section the non-
debt  tax  shields  will  be  defined  as  Depreciation  and  Amortisation  Expenses 
(NFINANCIAL.NKCODE'FE088) scaled by Total Assets (NFINANCIAL’FB067). It 
should be noted that this is a less popular definition of non-debt tax shields than the 
one used in the main empirical analysis. 
 
The results of this final robustness test are shown in tables 170-173 (Appendix G) and 
are similar to those of section 3.4.2.6. For the data set that includes all companies the 
NDTS produces statistically significant coefficients that are in accordance with the 
trade-off theory. As an example it should be stated that one s.d. in NDTS causes a 
1.2725 decrease in total leverage. Despite this, the results of NDTS in the data set that 
contains  only  private  firms  are  all  statistically  insignificant  and  thus  no  safe 
conclusions can be drawn. This is in accordance with the general view that the trade-
off theory works best for larger sized companies. 
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3.6.0 Conclusions 
This chapter examines capital structure in Japan by incorporating supply side theories. 
Specifically, it investigates the burst of the land value bubble and the credit crunch. 
We examined different groups of firms; public and private, bank-dependent and non 
bank-dependent. 
 
Results show:  
1.  Both economic events led to a severe reduction in the firms’ leverage ratios, 
mainly through a reduction of private debt. 
2.  During the burst of the land bubble public debt acted as a substitute of private 
debt; this is not so during the credit crunch. 
3.  During the land bubble we find small-public firms more levered than large 
ones; the opposite is true during the credit crunch. 
4.  Private companies are constantly more levered than public firms. 
5.  Private companies rely mostly on short term bank credit whilst public firms 
are also able to rely on public credit. This is also true of small public and 
private firms vs. large public and private firms. It should be noted that for 
private firms these results are robust only when sales are used as a measure of 
bank dependency. 
6.  Profitability  and  retained  earnings  have  an  inverse  relationship  to  external 
finance. 
7.  Non-debt-tax-shields produced mixed and sometimes statistically insignificant 
results.  
8.  Keiretsu members are significantly more levered and have higher private debt 
levels than other firms.   249 
9.  Trade credit in the majority of cases acts as a substitute of external finance. 
 
The results of this chapter support our theory that fluctuations in the supply of credit 
severely affect financial policy decisions and thus directly influence capital structure. 
This is because, the periods of the land bubble burst and credit crunch lead to lower 
leverage ratios. We  know  that during  these  periods of  economic  contraction bank 
loans  are  necessarily  reduced;  we  also  know,  through  the  results,  that  the  firms’ 
capital structure during these times consists of lower debt levels, whereas at monetary 
expansion periods the opposite occurs. Thus we conclude that the supply  of bank 
loans must necessarily affect capital structure.  
 
What  can  be  derived  from  bullet-point  2  above  is  that  public  debt  cannot  be  a 
complete substitute to bank loans because during a time of severe financial constraints 
not only does the banking sector faces severe problems but the capital markets are 
also affected and their operations disrupted. Therefore the implication of this is that 
public debt can only be a supplement to private, not a substitute. This leads to the 
requirement  of  examining  private  and  public  debt  separately  to  get  a  better 
understanding  of  capital  structure.  This  is  also  true  of  bullet-point  3  which  also 
Implicates  that  the  size  of  the  company  must  be  taken  into  consideration.  For 
example, the fact that large firms are more levered during the credit crunch can be 
linked to their greater access to public debt than smaller firms and due to information 
asymmetries which credit ration the latter. 
 
Bullet-point 4 can be explained by the fact that public firms can more easily issue 
equity than private firms and thus obtain external finance. Let us not forget that equity   250 
is not included in this study’s definition of leverage. Similarly bullet-point 5 shows 
that smaller firms or private firms in general mainly rely on bank loans, especially 
short-term, while public firms and larger firms in general have the ability of issuing 
public  debt  that  can  partially  mitigate  the  effects  of  the  land  bubble  burst.  The 
implications of this are that capital structure studies must take into account smaller, 
and especially private firms, face greater difficulties and have fewer options in raising 
external finance than larger, public firms. 
 
The implications of bullet-points 6 and 7 are that they provide support for the pecking 
order  hypothesis  and  are  against  the  trade-off  theory.  Bullet-point  8  proves  that 
keiretsu membership is clearly an influence on capital structure as keiretsu members 
have greater access to bank credit from their nucleus banks. Keiretsu membership 
must  thus  be  included  as  a  factor  in  future  Japanese  studies  of  capital  structure. 
Similarly bullet-point 9 is proof of the fact that trade-credit is an important contender 
in external finance and should also be included in future studies. 
  
The general implication of all the above results and analysis is that when attempting 
to understand the capital structure of firms it is necessary to include all the above 
mentioned factors.  Something that seldom been done in previous capital structure 
studies; here we prove it is a necessity. 
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Chapter 4: Empirical Analysis of Horse Race Tests 
 
In this chapter, an empirical comparison between the pecking order hypothesis and the 
trade-off  theory  for  the  Japanese  market  will  be  conducted.  The  data  set  used  is 
identical to that described in section 3.1.0. Firstly, the methodology applied in this 
chapter  is  presented  and  discussed,  then  the  results  of  the  regression  analyses  is 
reported and critically examined while conclusions of the effectiveness of the two 
theories will be drawn.  
 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study that applies a horse race 
test for Japan. It follows a similar methodology with that of the previous US studies of 
Shyam-Sunder & Myers (1999) and Frank & Goyal (2003). Furthermore, this is also 
the first study of its kind to take into consideration economic conditions as far as the 
effectiveness of the two competitive theories is concerned. Additionally this paper 
divides firms into public and private, a methodology not applied by the previous two 
studies.   
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4.1.0 Methodology 
 
 
In this part of the study, the two models accounting for the pecking order hypothesis 
and the trade-off theory will be depicted. First the dependent and then the independent 
variables will be reported and the reasons for their selection will be discussed. Finally 
the two models will be shown in their complete form alongside several key comments 
regarding their application. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   253 
4.1.1 Dependent Variables 
 
 
Is the tax driven trade-off theory or the informational asymmetry based pecking order 
hypothesis better able to explain and predict the firms’ decisions to issue or retire 
debt? In order to answer this question, Shyam-Sunder & Myers (1999) and Frank & 
Goyal (2003) derived two theoretical models, one for each theory, and tried to see 
which outperformed the other. 
 
Two different definitions were used as the dependent variable in both studies. The 
annual amount of debt issued scaled by the book value of assets or the change in 
leverage. These two definitions of debt issuance are also used in this study. 
 
More specifically, the main dependent variable used in this paper is the annual change 
in  total  debt  divided  by  total  assets.  The  creation  of  total  debt  was  achieved  by 
calculating the sum of short-term borrowings (NFINANCIAL’FB074), commercial 
paper  (NFINANCIAL’FB075),  long-term  debt  and  maturities  within  one  year 
(NFINANCIAL’FB076),  short-term  corporate  and  convertible  bonds 
(NFINANCIAL’FB077),  long-term  corporate  and  convertible  bonds 
(NFINANCIAL’FB098)  and  long-term  debt  (NFINANCIAL’FB101).  The  first 
difference of total debt was taken to account for the change of the firms’ total debt 
levels on an annual basis. Finally the first difference of total debt was scaled by the 
item of total assets (NFINANCIAL’FB067). 
 
For  more  robust  results  an  alternative  dependent  variable  was  used.  Instead  of 
dividing the first difference of total debt by total assets, the annual change of leverage 
was calculated. Leverage, as in section 3.3.1.1, was defined as total debt to total assets   254 
(NFINANCIAL’FB067). It should be mentioned that this definition of leverage is the 
one used by the majority of studies such as Frank & Goyal (2004), Gaud et al. (2005) 
and Rajan & Zingales (1995). 
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4.1.2 Independent Variables 
 
 
In section 3.3.2, the reader witnessed a large number of factors being utilised in order 
to examine the driving forces behind financial policy decisions. When horse race tests 
between the  two theories are being run things are much simpler. 
 
4.1.2.1 Target Debt Ratios 
 
Trade-off theory states that firms have an optimum level of capital structure in which 
they maximize their values. This optimal capital structure is determined by the tax 
advantages  of  borrowed  money and  by the financial  distress and  agency  conflicts 
costs that arise. Therefore, financial managers will strive to reach and maintain their 
target leverage ratios. Nevertheless this is a feat difficult to achieve since economic 
events and market conditions are likely to force companies to deviate from their target 
levels. Summarising, the trade-off theory postulates that every firm has a target level 
of debt to which it wants to revert to and this is the driving force behind financial 
policy decisions.   
 
The  problem  that  arises  though  is  that  the  target  debt  level  for  each  firm  is  not 
observable.  Shyam-Sunder  &  Myers  (1999)  were  able  to  circumvent  around  this 
problem  by  creating  proxies  for  the  companies’  desired  leverage  levels.  Their 
proposal was to simply use the historical mean of the debt to assets ratio for each firm 
in  order  to  simulate  their  targets.  This  was  also  applied  in  this  study.  For  every 
company in the sample, a historical average of leverage for the entire period of 1980-
2007 was calculated. 
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Nevertheless, economic conditions and therefore leverage targets for each company 
are likely to have changed during a period of approximately 30 years. In order to 
accommodate for this, 3 additional means of leverage were calculated: One for the 
land bubble period of 1980-1989, one for the years of the stagnant growth from 1990 
to 1998 and one for the credit crunch during 1999-2007. Changes to the firms’ target 
debt ratios are likely to have occurred between these three periods reflecting, as was 
discussed  in  chapter  3,  the  effect  of  monetary  conditions  on  capital  structure 
decisions. 
 
An alternative proxy to the companies’ desired debt levels, developed by Shyam-
Sunder & Myers (1999), was a rolling target based on a three or five year moving 
average of the book debt ratio. Even though Shyam-Sunder & Myer’s (1999) results 
for this proxy were not statistically significant, in this paper both a three and a five 
year rolling average is constructed for each company. 
 
4.1.2.2 The Funds Flow Deficit 
 
 
The  pecking  order  hypothesis  states  that  a  company  will  prefer  to  finance  its 
investment projects by using internal finance. If internal finance is not sufficient to 
meet its needs, then the firm will be forced to issue external finance. Even when 
external finance needs to be raised the company will prefer debt (safest form first) to 
equity. The pecking order hypothesis postulates that equity issues should be the least 
preferable way for firms to obtain finance and should seldom occur. 
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It is therefore understood why Shyam-Sunder & Myers (1999) and Frank & Goyal 
(2003) selected the funds flow deficit as a factor able to explain why and when a firm 
decides to issue or retire debt. If the funds flow deficit is positive then a company 
issues debt of an amount equal to that of the deficit. Naturally if the deficit is negative 
the firm decides to retire debt. In both papers equity issues or repurchases are not 
included since a corporation, according to the pecking order hypothesis, will only 
issue equity as a last resort. 
 
 
Shyam-Sunder  &  Myers  (1999)  define  the  funds  flow  deficit  as  can  be  seen  in 
equation 33 below: 
 
it it it it it it C R W X DIV DEF − + ∆ + + =  
Equation 33:Funds Flow deficit 
 
 
Where: 
 
it C =Operating cash flows, after interest and taxes. 
 
it DIV =Dividend payments. 
 
it X =Capital expenditures. 
 
it W ∆ =Net increase in working capital. 
 
it R =Current portion of long term debt at start of period. 
 
 
 
The same definition of funds flow deficit is adopted in this paper. More specifically in 
Nikkei Needs terms dividend  payments can be found as common stock  dividends 
(NFINANCIAL'FC071), capital expenditures as the first difference of total tangible 
fixed  assets  (NFINANCIAL'FB032),  net  increase  in  working  capital  as  the  first 
difference of net working capital (NFINANCIAL'FP01062), current portion of long   258 
term  debt  at  start  period  as  long-term  debt  and  maturities  within  one  year 
(NFINANCIAL'FB076) and operating cash flows after interest and taxes as cash flow 
(NFINANCIAL'FP01101). It should be stated that in the case of total tangible fixed 
assets (NFINANCIAL'FB032) depreciation expenses are included in the value of the 
specific balance sheet item. 
 
One main difference exists between the Shyam-Sunder & Myer’s (1999) definition of 
funds flow deficit and that of Frank & Goyal (2003). The latter, decided not to include 
the current portion of long term debt at the start of period on the basis that it “does not 
appear  to  belong  in  the  definition  of  deficit”.  Nevertheless  this  alteration  of  the 
definition of the funds flow deficit did  not affect their conclusions as  the authors 
themselves stated. In this paper both definitions were used and, as in the case of Frank 
& Goyal (2003), results remained for the most part the same. The final choice of 
adding or not the current portion of long term debt was taken according to the results 
given from the disaggregated version of the pecking order model. The results showed 
that  in  most  cases  the  coefficients  of  the  current  portion  of  long-term  debt  were 
statistically insignificant or presented the wrong sign. Therefore it was decided, as in 
the case of Frank & Goyal (2003), to exclude this particular factor from the analysis. 
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4.1.3 Regression Models 
 
 
After the analysis of all variables used in the two competitive models, the regression 
models are going to be depicted alongside key comments concerning their application. 
The trade-off model will be presented first and the pecking order hypothesis model 
will follow. 
 
4.1.3.1 Trade-off Model 
 
As  was  stated  in  section  4.1.2.1,  the trade-off theory  predicts  that  changes  in  the 
firm’s debt levels will cause it to revert to its target capital structure. This can be 
witnessed in equation 34 which presents the trade-off theory model. 
 
it t i
it
it it
TA
it
it e v u
s Totalasset
D D
b
s Totalasset
D
+ + +
−
+ =
∆ − ) ( 1
*
α  
Equation 34:Trade-off Model 
 
 
 
it D ∆  depicts the first difference of total debt and 
*
it D  is the target debt level for each 
firm i at time t. Every variable was scaled to total assets as seen in Shyam-Sunder & 
Myers (1999). Trade-off theory dictates that  0 > TA b  because companies should be 
moving  towards  their  desired  target  but  also  1 < TA b  implying  positive  adjustment 
costs. As was mentioned in section 4.1.1 the 
it
it
s Totalasset
D ∆
 term was replaced with 
it Leverage ∆  in order to run robustness tests and different definitions of the target debt 
levels were used.   260 
4.1.3.2 Pecking Order Model 
 
In the pecking order hypothesis, emphasis was given to the fact that yearly changes of 
leverage depended on the funds flow deficit. The model constructed was based on 
both the Shyam-Sunder & Myers (1999) and the Frank & Goyal (2003) papers and 
can be seen in equation 35. 
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Equation 35:Pecking Order Model 
 
 
As  in  the  case  of  the  trade-off  model  the 
it
it
s Totalasset
D ∆
term  was  replaced  by 
it Leverage ∆  in order for the robustness tests to be conducted. All terms were scaled 
by total assets. Details for the derivation of the funds flow deficit ( it DEF ) can be 
found in section 4.1.2.2. 
 
The pecking order hypothesis propels that the results of equation 35 should include 
0 = α and 1 = PO b .  Basically  this  means  that  the  only  variable  affecting  a  firm’s 
issuance of debt is its funds flow deficit and that the amount of debt issued (or retired, 
by setting aside money each year in a sinking fund) will be equal to the positive (or 
negative) value of its deficit. Of course this is a simplified version of the pecking 
order hypothesis since it presumes that the least desirable form of external finance 
(equity) will never be issued. 
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Frank & Goyal (2003) questioned the need of aggregating the accounting data by 
calculating the funds flow deficit as was done by Shyam-Sunder & Myers (1999) and 
of  course  as  seen  in  equation  35.  Frank  &  Goyal  (2003)  claimed  that  important 
information  was  likely  to  exist  within  the  it DEF  and  thus  they  proceeded  in 
disaggregating it into equation 36 shown below. 
 
it C it R it W it X it DIV it C b R b W b X b DIV b D − + ∆ + + + = ∆ ∆ α  
Equation 36:Pecking Order Model Disaggregated 
 
 
 
All terms of equation 36 are divided by total assets. If the Shyam-Sunder & Myers 
(1999)  model  and  the  pecking  order  hypothesis  hold,  then 
1 = = = = = ∆ C R W X DIV b b b b b  and  no  additional  information  can  be  retrieved  by 
disaggregating the funds flow deficit. In this study, equation 36 was also run as a 
robustness test. Results on the current long-term portion of debt at the start of the 
period indicated that the dependent variable should be excluded. Therefore the results 
shown in section 4.2.4 do not include it.  
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4.1.4 Comments on the Application of Both Models 
 
 
In chapter 3, great attention was given to how large and small firms react accordingly 
to  capital  structure  decisions.  When  horse  race  tests  are  run,  size  also  plays  an 
important role and its usage as a factor can reveal several noteworthy insights.  
 
More specifically, Frank & Goyal (2003) categorised companies into quartiles based 
on their total assets. Small firms were classified as belonging to the 25
th percentile of 
the distribution and large firms as belonging to the 75
th percentile. The remaining 
companies  were  categorised  as  medium  sized.  The  size  factor  has  also  received 
attention in this study and a similar classification has been made. In accordance with 
chapter 3, and previous Fama & French (2002) paper, companies were categorised 
according to their total assets (NFINANCIAL’FB067). Thus every year, the lowest 
30% of companies were labelled as “small” and the highest 30% as “large”, the rest 
of the sample received the classification of “medium”.  
 
Frank & Goyal (2003) also drew their attention to the firms’ leverage levels and in a 
similar way to size, created three sub samples of companies with high, medium and 
low leverage levels. This procedure was also adopted in the present paper, dividing 
the sample of companies into the three aforementioned groups. Again on a yearly 
basis, the 30% of companies with the lowest debt to assets ratios is defined as ‘Low 
leverage firms’ and the 30% of companies with the highest debt to assets values is 
defined ‘High leverage firms’. The remaining companies in the sample receive the 
‘Medium leverage firms’ characterisation.  
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One of the most important aspects of this study, is to identify if and in what way 
changes in monetary conditions affect capital structure. In order to study the effect 
that this has on either of the two examined financial policy theories the sample was 
divided into three parts. The first sample accounts for the land bubble period of 1980-
1989, the second for the years of the stagnant growth from 1990-1998 and the third 
for the credit crunch during 1999-2007. Therefore the horse race tests were conducted 
for the entire sample spanning during 1980-2007 but also for the three sub samples 
mentioned above. 
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4.1.5 Tests of Statistical Power 
 
As a robustness test, Shyam-Sunder & Myers (1999) constructed and carried out tests 
of statistical power. The notion was to generate hypothetical time series for each firm, 
based on either the pecking order hypothesis or the trade-off theory and to then see 
how well the models fit these simulated data. If, for example, the trade-off theory 
model has statistical power it should not be able to explain financing decisions that 
are purely generated by the pecking order hypothesis and vice versa. 
 
The first step in carrying out these tests is the creation of the hypothetical time series 
of debt ratios for each company in the sample. As seen in Shyam-Sunder & Myers 
(1999), the creation of the time series started with the actual value of total debt for 
each company. For Shyam-Sunder & Myers (1999) this was the debt values for year 
1971 since they had a balanced panel of data. In this study though, as was mentioned 
in section 3.1.0, an unbalanced panel of data exists. Therefore the year in which the 
first observation for each firm lies, varies. Based on each company’s initial actual 
data,  the  hypothetical  time  series  will  be  created  according  to  the  methodology 
reported below. 
 
4.1.5.1 Pecking Order Simulated Data 
 
As  was  described  in  section  4.1.3.2  and  shown  in  equation  35,  according  to  the 
pecking order hypothesis a firm will decide to issue debt if the deficit is positive and 
retire  debt  if  the  deficit  is  negative.  The  amount  of  the  debt  issued  or  retired  is   265 
assumed to be equal to that of the deficit. Therefore in the first observation of each 
company, the funds flow deficit is added to the actual value of total debt. This will 
generate the simulated total debt value for the following year; this value will be added 
to that year’s deficit and thus the simulated total debt for the company’s third year 
will be created and so on. This will result in a simulated time series of total debt for 
each firm according the pecking order hypothesis. 
 
4.1.5.2 Trade-off Simulated Data 
 
The method used by Shyam-Sunder & Myers (1999) to create the simulated, total debt 
data based on the trade-off theory dictates that the firms’ target level of debt is their 
historical mean. They assumed that companies have the same target during the entire 
time period of the sample. In this paper it is believed that companies make alterations 
to their debt ratio targets, if such targets exist, and these decisions are most likely 
affected by monetary conditions. Therefore the 
*
it D  term in equation 34 will be equal 
to each firm’s mean of total debt for each of the three sub-samples created. These 
three sub-samples will be covering the land bubble period of 1980-1989, the years of 
the stagnant growth from 1990 to 1998 and the credit crunch during 1999-2007. 
 
Of course in order for simulated data to be generated, equation 34 as shown below 
must be applied. 
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Equation 34:Trade-off Model 
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According to the trade-off theory  0 = a and therefore the only remaining factor to be 
identified for the calculation of the hypothetical time series is TA b  . Shyam-Sunder & 
Myers (1999) in their paper attributed to  TA b  the estimated coefficient received from 
their empirical analysis. This study will follow the same methodology.  
 
Each company will start with its actual debt value in its first observation and the 
simulated  debt  level  in  its  second  observation  will  be  equal  to  ( ) 1
*
− − it it TA D D b  
plus 1 − it D . 
*
it D  will  be  the  firms’  average  value  of  total  debt  for  the  specific  sub-
sample,  TA b will be the estimated coefficient from the  initial empirical analysis (in 
other words it is obtained by the regression analysis of sections 4.2.2.1-4.2.2.3) and 
1 − it D  will be the previous total debt value, in this case the actual total debt of the 
company’s first observation. The following years for each firm will be generated in 
the same manner. 
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4.2.0 Results 
 
After an extensive description of the methodology utilised, in this part of the study the 
results of the regression analysis will be reported. Firstly, descriptive statistics for the 
utilized variables will be depicted along with related graphs. We will then continue 
with  tables  of  the  results  of  the  regression  models  along  with  their  respective 
comments. 
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4.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Before moving on to the empirical analysis’ regression results, this study will present 
descriptive  statistics  for  the  factors  of  this  research.  Year-by-year  trends  and 
comparisons  of  values  between  listed  and  non-listed  firms  are  just  some  of  the 
methods that will be used.  This hopefully will give the reader a better understanding 
of the data set as well as draw some initial conclusions concerning the effectiveness of 
the trade-off and the pecking order theory. 
 
Tables  182-183  (Appendix  H)  depict  mean  values  of  factors  that  are  of  great 
importance to this study for listed and non-listed companies respectively. Total assets, 
the first item reported, clearly tells a story of almost continuous growth for Japanese 
public firms. Private companies on the other hand, seem to be experiencing growth 
mostly during the 90s. Nevertheless it is evident that for both groups of firms a halt or 
even negative growth is recorded around 2004, when the credit crunch in Japan was in 
full effect, thus indicating the effect that an economic contraction has on the corporate 
sector. Further support to this argument can be drawn by the profitability indicator. 
The EBIT to total assets ratio for listed and non-listed companies gradually declines 
from the end of the 80s onwards, until 2007 where it has almost halved its value. 
 
Another side of the Japanese manufacturing sector can be seen through debt. Debt 
issues are also  positive and  attain  their  highest values for  both  groups during  the 
economic boom of the 80s but from the 90s onwards have a negative sign. Total debt 
also  shows  the  same  pattern  with  its  mean  dropping  in  1989,  just  when  the  land 
bubble bursts, and then again in 2003 when the credit crunch occurs.   269 
 
Of course the most important and clear conclusions are drawn by leverage itself. For 
both listed and non-listed firms, leverage has high values during the economic boom 
of the 80s but with the burst of the bubble in 89-90, it experiences a steep droop. As 
tables 182-183 (Appendix H) show, debt ratios stabilise during the rest of the 90s but 
are generally at lower values than those of the previous decade. During the credit 
crunch from 2000 onwards leverage again greatly declines until it reaches record low 
values in 2007. It should also be mentioned that public corporations have consistently 
significantly lower leverage ratios than private ones. In general it is clearly evident 
that in Japan monetary conditions directly affect capital structure. During economic 
expansions the size, magnitude of debt, and the profitability of firms rises while the 
opposite takes place during an economic contraction.  
 
As  observed  in  debt  related  statistics,  equity  also  appears  to  be  correlated  with 
economic conditions. For both groups of firms, equity issues take their highest values 
in  the  mid  to  late  80s.  This  is  not  surprising  since  during  an  economic  boom 
companies are expected to have an easier  access  to external finance,  including of 
course the issuance of equity. During the credit crunch, when the economy slows 
down,  equity  issues  revert  to  low  values  and  are  essentially  zero  for  non-listed 
companies. It should be noted that the amount of equity scaled by total assets for 
listed firms is almost two to three times higher than that of non-listed ones. This is 
one  more  indication  of  the  informational  asymmetries  that  smaller,  non-listed 
corporations face, thus restricting their access to equity and also of course an indicator 
of how much more important debt is to them.   270 
Even though the mean values of the funds flow deficit are reported in tables 182-183 
(Appendix H) for both listed and non-listed firms it has been considered much more 
useful to present this information to the reader via a graph. As in Frank & Goyal 
(2003), a figure showing how close debt and equity issues track the financial deficit 
will be presented. According to the pecking order hypothesis, debt should track the 
funds flow deficit much more closely than equity. 
 
Graph 45 depicts how closely the financial deficit tracks the issuance of debt and 
equity for listed firms. Within it, the average values of the companies’ financial deficit 
and debt and equity issues, all scaled by total assets, are shown. Contrary to Frank & 
Goyal’s  (2003)  results,  the  firms’  funds  flow  deficits  seem  to  move  more  in 
accordance with their debt rather than their equity issues. Equity also appears to move 
similarly to deficit but less so. 
 
This is even more apparent throughout the 80s when an economic boom is taking 
place. During that period, correlation between debt issuance and the financial deficit 
is much higher than what it is for the rest of the sample. More specifically, correlation 
between debt and deficit is 0.59 during the bubble sub-sample but in the sub-sample 
of the credit crunch it falls down to -0.10 while for the entire sample it is a 0.4. This is 
the  first,  serious  indication  that  economic  conditions  are  indeed  a  factor  to  be 
considered while examining the effectiveness of the pecking order hypothesis. More 
specifically it seems that during a period of monetary contraction the pecking order 
hypothesis does not operate as effectively as it does during an economic boom or 
during a period of economic stability. 
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Graph 45:Deficit, Debt & Equity for Listed Firms 
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Graph 46:Deficit, Debt & Equity for Non-Listed Firms 
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An even more impressive story in favour of the pecking order hypothesis is told in the 
non-listed companies’ sample. Graph 46 shows a much closer relationship between 
deficit and debt. This is to be expected given the fact that non-listed firms face much 
greater information asymmetries than listed ones and are therefore severely restricted 
from issuing equity. This restriction is shown in graph 46 by the line depicting equity 
issues which is essentially flat. 
 
Again  economic  conditions  seem  to  influence  correlation  between  the  funds  flow 
deficit and debt issuance. During the bubble sub-sample, correlation between the two 
factors is 0.73, in the post-bubble it is 0.78 and during the credit crunch it drops to 
0.70. It again appears that while the credit crunch is in effect the financial deficit loses 
its power over the issuance of debt. While the economy is experiencing a contraction, 
debt will most likely become scarce and thus corporations will not be able to receive 
private debt even if they should desire to do so based on their deficit. 
 
It should be noted that a gap exists between debt and deficit, meaning the firms’ funds 
flow deficit is not the only driving force behind financial decisions. This does not 
mean  though  that  the  pecking  order  hypothesis  should  be  rejected.  Myers  (1984) 
himself  has  stated  that    “Of  course,  the  pecking  order  hypothesis  can  be  quickly 
rejected if we require it to explain everything…..But when one looks at aggregates, 
the heavy reliance on internal finance and debt is clear.” 
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After this initial analysis of descriptive statistics and a first glance of the data set in 
hand, this study will proceed to the main part of the empirical analysis which is the 
implementation of the regression models constructed in sections 4.1.3.1-4.1.3.2. 
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4.2.2 Regression Analysis 
 
 
In this section of the empirical analysis the regression models of the trade-off and the 
pecking  order  hypothesis  constructed  in  sections  4.1.3.1-4.1.3.2  will  be  run.  The 
results of these tests will be reported and conclusions based on them will be drawn.  
 
As it was mentioned in section 4.1.4, monetary conditions are likely to impact the 
effectiveness of both of the two aforementioned competitive theories. This belief is 
formed both from the theoretical background developed in chapter 2 and also by the 
empirical  results  of  chapter  3.  Therefore  as  described  in  section  4.1.4  the  entire 
sample is going to be divided into three sub-samples covering the bubble, post-bubble 
and crunch periods. Equations 34 and 35 representing the trade-off and the pecking 
order hypothesis respectively will be run in each of these sub-samples as well as for 
the entire sample. For the ease of the reader equations 34 and 35 are reported once 
more below. 
 
In regards to the definition of the debt target, depicted as 
* D in equation 34, three 
different approaches were followed. The target was defined as a fixed simple average 
of total debt for any of the samples examined, or a 3 or 5 year moving average. The 
definition that produced the best results for the target adjustment model was that of 
the  fixed  target.  The  3  year  moving  average  resulted  in  failures  of  the  target 
adjustment model in many cases and thus its results were not reported. The 5 year 
moving average also had a significant number of failures, even though it produced in 
many cases significantly higher coefficient and R
2 values than the fixed target model. 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of a target adjustment model with a moving target was   275 
thought to provide useful insights and was thus included in this paper. Therefore the 
best definitions of the firms’ target of debt were included in this analysis. 
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Equation 35:Pecking Order Model 
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4.2.2.1 Bubble Period     
 
The  first  sub-sample  examines  the  time  period  of  1980-1989  in  which  Japan 
experienced a period of unprecedented economic growth ( results shown in tables 
189-190, Appendix I).   
 
Table 188 (Appendix I) presents the results for public firms. The most striking finding 
is the vast difference in coefficient values between the target adjustment model using 
a fixed target of debt and that using a moving target of debt. The target adjustment 
model  using  a  5  year  moving  average  value  of  debt  as  the  firms’  desired  target 
( 5 TAMA b ) is approximately three times the size of the model that assumes that a simple 
average of debt for the entire bubble period ( TAAV b ) could be utilized as the firms’ 
target.  More  specifically  a  one  s.d.  increase  to  TAAV b  leads  to  a  0.3487(E:8.35) 
increase to debt issued while a one s.d. increase to  5 TAMA b  results in a 0.9128(E:1.49) 
increase to debt issued. This can be attributed to the fact that the target adjustment 
model using a moving target of debt is genuinely a superior model. Alternatively it 
could be the case that due to the mean reverting nature of debt ratios the trade-off 
models report spuriously good fits. If this is true then a 5 year moving average model 
would certainly outperform a model of a 10 years simple average; but this will be 
discussed in detail in section 4.2.3. 
 
This is exactly the opposite from what Shyam-Sunder & Myers (1999) reported in 
their  study,  stating  that  3  or  5  year  rolling  average  targets  produced  insignificant 
coefficients  and thus  were  not  reported.  The  present  study  also  used  a  three  year   277 
moving average target of debt but the results indicated a failure of the model since the 
reported  coefficients  were  larger  than  unity;  this  is  not  accepted  by  the  trade-off 
theory. Since this was the case, three year rolling targets results were not reported in 
this study in favor of the more successful 5 year rolling targets.    
 
Returning to table 188 (Appendix I), it should be mentioned that the overall worst 
performer is the target adjustment model with a fixed target. The pecking order model 
( PO b ) performs significantly better whether the value of the coefficient is taken into 
consideration or whether the value of R
2 is taken into consideration. As an example, a 
one  s.d.  increase  of  PO b  leads  to  a  0.4203(E:1.70)  increase  to  debt  issued.  This 
conclusion is valid no matter what explanatory variable is used, even though values 
are generally lower for both theories when changes in debt ratios are investigated. 
This  is  also  the  case  in  Frank  &  Goyal’s  (2003)  study.  Moreover  even  if  both 
variables are simultaneously used, the pecking order coefficient still performs much 
better. Nevertheless when compared to the target adjustment model with a moving 
target, pecking order severely underperforms in every case.  
 
The same story is told in table 189 (Appendix I), showing results for private firms. It 
should be stated though that the pecking order hypothesis seems to fit the data of 
private  companies  much  better  than  their  public  counterparts.  Coefficient  and  R
2 
values are consistently higher. The reverse is observed for both models representing 
the trade-off theory since their performance is generally at lower levels compared to 
table 188 (Appendix I). Additionally when debt issues are examined a failure of the 
target adjustment model with a moving target is reported since its coefficient is larger   278 
than 1. Specifically a one s.d. increase of  PO b  will cause a 0.5244(E:2.65) increase to 
debt issued; likewise  TAAV b  will cause an increase of only 0.2144(E:0.47). 
 
Based on these results the pecking order hypothesis seems to work better on private 
firms.  This  is  not  surprising  since  private  corporations  are  subject  to  more 
informational asymmetries than listed companies and, as was shown in chapter 3, face 
greater difficulties in raising equity. Furthermore, even if companies have the desired 
levels of debt, private firms that are more likely to face financial constraints than their 
listed counterparts will be less likely to move towards their target.  
 
As a general comment, all of the examined models appear to  perform quite well. 
Constants  are  in  every  single  case  very  close  to  zero,  R
2  reported  values  are 
encouraging  regarding  the efficiency  of  the  models  and  the coefficient  values  are 
within the accepted parameters. The results of the test command failed to show that 
any of the models have coefficients that are statistically equal to unity. This is not 
unexpected since even in the original papers of Shyam-Sunder & Myers (1999) and 
Frank  &  Goyal  (2003) none  of  the  models tested ever  had a  coefficient  that  was 
statistically  equal  to  unity.  These  findings  only  indicate  that  neither  of  the  two 
theories perfectly describes reality, a very high benchmark for any theory. 
 
A comparison of this study’s results with those of Shyam-Sunder & Myers (1999) and 
Frank & Goyal (2003) is deemed useful. Shyam-Sunder & Myers (1999) report much 
higher coefficient and R
2 values and generally both theories seem to fit much better 
their data. Nevertheless as Frank & Goyal (2003) report, Shyam-Sunder & Myers 
(1999) have constructed a sample with a fairly small number of 157 firms which are   279 
some of the largest of the U.S. When Frank & Goyal (2003) apply the pecking order 
model in a much larger data set of companies the results produced have much lower 
coefficient  and  R
2  values.  Frank  &  Goyal  (2003)  state  that  the  pecking  order 
hypothesis seems to fit much better firms that have certain characteristics. 
 
The  sample  used  in  this  paper  contains  1566  listed  and  2390  non-listed  Japanese 
corporations. Even though it is not as big as the one used by Frank & Goyal (2003) it 
is certainly of a much larger size than the one utilized by Shyam-Sunder & Myers 
(1999). The values reported in tables 188-189 (Appendix I) are generally closer to 
those of Frank & Goyal (2003). This fact has led this study to investigate in more 
detail  how  these  alternative  theories  perform  when  applied  in  different  groups  of 
firms.  
 
The methodology followed was similar to that of Frank & Goyal (2003) and included 
creating sub-samples of firms according to size and leverage values for listed and non-
listed companies. Therefore firms were characterized as small, medium and large size 
as well as of low, medium and high leverage. Results are shown in tables 190-191 
(Appendix I). 
 
Results from tables 190-191 (Appendix I) are rather surprising. For listed companies 
the pecking order and the trade-off seem to work best for large firms. For example a 
one  s.d.  increase  to  TAAV b  leads  in  a  0.2227(E:1.433),  0.2215(E:0.459)  and 
0.2581(E:0.276) increase to debt issued in the small, medium and large sized groups 
of firms. Regarding private companies, the smaller the size of the firm the better the 
models perform for both theories. In this case a one s.d. increase to  PO b  leads in a   280 
0.5227(E:33.4), 0.4898(E:1.575) and 0.4311(E:1.597) increase to debt issued in the 
small, medium and large sized groups of firms. These results are puzzling mostly 
because both theories seem to perform best for the same group of firms. Nevertheless 
the results clearly show that size is a factor worth taking into consideration when 
applying either of these two competitive theories. 
 
Where leverage is concerned companies that have low leverage levels, whether they 
are listed or not, seem to follow the trade-off theory and companies of high leverage 
values follow a pecking order in their capital structure decisions. For example, in the 
public  firms  data  set  (table  190,  Appendix  I),  a  1  s.d.  increase  to  PO b  leads  in  a 
0.1097(E:1.182), 0.3575(E:0.97) and 0.5517(E:0.606) increase to debt issued in the 
low, medium and high leverage groups of firms.   281 
4.2.2.2. Post Bubble Period 
 
The second sub-sample examined the time period of 1990-1999 during which the land 
value  bubble  bursted  and  Japan  entered  the  period  of  so  called  stagnant  growth 
(results shown in tables 192-193, Appendix I). 
 
Table 192 (Appendix I) shows that the pecking order model loses significant power in 
the  period  of  the  90s  in  comparison  to  the  80s.  The  size  of  the  coefficient  is 
significantly lower where issues of debt are concerned and is almost halved when the 
dependent  variable  is  change  in  leverage.  Similar  results  also  come  from  an  R
2 
examination. Compared to the target adjustment model, the pecking order hypothesis 
performs significantly worse. This is true whether there is a simple comparison of the 
two models or where there is a model with both variables is examined. For example a 
one s.d. increase of  PO b  will cause a 0.2725(E:1.80) increase to debt issued; likewise 
TAAV b  will cause an increase of 0.4048(E:0.92). 
 
Trade-off theory based regression models, contrary to those derived by the pecking 
order  hypothesis,  appear  to  be  performing  much  better  in  this  sample  than  the 
previous one. Either using a fixed or a moving target, coefficient values and R
2 are 
significantly higher. It should also be reported that the moving target model as in 
section 4.2.2.1 outperformed the fixed target model. 
 
Results are quite different though  when non-listed companies are investigated. As 
seen in table 193 (Appendix I), when issues of debt are examined, the pecking order   282 
models perform extremely better (one s.d. increase of  PO b  leads to a 0.5636 increase 
to debt issued; E:3.575). The reported coefficient and R
2 values are even higher than 
those of table 193 (Appendix I) that covers the bubble period. On the contrary both 
target adjustment models report statistically insignificant coefficients and thus fail to 
explain financial policy decisions. This is valid even when joint models are examined. 
 
When changes  in  debt  ratios  are examined the  effectiveness  of  the  pecking  order 
model  drops  dramatically  and  is  surpassed  in  terms  of  coefficient  values  by  both 
trade-off models. Nevertheless when both theories are included in the same equation, 
pecking order performs slightly better than the target adjustment model with a fixed 
target. In the above mentioned case one s.d. increase of  PO b  and  TAAV b  will cause a 
0.5614 and a 0.0081 increase to debt issued respectively. 
 
It  should  be  noted  that  for  both  groups  of  companies  all  three  models  seem  to 
efficiently explain capital structure decisions. Constants are in every single case very 
close to zero, R
2 are also indicating that the models fit nicely the data at hand given 
the  size,  form  of  the  sample  and  the  field  investigated.  Moreover  the  coefficient 
values are within the accepted parameters with the exception of the target adjustment 
model with a moving average in table 53 that is larger than unity and thus results in a 
failure of the model. It should be noted that another such case was reported in section 
4.2.2.1. For once more the results of the test command failed to show that any of the 
models have coefficients that are statistically equal to unity. 
 
When the factor of size is examined the conclusions drawn by the investigation of the 
post bubble period are different from those drawn from the bubble one. Where listed   283 
firms are concerned it appears that both theories work best for medium sized firms; in 
the bubble sample both theories worked best for large sized companies. The actual 
results of this analysis are evident in tables 194-195 (Appendix I). As an example it 
should  be  stated  that  a  one  s.d.  increase  to  PO b  leads  in  a  0.2339(E:2.33), 
0.2857(E:2.70) and 0.2140(E:0.894) increase to debt issued in the small, medium and 
large sized groups of firms. 
 
For  non-listed  corporations  the  pecking  order  model  works  best  for  small  size 
companies (table 195, Appendix I); the same was reported in section 4.2.2.1. On the 
other hand the target adjustment model works better for large sized firms (the group 
of large firms has a  TAAV b  coefficient equal to 0.6038; E:0.708). This is contrary to the 
findings of the land value bubble sample. This is not surprising. During periods of 
economic  expansion,  such  as  the  land  bubble,  small  firms  face  fewer  financial 
constraints and therefore are likely, according to the trade-off theory, to achieve their 
optimal capital structure. However during a monetary tightening, such as the post land 
bubble period, small firms face increased financial constraints and are thus deterred 
from  their desired debt targets. Larger  companies on the other  hand face no such 
constraints and are thus able to reach an optimal capital structure. 
 
Contrary to size, the leverage factor produces much more consistent results with the 
bubble period. The pecking order hypothesis fits much better the groups of firms that 
have high leverage values while it performs the worst for the groups that have the 
lowest values of leverage. These conclusions are valid for listed and non-listed firms. 
More specifically, in the public firms data set (table 194, Appendix I), a one s.d.   284 
increase  to  PO b  leads  in  a  0.1656(E:1.098),  0.2393(E:1.327)  and  0.2933(E:0.426) 
increase to debt issued in the low, medium and high leverage groups of firms. 
 
The  trade-off  theory  based  model  appears  to  work  best  for  medium  leverage 
companies  in  the  sample  containing  listed  firms  (table  194,  Appendix  I). 
Nevertheless, as in the bubble period, it provides much better results for low leverage 
firms than for high leverage ones. Similar results are also reported from the non-listed 
sample. The coefficient values of the target adjustment model are higher for medium 
leverage companies compared to low leverage ones. In the non-listed firms sample 
though  a  failure  of  the  target  adjustment  model  for  the  group  of  high  leverage 
companies does not allow robust conclusions to be drawn. More specifically, in the 
public  firms  data  set,  a  one  s.d.  increase  to  TAAV b  leads  in  a  0.8476(E:4.52), 
0.9572(E:2.923) and 0.3604(E:0.349) increase to debt issued in the low, medium and 
high leverage groups of firms.   285 
4.2.2.3 Crunch Period 
 
The third sub-sample examined is the one covering the time period of 1999 to 2007. 
During this period the severe problems in the Japanese banking sector resulted in an 
unprecedented  reduction  in  bank  lending  growth,  thus  effectively  commencing  a 
credit crunch period for Japan.   
 
One of the most important conclusions to be drawn by table 196 (Appendix I) is that 
the  pecking  order  model  fails  in  every  single  regression.  After  a  very  good 
performance during the growth period of the 80s and consistent results during the 90s, 
it  appears  that  the  pecking  order  hypothesis  has  no  explanatory  power  during  the 
credit crunch. On the other hand, the target adjustment model  with a fixed target 
seems to perform its best. The same cannot be said though about the trade-off theory 
based model with a rolling target which consistently fails when the dependent variable 
is issued debt. As an example it should be stated that a one s.d. increase of  PO b  and 
TAAV b  will  cause  a  0.5335(E:1.14)  decrease  and  a  0.8315(E:0.18)  increase  to  debt 
issued respectively. 
 
Nevertheless table 197 (Appendix I), depicting non-listed companies, tells a different 
story. The pecking order model, despite having significantly decreased coefficients 
and R
2 than the other two periods still performs quite well. The target adjustment 
model  with  a  fixed  target appears  to be  performing  better  than  the  pecking  order 
model. Though if both are used simultaneously in an equation, then pecking order is 
revealed  to  have  more  explanatory  value.  In  the  above  mentioned  case  one  s.d. 
increase  of  PO b  and  TAAV b  will  cause  a  0.3330(E:0.676)  and  a  0.3234(E:0.156)   286 
increase to debt issued respectively. The trade-off theory based model with a moving 
average reports failures when issued debt is examined.  
 
Tables 198-199 (Appendix I) present the results produced from the examination of the 
size and leverage factors. When listed firms are examined, results indicate that larger 
firms follow a pecking order. Smaller sized companies appear to set debt targets. It 
should be stated though that a failure of the trade-off model during the examination of 
large sized firms does not allow robust results. Table’s 199 (Appendix I) results for 
non-listed firms indicate that the pecking order hypothesis and the target adjustment 
model work better for small companies. More specifically a one s.d. increase to  PO b  
leads  in  a  0.7797(E:1.11),  0.3095(E:0.819)  and  0.2907(E:0.815)  increase  to  debt 
issued in the small, medium and large sized groups of firms.  At least in the case of 
the pecking order model results are in accordance with those of the previous sections. 
 
Results relevant to leverage are not as clear as previous periods but generally are as 
expected. In table 198 (Appendix I) it can be seen that the pecking order equation 
performs best for medium leverage. At the same time though, high leverage firms 
have a coefficient that is three times that of low leverage ones. Moreover it should be 
taken  into  consideration  that  the  pecking  order  hypothesis  has  failed  to  explain 
financial policy decisions during the credit crunch for listed firms. In the non-listed 
companies  sample  the  pecking  order  model  once  again  performs  best  for  those 
corporations belonging to the high leverage group. As can be seen in tables 198-199 
(Appendix I) the target adjustment model performs it performs best for low leverage 
companies. As an example, for the private listed firms data set, a one s.d. increase to 
TAAV b  leads in a 0.9617(E:0.107), 0.2094(E:0.080) and 0.6377(E:0.908) increase to   287 
debt issued in the low, medium and high leverage groups of firms. These results are in 
accordance with those of section 4.2.2.1 and partly with those of section 4.2.2.2.   288 
4.2.2.4 Total Sample 
 
Having analyzed each of the three sub-samples in the previous sections, this part of 
the regression analysis will end with the examination of the entire sample. In other 
words the entire real data set, spanning from 1980-2007 will be utilized to conduct 
this analysis.  
 
In  table  200  (Appendix  I),  the  reader  can  see  that  the  pecking  order  model  fails 
completely to interpret the firms’ capital structure decisions. If a thorough analysis of 
periods of different monetary conditions had not been made the reader would have 
immediately rejected  the  pecking order  hypothesis. This  would have resulted in a 
serious loss of information.  
 
As it seems, the results reported in table 200 (Appendix I) are severely influenced by 
the credit crunch period of 1999-2007. The pecking order hypothesis appears not to 
work when a monetary tightening takes place. This should not be puzzling; during a 
credit crunch even  if a firm has a positive  deficit, it could simply not be able to 
receive  credit  or  be  forced  to  issue  equity.  During  an  economic  expansion  firms 
generally have an easier time of obtaining leverage and therefore financial managers 
are free to follow a pecking order.  
 
Results from table 201 (Appendix I) are more in favor of the pecking order model. 
From what was seen in previous sections as well, throughout the sample the pecking 
order hypothesis does a much better job of explaining financial policy decisions for 
non-listed companies than the trade-off theory. Even if both the target adjustment and 
the  pecking  order  model  are  included  in  the  same  equation,  the  results  remain   289 
unchanged no matter which dependent variable is used. It should be stated that a one 
s.d. increase to  PO b  leads in a 0.5629(E:54.02) increase to debt issued. This was to be 
expected since due to informational asymmetries, non-listed firms have much fewer 
options of obtaining external finance than their listed counterparts. Still, the effect of 
tight  economic  conditions  affect  this  group  of  corporations  too  with  the  lowest 
performance  of  the  pecking  order  model  being  recorded  during  the  credit  crunch 
period. 
 
As far as the trade-off theory is concerned, the target adjustment model with a fixed 
target seems to have consistently lower values than the one with the 5 year moving 
target. Nevertheless the moving target model in many cases, throughout the examined 
sub-samples, presented coefficients larger than unity and this of course resulted in a 
failure according to its underlying theory; this casts serious doubts over its validity. 
Generally the fixed target model is a much more consistent choice even by having 
lower coefficients and R
2 values. For example, in data set containing solely public 
firms (table 200, Appendix I), a one s.d. increase to  TAAV b  leads in a 0.1998(E:2.72) 
increase to leverage issued. On the other hand a one s.d. increase to  5 TAMA b  leads in a 
0.5020(E:0.48) increase to leverage issued 
 
Both  target adjustment models perform  better for  listed companies. This could be 
possibly due to the fact that these large, mature firms are able to move towards their 
desired targets much more easily than their non-listed counterparts that have a much 
more difficult time achieving this. Furthermore trade-off theory based models appear 
to  perform  better  when  there  is  a  tightening  of  monetary  conditions.  This  is  an 
unexpected conclusion and casts serious doubts over the validity of the model. During   290 
hard economic periods, companies should have a harder time achieving their goals 
concerning financial policy decisions. These results could possibly indicate that even 
though there is high correlation between debt ratio movements and leverage targets 
there is not causation. This topic will be discussed in more depth in section 4.2.3.  
 
The results reported from the analysis of the entire sample are generally in accordance 
with those depicted in sections 4.2.2.1-4.2.2.3. It is clear from the results reported in 
tables 202-203 (Appendix I) that both size and leverage are factors that should be 
taken  into  consideration  when  either  of  the  two  theories  of  capital  structure  is 
examined.  
 
The pecking order hypothesis appears to be generally best for either the largest or the 
smallest  of  companies.  For  listed  firms  the  pecking  order  model,  in  general, 
performed better for companies that belonged to the “large firms” group (table 202, 
Appendix I). For the non-listed data set it worked best for those companies in the 
“small  firms”  group  (table  203,  Appendix  I).  The  leverage  factor  produced  even 
clearer results. Without regards to whether a company is listed or not, firms with high 
leverage values follow much more closely a pecking order pattern than firms that have 
low leverage ratios.  As an example, for the private listed firms data set, a one s.d. 
increase to  PO b  leads in a 0.0968, 0.4711 and 0.5937 increase to debt issued in the 
low, medium and high leverage groups of firms 
 
As far as the target adjustment model is concerned results indicate that the trade-off 
theory works best for large size public companies. This conclusion is quite interesting; 
it  appears  that  both  theories  work  best  for  the  largest  of  firms  when  public   291 
corporations are examined. For the pecking order hypothesis similar results have been 
recorded by the previous study of Frank & Goyal (2003) and thus this should come as 
no surprise. Furthermore the trade-off theory itself predicts that larger, more mature 
and trustworthy firms should have higher leverage levels and of course reach their 
optimal capital structure targets easily. The reported findings from the examination of 
private firms do not allow any substantial conclusions to be drawn. Leverage on the 
other  hand  produced  much  clearer  results.  In  general,  when  listed  or  non  listed 
companies  were  examined,  the  target  adjustment  model  performed  the  worst  for 
companies with high leverage levels and best for those that had low leverage values. 
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4.2.3 Tests of Statistical Power 
 
In  this  section  the  statistical  power  of  the  models  examined  earlier  will  be 
investigated.  The  methodology  was  explained  in  section  4.1.5.  and  was  initially 
derived by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). The aforementioned authors wanted to 
examine  the  robustness  of  the  results  of  the  target-adjustment  and  pecking  order 
models utilised and see if the findings were misleading. The main notion was that, for 
example, the pecking order model should fail to explain the simulated data set in 
which financial decisions were solely based on the trade-off theory. If it was able to 
provide a good fit for the data then clearly that would be a false positive.  
 
As was seen in section 4.2.2, a significant number of failures for the target-adjustment 
model with a 5 year moving average were reported. Therefore it was decided that the 
target adjustment model with a fixed target was the best representative of the trade-off 
theory and was thus pitted against the pecking order equation. 
 
In Shyam-Sunder & Myers’ (1999) research, the trade-off theory based model failed 
to be rejected when fitted in the simulated pecking order data set. This indicated that 
the positive and significant coefficients reported by the target-adjustment model were 
due  to the fact that debt ratios exhibit mean reversion. This  of course meant that 
companies were not issuing or retiring debt according to the trade-off theory. The 
mean  reverting  nature  of  debt  ratios  led  the  target-adjustment  model  to  generate 
spuriously good fits without this to have anything to do with targets of optimal capital 
structure. On the contrary the pecking order regression model failed to explain the 
simulated data set based on the trade-off theory.   293 
 
The results of this paper are in accordance with those of Shyam-Sunder & Myers 
(1999).  Tables  204-205  (Appendix  I)  show  the  results  for  listed  and  non-listed 
companies. In table 204 (Appendix I) it is shown that the pecking order model fails to 
provide a good fit to the trade-off based data set. Vice versa the target-adjustment 
model was able to explain the pecking order based data set by reporting positive and 
significant coefficients albeit its  low  R
2  values.  The  credit  crunch  period  was  the 
exception  with  the  roles  of  the  two  models  reversing.  Even  though  a  proper 
explanation behind this cannot be found, it is clear for once more that the pecking 
order hypothesis breaks down during a severe monetary tightening. 
 
Evidence for non-listed companies though, are clearly in support of the pecking order 
as can be seen in table 205 (Appendix I). In every single examined period the pecking 
order equation is rejected by the trade-off data set while the target-adjustment model 
is able to provide a good fit for the pecking order data set. 
 
Therefore the conclusions that are drawn by these statistical power tests show that the 
results of the target-adjustment models in section 4.2.2 are not entirely trustworthy. 
As Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) have stated, the mean reverting nature of debt 
ratios lead the target-adjustment model to generate spuriously good fits without this to 
have anything to do with targets of optimal capital structure. In order to formally 
examine this  the  Fisher type  (Choi,  2001)  unit  root test,  based on  the  augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test, is run through the use of the xtunitroot STATA command (tables 
204-205,  Appendix  I).  The  Fisher  type  test  was  selected  over  the  Levin-Lin-Chu 
(2002) and Harris-Tzavalis (1999) tests because the latter require a balanched panel   294 
dat-set. The results show that indeed debt ratios, for either public or private firms, are 
stationary since the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected in every case. This only 
confirmed the suspicious failures of the target-adjustment models (larger than unity 
coefficients) throughout the examined periods. On the other hand the pecking order 
regression model reaffirmed its robustness and, as in the case of Shyam-Sunder & 
Myers (1999), according to the results shown in sections 4.2.2-4.2.3 is accepted as the 
best theory of the two.   295 
4.2.4 Disaggregating the Funds Flow Deficit 
 
Since it was shown that the pecking order hypothesis seems to be the best theory to 
explain the firms’ financial policy decisions this section will try to shed a bit more 
light on it. As mentioned in section 4.1.3.2, Shyam-Sunder & Myers (1999) stated that 
in order to test the pecking order theory it was necessary to aggregate the accounting 
data and calculate the funds flow deficit. Nevertheless Frank & Goyal (2003) argued 
that this aggregation could lead towards the loss of information.  
 
In order to investigate this issue the aforementioned authors disaggregated the firms’ 
financial deficit as is shown in equation 36:  
 
it C it R it W it X it DIV it C b R b W b X b DIV b D − + ∆ + + + = ∆ ∆ α  
Equation 36:Pecking Order Model Disaggregated 
 
 
If  the  coefficients  of  the  variables  were  all  equal  to  unity  then  Shyam-Sunder  & 
Myer’s (1999) methodology would be justified; alternatively there would be a loss of 
information. It must be stated that Frank & Goyal’s (2003) study produced ambiguous 
results. When a smaller  sample consisting of relatively larger  sized firms is  used, 
findings are generally supportive of the aggregation step. Alternatively when a larger 
sample  is  examined  then  the  variables’  coefficients  vary  significantly  from  unity. 
Generally, results from debt issues are more supportive towards the aggregation step 
than those coming from debt ratio changes. 
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This paper’s results also vary according to the data set and the time period examined. 
Table  206  (Appendix  I)  reported  the  results  for  listed  companies  and  table  207 
(Appendix  I)  for  non-listed  ones.  In  both  tables  the  reader  can  see  that  the  most 
encouraging  results  come  from  the  capital  expenditures  and  cash  flow  variables. 
These two variables are the ones that consistently report coefficients that are close to 
unity  despite the  group  of firms  or  the  time  period  examined.  On  the  other  hand 
results for dividend payments are erratic and in many cases report coefficients greater 
than unity or even have the wrong sign; this is more evident for the listed companies’ 
data set. The variable depicting the first difference of net working capital also reports 
coefficients of low levels or having a negative sign especially for the listed firms’ data 
set.  
 
It  should  be  stated  that  the  non-listed  companies’  data  set  report  results  more 
favorable towards the aggregation step than those reported from the listed firms’ data 
set. Furthermore, as in the case of Frank & Goyal (2003), results are generally better 
when changes of debt issues instead of debt ratios are examined. As an example, 
when the data set containing private firms is examined (entire time period, table 206, 
Appendix I), a one standard deviation increase to the ratio of cash dividends to total 
assets and capital expenditure leads in a 3.0395 and 0.7372 increase to debt issued. In 
the same example a one s.d. increase to net increase of working capital and operating 
cash flows results in a 0.1513 and 0.7682 decrease to debt issued. 
 
Of course in order for robust conclusions to be drawn, a formal test examining the 
hypothesis of  1 = = = = = ∆ C R W X DIV b b b b b  should be applied. The results of this test 
are  shown  in  tables  206-207  (Appendix  I)  and  in  each  case  reject  the  examined   297 
hypothesis. This paper, similarly to Frank & Goyal (2003), concludes that aggregating 
the  accounting  data  and  calculating  the  funds  flow  deficit  result  in  a  loss  of 
information. 
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4.2.5 Robustness Tests 
 
In order to validate the findings reported in sections 4.2.2.1-4.2.2.3 the inclusion of 
robustness tests was deemed necessary. The first robustness tests that will be run will 
essentially re-estimate equations 34-35 but this time instead of OLS, random, or fixed 
effects estimators “System GMM” estimators will be used due to the advantages they 
posses as described in section 3.2.1.4. 
 
The results of these GMM robustness tests, are shown in tables 208-209, 212-213, 
216-217, 220-221  (Appendix I). In both data sets the results of the main empirical 
analysis  are  generally  confirmed  since  the  pecking  order  model  consistently 
outperforms the target adjustment model with a fixed target during the bubble period. 
During the post bubble period the pecking order theory is still the winner but in the 
public firms sample it is found to lose its power. Finally during the credit crunch 
period  the  trade-off  theory  is  found  to  be  the  winner  while  at  the  same  time  the 
pecking order breaks down and this is evident for both public and private firms. As a 
general note it should be stated that all models have coefficient smaller in sizes than 
those reported in section 4.2.2.  
 
As far as the size and leverage factors conclusions are concerned the results are mixed 
(tables  210-211,  214-215,  218-219,  222-223  Appendix  I).  The  pecking  order 
hypothesis does seem to work better for small sized private firms, for large size public 
firms (with the exception of the post bubble period) and also the firms that have the 
highest leverage levels (either public or private firms). This is in accordance with the 
findings of the main empirical analysis. Contradictory results come from the target   299 
adjustment model though. The trade-off theory appears to work best for those firms 
that have the highest leverage levels, with the exception of the credit crunch period 
where an opposite relationship holds. As far as size is concerned the target adjustment 
model  seem  to  perform  best  for  largest  private  firms  (consistent  with  the  main 
empirical results) but also performs best for the smallest public firms (inconsistent 
with  the  main empirical  results). On the whole  the  GMM robustness tests  do not 
validate the original conclusions on the effect that size and leverage has on the trade-
off theory. 
 
As  a  final  note  to the GMM  robustness  tests  it  should  also  be  stated  that  results 
coming from the tests of statistical power confirm the validity of the pecking order 
model while at the same time cast doubts on the validity of the target adjustment 
model (tables 224-225, Appendix I). In most cases (except the credit crunch period in 
the data set containing public firms) the target adjustment model is able to explain the 
hypothetical time series based on the funds flow deficit while at the same time the 
pecking  order  model  does  not  seem  able  to  explain  the  hypothetical  time  series 
created according to the trade-off theory (with the exception of the postbubble period 
in the public firm data set). Moreover when the disaggregated funds flow deficit is 
examined yet again the findings show that its ingredients do not show coefficients that 
are  not  equal  to  unity,  as  the  X  test  indicates.  The  signs  and  magnitudes  of  the 
coefficients are similar to those shown in the main empirical analysis (tables 226-227, 
Appendix I).   
 
The results of the GMM robustness tests ( J  ,  1 m , 2 m  tests)  indicate in most cases no 
major problems as far the overidentifying restrictions and serial correlations tests are   300 
concerned. Of course a few exceptions to this exist but their number are few and in 
most cases indicate mild, not major, problems of serial correlation or endogeneity. 
 
 
The next series of robustness tests examined if changes in the sample used affect the 
results of the main empirical analysis. Outliers were omitted from the original sample 
by removing  the  1% tails of  the  distribution of  all regression  variables. This  was 
applied for public and private firms. 
 
The results shown in tables 228-229, 232-233, 236-237 (Appendix I) do not vary from 
those seen in sections 4.2.2.1-4.2.2.3. There is one big difference, the pecking order 
model in the data set with the public firms does not break down during the credit 
crunch. It retains statistically significant, positively signed coefficients. Specifically 
table 236 (Appendix I) states that one s.d. increase to  PO b  leads to a 0.1243 increase 
to  debt  issued.  It is  thus  evident  that  omitting  outliers  results  in a much  stronger 
performance of the pecking order hypothesis. This conclusion is also verified when 
the entire time period is examined as is evident in tables 240-241 (Appendix I); the 
pecking  order  model  continues  to  have  a  statistically  significant  and  positive 
coefficient. 
 
On the whole results from the robustness tests regarding size and leverage are much 
more supportive towards the conclusions drawn in the main empirical analysis rather 
their respective GMM tests (tables 230-231,234-235,238-239, 242-243 Appendix I). 
Firstly it should be stated that effects of leverage are clear no matter what time period 
or data set is examined. The trade-off theory works best on low leverage firms while 
the pecking order hypothesis explains best high leveraged firms. On the other hand no   301 
safe conclusions can be drawn as far as the size factor is concerned. This is because 
even though both  PO b  and  TAAV b  are statistically significant, their results indicate no 
clear patter as to which group of firms (small, medium or larger) they explain best. 
The robustness tests of statistical power (tables 244-245, Appendix I) in every case 
accept the pecking order model and also reject the target adjustment model. Similarly 
expected results are shown by the robustness tests using a disaggregated funds flow 
deficit in tables 246-247 (Appendix I).   
 
A  further  robustness  test  is  the  addition  of manufacturing  companies  that  did  not 
submit their financial statements in the end of March in the sample used to produce 
the results of the main empirical analysis. Contrary to the omission of outliers the 
addition of the aforementioned firms did not alter the results for either of the two 
theories (tables 248-249, 252-253, 256-257, 260-261 Appendix I). The story remains 
the same: the pecking order hypothesis works best for private firms but despite the 
group of companies examined the pecking order model loses power when monetary 
conditions worsen. The trade-off theory on the other hand works best for public firms 
and generally performs best when monetary conditions worsen.  
 
The results coming from size and leverage ( tables 250-251, 254-255, 258-259, 262-
263  Appendix  I)  also  verify  to  large  extent  the  conclusions  drawn  in  the  main 
empirical analysis. The pecking order model works best for the smallest of private 
firms and the largest of the public firms (exceptions to this is the sample of private 
firms during the land bubble and the sample of public firms during the post bubble 
period). Similarly the trade-off model is able to best describe the capital structure 
decisions of the largest corporations, public or private, in almost every single case   302 
examined. Results coming from the leverage factor state that the pecking order works 
best for high leverage firms and the trade-off theory for low leverage firms. A few 
contradictory results to this exist as far as the trade-off model is concerned but on the 
whole the results of this round of robustness tests are supportive of the conclusions 
drawn in sections 4.2.2.1– 4.2.2.3. 
 
Another method used to ensure the validity of this thesis’ results was the inclusion of 
dynamic specifications. The findings of these robustness tests can be seen in tables 
264-279 (Appendix I). In general the inclusion of lagged dependent variables, which 
in many cases are statistically insignificant, caused: the performance of the pecking 
order model to decrease, the fixed target-adjustment model to produce statistically 
insignificant  results  and  the  moving  target  model  to  fail  in  the  majority  of 
specifications.  The  inclusion  of  a  lagged  dependent  variable  in  the  regressions 
examining the size and leverage factors leads to inconclusive findings since in most 
specifications the results are statistically insignificant. The lagged dependent variables 
themselves  are  in  most  cases  statistically  insignificant  and  produce  mixed  signs 
therefore preventing any robust conclusions to be drawn.   
 
Robustness tests were also run to ensure the accuracy of the results as far as monetary 
conditions are concerned.  Therefore alternative definitions to the “Bubble”, “Post-
Bubble” and “Crunch” periods were given. More specifically years 1980-1988 were 
defined as the “Bubble” period, years 1990-1997 were classified as the “Post-Bubble” 
and  finally  years  1999-2006  were  categorised  as  the  “Crunch”  period.  These 
alternative definitions exclude the years 1989, 1998 and 2007. The last months of 
1989 the land bubble started to burst; the last months of 1998 the Japanese credit 
crunch started to take place; and 2007 was the year that the recent international credit   303 
crunch started occurring. All these years are essentially points in time where the was a 
turnaround  of  economic  conditions  therefore  possibly  causing  a  distortion  to  the 
results.  
 
These alternative definitions of the three economic periods did not change the winner 
of the two competing  theories but produced some  interesting findings nonetheless 
(tables 280-291, Appendix I). Specifically the drop of 1989 caused an increase to the 
coefficient  of the pecking  order model for both  groups  of firms. When 2007  was 
dropped the coefficient of the pecking order model in the sample containing private 
firms  almost  doubled  in  size.  During  the  “Crunch”  period  in  the  main  empirical 
analysis, private firms data set, a  one s.d. increase of the  PO b  led to a 0.377 increase 
to debt issued (table 197, Appendix I). While using this alternative definition of the 
“Crunch” period a  one s.d. increase of the  PO b  leads to a 0.6040 increase to debt 
issued  (table  289,  Appendix  I).  The  improvement  of  the  pecking  order  model’s 
performance when years, in which monetary tightenings are likely to have occurred, 
are  dropped  further  supports  the  notion  that  economic  conditions  affect  capital 
structure decisions. The size and  leverage  factors  on the  whole  produce  the  same 
results  as  those  shown  in  the  main  empirical  analysis  and  thus  for  the  most  part 
remain unaffected by this alternative definition of monetary conditions. 
 
As a further robustness test for results obtained from the size and leverage factors it 
has been decided to use alternative cut-off points. Therefore every year the firms were 
ranked  according  to  their  total  assets  or  leverage  levels  and  the  lowest  20%  (the 
percentage in the main empirical analysis was 30%) was classified as “small” or “low   304 
leverage” firms. The highest 20% was characterised as “large” or “high leverage” 
firms whereas the remaining 60% was classified as “medium” or “medium leverage”.  
 
This alternative definition ultimately did not cause a major difference to the results 
shown in table 292-297 (Appendix I). As far as the pecking order model is concerned 
it is clear that in every case examined, firms with high leverage followed more closely 
a pecking order in their financial policy decisions than other firms; this also applied 
for the smallest private firms or the largest public firms. The target adjustment model 
on the other hand appeared to perform best for corporations of low leverage levels 
even though two exceptions, one in the post-bubble and one in the crunch period, 
were  documented.  During  the  post  bubble  period  it  was  shown  that  the  target 
adjustment model worked best for the largest firms but similar conclusions were not 
drawn in the other periods examined. It should be stated though the size factor also 
produced, up to a certain extent, mixed results in the main empirical analysis.  
 
As a final robustness test it was decided to further examine the size factor. A different 
definition for size was used and thus total assets were replaced by sales as a measure 
for size. Therefore every year the firms were ranked according to their sales levels; 
the  lowest  30%  was  classified  as  “small”,  the  highest  30%  was  characterised  as 
“large” and the rest of the firms were labelled as “medium”. The results of these 
robustness tests are shown in tables 298-300 (Appendix I).   
 
Nevertheless  the  findings  as  far  as  the  trade-off  theory  is  concerned  are  still 
inconclusive. During the post-bubble period the target adjustment model works best 
for the largest of firms while during the credit crunch the opposite occurs. On the 
other hand the robustness tests confirm for once more the effect that the size factor   305 
has on the pecking order model. The pecking order theory appears to perform best for 
either the largest public firms or the smallest private firms.   
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4.3.0 Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to decide whether the pecking order hypothesis or the 
trade-off theory better explains capital structure. The unique contribution offered in 
this paper specifically is the inclusion of monetary conditions and division of firms 
into different groups (public/private, small/large size, low/high leverage).  
 
Results show the following conclusions: 
1.  The pecking order performs better than the trade-off models in all cases of 
private firms. 
2.  The pecking order performs better than the trade-off models during the land 
bubble for public firms. 
3.  The trade-off models perform better than the pecking order during the stagnant 
growth and credit crunch periods for public firms. 
4.  The pecking order, for public firms, performs better during the land bubble 
than it does during the stagnant growth and finally breaks down during the 
credit crunch. The entirely opposite is true for the trade-off models. 
5.  Between fixed and moving target adjustment models, the fixed model is the 
best  performer.  On  many  occasions  the  latter  presents coefficients  that  are 
larger than unity and thus fail. 
6.  Size  does  play  a  significant  role  on  the  performance  of  both  theories.  For 
public firms both theories perform best for the large companies. For private 
firms the pecking order model performs best for small firms while the trade-
off model findings are inconclusive. 
7.  Leverage also plays a significant role. Both public and private firms’ results 
are generally the same: the higher the level of leverage the better the pecking   307 
order model works and the lower the level of leverage the better the trade-off 
model works. 
8.  Disaggregating  the  financial  deficit  in  most  cases  does  provide  extra 
information. 
9.  When tests of statistical power are run the pecking order model is the winner.  
 
The overall conclusion that can be drawn from the above results is that the winner is 
the pecking order hypothesis. This means that future studies in capital structure would 
have to take into consideration that Japanese firms follow a pecking order model that 
determines their financial policy decisions.  
 
The result in bullet-point 1 can be explained by the fact that private firms face higher 
information asymmetries and thus have greater difficulties in raising external finance. 
Therefore these firms are expected to follow more closely a pecking order model of 
financial policy decisions.  
 
Bulletpoints 2 and 3 are simply the results of the horse race test, the implications of 
which are found in point 4. That the pecking order breaks down during the crunch 
makes economic sense. During a monetary tightening firms are likely to be financially 
constrained and therefore their financial managers wishes are not likely to become a 
reality. The implication therefore is that they do not get a chance of using a pecking 
order  style  of  capital  structure.  On  the  other  hand  finding  an  explanation  for  the 
increasingly better performance of the trade off model especially during the credit 
crunch has proved more difficult. While economic contraction takes place it should be 
more difficult to reach the optimal debt targets.    308 
The effect of size on the pecking order model on public firms as described in bullet-
point 6 is a similar result to that of Frank & Goyal (2003) and thus should come as no 
surprise. The paper’s result is that the pecking order does not perform well for small 
public  firms  because  these  firms  are  particularly  subject  to  adverse  selection 
problems. For the trade off model the theory itself predicts that larger, more mature 
and trustworthy firms should have higher leverage levels and of course reach their 
optimal capital structure targets easily. Nevertheless, this is the first study, as far as 
horse race tests are concerned that verifies these theoretical predictions. Clearly the 
implication is evidential support for the trade off model.  
 
Frank & Goyal (2003) also questioned the aggregation step used by Shyam-Sunder & 
Myers (1999) to form the funds flow deficit for the pecking order model. Their results 
indicated that when the pecking order model is applied to a large sized data set the 
factors of deficit have coefficients with values that vary substantially from unity; this 
results in a severe loss of information. Bullet-point 8 is in accordance with Frank & 
Goyal (2003). In cases where the pecking order model performs well the factors that 
comprise the financial deficit are close to unity, especially capital expenditures and 
cash flows. This changes when the regression model loses its power. In any case this 
paper’s  conclusion  is  that  disaggregating  the  financial  deficit  in  most  cases,  does 
provide extra information especially since the pecking order hypothesis is not likely to 
work perfectly in every single instance and for every data set. 
 
Finally bullet-point 9 declares the pecking order theory as the winner. The trade-off 
theory  based  model  provides  a  good  fit  for  a  simulated  data  set  of  firms  whose 
underlying behavior is entirely pecking order. This proves that the target-adjustment   309 
model  can  generate  plausible  and  significant  results  even  when  it  is  false.  Mean 
reversion in debt ratios generates spuriously good fits and leads the trade-off model to 
produce large in size and statistically significant coefficients even though this has 
nothing to do with a target capital structure. On the other hand the pecking order 
model fails to provide a good fit to the simulated data set according to the trade-off 
theory. This helps to ascertain its validity and make it the most attractive theory to 
explain capital structure. 
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Chapter 5: Empirical Analysis of Trade Credit 
 
This  chapter  investigates  the  special  role  that  trade  credit  (hereinafter  TC)  has  in 
capital structure. Recent studies, such as those of Mateut et al. (2006), Rodriguez 
(2006) and Love et al. (2007), examine TC during monetary contractions and have 
stated that TC acts as a substitute to bank credit for financially constrained firms.  
 
In this study, evidence in favour of this view has been initially documented in chapter 
3,  where  accounts  payable  have  exhibited  an  inverse  relationship  with  leverage, 
private and public debt. These findings have urged a further investigation of TC since 
it  has  been  proven  to  be  an  important  component  of  companies’  financial  policy 
decisions. The methodology used will be similar to that of the studies mentioned in 
the above paragraph. 
 
The only other study examining the role of TC in Japan is that of Fukuda et al. (2006). 
This study has focused solely on private firms and only during the 1997-2002 period 
thus excluding a large section of the Japanese sector as well as several extremely 
important economic periods. Their results indicate that during financial turbulence the 
substitution hypothesis between TC and bank loans does not hold. This is in contrast 
to the evidence brought forward by the majority of the other relevant studies and also 
surprising since it is during monetary tightenings that the TC channel should be more 
apparent.  
 
Based on the results of chapter 3, this chapter is expected to contradict Fukuda et al.’s 
(2006)  findings.  Evidence  will  be  based  on  a  much  larger  sample  including  both   311 
public and private companies and examine the much larger time period of 1980-2007, 
thus including several changes of monetary policy in Japan. The data set is identical to 
that  described  in  section  3.1.0  and  the  methodology  applied  follows  in  the  next 
section. Next, the results of the regression analysis will be reported and conclusions 
about the existence and effectiveness of the TC channel will be drawn. 
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5.1.0 Methodology 
 
The following section will analyse the methodology utilised in this paper. Initially the 
dependent  variables  will  be  presented  and  the  reasons  behind  their  selection 
discussed. A similar discussion will be held for the independent factors. In the end, 
the regression equations run will be shown alongside with any relevant comments. 
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5.1.1 Dependent Variables 
 
The selection of the variables that will be examined is of  the  utmost importance. 
Therefore, as in chapters 3-4, a detailed discussion on the dependent variables utilised 
in this paper, and as to why they were chosen, will be held. 
 
5.1.1.1 Trade Credit Received  
 
The dependent variable used to carry out the main part of the empirical analysis is 
accounts payable scaled by current liabilities. This definition of TC receivable has 
been used by the studies of Rodriguez (2006), Kohler et al. (2000) and Martinez De 
Guerenu (1996) as stated in Rodriguez (2006). This is possibly the ideal definition for 
examining the role of trade credit. Scaling trade credit receivable to current liabilities 
will ensure that larger firms do not disproportionately affect the results. Furthermore 
the  role  of  accounts  payable  as  a  substitute  of  other  short-term  external  finance 
options, i.e. short-term bank loans, will be investigated. In this study, this variable was 
constructed  by  dividing  Notes  and  Accounts  Payable 
(NFINANCIAL.NKCODE’FB069)  to  Total  Current  Liability 
(NFINANCIAL.NKCODE’FB068). 
 
Nevertheless, papers such as those of Mateut et al. (2006) and Van Der Wijst & Hol 
(2002) have used an alternative definition for trade credit received: accounts payable 
scaled to total liabilities. This is a similar definition to the one used above but this 
time, current and fixed liabilities are taken into consideration. This definition has the 
advantage  of  capturing a  potential firms’ movement  from  short-term  to  long-term   314 
bank debt but it is also of a broader nature. The essential difference between these two 
definitions lies in what the primary target of the investigation is: TC as an instrument 
of short-term credit or TC as a general option for external finance?  
 
As in Rodriguez (2006), the accounts payable to total liabilities ratio is thought to be a 
perfect  way for running a  robustness  test. In  Nikkei  Needs terms,  this variable is 
generated by scaling Notes and Accounts Payable (NFINANCIAL.NKCODE’FB069) 
to Total Liability (NFINANCIAL.NKCODE’FB121).  
 
One last definition for TC received comes from Mateut et al. (2006) who directly test 
the relationship between TC and short-term borrowings. They examine the ratio of TC 
to  the  sum  of  TC  and  bank  loans  in  order  to  directly  investigate  the substitution 
hypothesis between trade and bank credit. In this study, the current definition of TC is 
used  as  a  final  robustness  test  and  is  defined  as  Notes  and  Accounts  Payable 
(NFINANCIAL.NKCODE’FB069)  to  Notes  and  Accounts  Payable 
(NFINANCIAL.NKCODE’FB069)  plus  Short-Term  Borrowings 
(NFINANCIAL.NKCODE’FB074). 
 
5.1.1.2 Short-Term Bank Loans 
 
It  is  also  deemed  important  to  perform  an  analysis  on  short-term  bank  credit 
considered to be a substitute to TC. This is in accordance with Mateut et al. (2006) 
who conducted  an empirical analysis  on  short-term  bank loans  while  utilising  the 
same set of explanatory variables they used to investigate TC. They then compared   315 
the  results  of  the  two  regression  analyses  and  drew  important  conclusions  on  the 
nature of the relationship between these two external finance options. 
 
The same methodology will also be applied in this chapter. The dependent variable 
that will be used to examine short-term bank credit will be Short-Term Borrowings 
(NFINANCIAL.NKCODE’FB074)  to  Total  Current  Liability 
(NFINANCIAL.NKCODE’FB068).  This  definition  is  identical  to  the  one  used  in 
section 3.4.2.2 to examine short-term private debt. 
 
5.1.1.3 Trade Credit Extended 
 
For a better view of how the TC channel operates an examination of the TC extended 
must be made. This is particularly significant for the financial assistance view which 
states that during economic recessions large firms, with access to bank credit, will 
extend large amounts of TC towards smaller firms.   
 
Even  though  the  majority  of  the  existing  studies  have  focused  their  attention  on 
accounts payable there have also been some, such as those of Choi & Kim (2003), 
Wilson  et  al.  (2004)  and  Love  et  al.  (2007),  that    have  investigated  accounts 
receivable. Nevertheless a consensus has not yet been achieved. Wilson et al. (2004) 
report that, against the financial assistance view, smaller companies extend more TC 
than larger ones during monetary contractions. Choi & Kim (2003) find that, even 
though accounts receivable increase more than accounts payable during a recession, 
large companies do not act as credit suppliers relevant to small firms. Finally, Love et   316 
al. (2007) state that even though before and during a recession accounts receivable 
increase, they are reduced drastically immediately afterwards. 
 
Therefore further research must be made for robust conclusions to be drawn. This 
chapter  will  provide additional evidence from Japan, a country in  which accounts 
receivable have not yet received much attention. The dependent variable used in this 
analysis will be Bills and Accounts Receivables (NFINANCIAL.NKCODE’FB004) 
scaled to Total Current Liability (NFINANCIAL.NKCODE’FB068). 
 
 
5.1.1.4. Net Trade Credit 
 
In order to complete our investigation of TC the last dependent variable examined will 
be net trade credit (hereinafter NTC). The reason for examining NTC is that it shows 
the actual volume of TC circulating within the economy since it incorporates both 
accounts  receivables  and  accounts  payables.  This  will  help  us  to  see  how  and  if 
changes in monetary conditions affect the total TC created and if the examined groups 
of firms have different relationships to NTC. 
 
NTC has been investigated by numerous studies examining the TC channel such as 
those of Marotta (1997), Choi & Kim (2003), Wilson et al. (2004) and Love et al. 
(2007). The definition of NTC used in this thesis is similar to that used in the above 
studies. This is Bills and Accounts Receivables (NFINANCIAL.NKCODE’FB004) 
minus Notes and Accounts Payable (NFINANCIAL.NKCODE’FB069) the results of 
which is  divided by  Total Current Liability (NFINANCIAL.NKCODE’FB068). 
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5.1.2 Independent Variables 
 
 
In order to examine the role of the TC channel, a set of explanatory variables was 
deployed. This set included dummy variables investigating monetary policy episodes, 
size, short-term bank loan levels and a number of factors frequently used in relevant 
studies. These factors are sales, liquidity, asset tangibility and internally generated 
funds.  A  more  detailed  discussion  around  these  explanatory  variables  will  follow 
alongside the reasons for their selection. 
 
5.1.2.1 Monetary Conditions 
 
Severe changes in monetary conditions in Japan make it the perfect testing ground for 
investigating the TC channel. After all, most relevant studies, such as those of Love et 
al. (2007), Choi and Kim (2003) and Blasio (2003), revolve around monetary shocks. 
The  general  notion  is  that  certain  groups  of  firms,  especially  during  economic 
recessions, are credit rationed and have to resort to TC if the substitution hypothesis 
holds. In order to incorporate the changes of monetary conditions in the analysis, the 
use of a dummy variable was necessary.  
 
This  is a  novelty compared to existing  studies of  TC. In past papers  the  level of 
interest rates set by central banks is utilised as an indicator of monetary conditions. 
This study has access to data that directly reveal bank lending growth as shown in 
graph 51B. Bank lending growth is of greater importance than interest rates since it 
directly shows the amount of bank loans issued in an economy. Graph 51B shows the   318 
increase of bank lending during the land value bubble period (1980-1989) its sharp 
decline after its burst (1990-1998) and its drop to negative levels during the credit 
crunch  period (1999-2007). 
 
Graph 51B:Bank Lending Growth in Japan  
 
Source:Profit Research Center Ltd, Tokyo 
 
In a similar fashion to chapter 3, the analysis was split into two data sets; one set 
covering the land value bubble and the other investigating the credit crunch. In the 
first file, the dummy variable was equal to 1 in 1980-1989 and 0 in 1990-1999. For 
the second file it had a value of 1 during 2000-2007 and 0 during 1990-1999. 
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5.1.2.2 Size 
 
Numerous studies examining the TC channel have presented findings showing that 
smaller  firms,  especially  during  economic  recessions,  rely  more  on  TC  than  their 
larger counterparts. Nilsen (2002), Rodriguez (2006) and Mateut et al. (2006) are just 
some of the studies supporting this view. Specifically, Mateut et al. (2006) divided 
their  sample  into  three  categories  of  small,  medium  and  large  sized  firms.  This 
classification was made either according to the size of the firms’ total assets or by 
using the criteria of the Companies Act (1985). 
 
Since important conclusions are drawn by the classification made by Mateut et al. 
(2006) this study will adopt a similar methodology. In accordance to chapters 3, 4 and 
Mateut  et  al.  (2006)  firms  will  be  ranked  according  to  their  total  assets  values. 
Companies that belong to the lowest 30% will be characterised as “small”, those that 
belong to the highest 30% will be labelled “large” and the rest will be categorised as 
“medium”. This classification will be made in an annual basis throughout the sample.  
 
Contrary to Mateut et al. (2006) the sample of this study will not be divided into sub-
samples but instead dummy variables will be used. This approach is likely to portray a 
clearer picture and provide more robust results. This is because the size of the dummy 
variables’ coefficients can be measured and their statistical significance taken into 
consideration. When the behaviour of small sized firms will be examined, the dummy 
variable Small will be deployed taking the value of 1 if the company belongs to the 
small  firms  group  and  0  if  it  is  not.  The  same  methodology  will  be  utilised  for 
medium and large sized companies.   320 
5.1.2.3 Short-Term Bank Lending 
 
Short-term  bank  loans  have  frequently  been  utilised  as  a  factor  in  TC  studies. 
Rodriguez et al. (2006), Fukuda et al. (2006) and Choi and Kim (2003) have inserted 
a short-term bank credit variable in their empirical analysis. The conclusions derived 
indicate  that  in  most  cases  an  inverse  relationship  between  bank  and  trade  credit 
exists.  
 
The drawback of using short-term bank credit as a factor in the investigation of TC is 
the potential problem of endogeneity. Endogeneity violates the assumptions of OLS 
and can therefore cause significant problems in the empirical analysis. A solution for 
the potential problem of endogeneity is the use of GMM estimators that, as discussed 
in section 3.2.1.4., provide valid estimates in the presence of endogeneity. Therefore 
GMM robustness tests were carried out in section 5.2.2.5. 
 
Love et al. (2007) have developed an interesting method of testing the substitution 
hypothesis between bank and trade credit. The authors stated that companies which 
enter a period of monetary contraction with a high proportion of short-term bank debt 
are more likely to be at a disadvantage and are thus expected to increase their reliance 
on credit offered by their suppliers. They deploy dummy variables in order to test this 
hypothesis.  
 
This chapter will perform a similar analysis to that of Love et al. (2007). Dummy 
variables are going to be utilised and firms will be categorised into those having a 
high, medium or small proportion of short-term bank loans relevant to their current   321 
liabilities. On an annual basis, companies that have a ratio of short-term borrowings to 
current liabilities belonging to the lowest 30% of the sample will be classified as 
having “low short bank loan” levels. Vice versa, firms with a short-term borrowing 
ratio belonging to the highest 30% of that year will be labelled as having “high short 
bank loan” levels. The rest of companies will be categorised as having “medium short 
bank loan” levels. As an example, if a firm is classified of having low levels of short-
term bank credit then, when the lowshortbankloans variable is used, it will receive the 
value of 1 while when the highshortbankloans variable it utilised it will receive the 
value of 0.    
 
5.1.2.4 Natural Logarithm of Sales 
 
 
Most  studies  examining  the  TC  channel  take  into  account  the  magnitude  of  a 
company’s transactions as a factor in their analysis. In this paper it was decided to use 
the natural logarithm of sales to measure this effect on TC; the same definition has 
also  been  used  by  the  studies  of  Mateut  et  al.  (2006)  and  Fukuda  et  al.  (2006). 
Furthermore this definition is consistent with chapter 3 where the natural logarithm of 
sales was also deployed to examine the determinants of the firms’ capital structure 
decisions. 
 
The size of financial activity is thought to have a positive impact on TC. Fukuda et al. 
(2006) state that a company’s financial conditions are bound to affect its TC levels. 
More specifically they state that companies with higher amount of transactions should 
also use more TC. The findings of both Mateut et al. (2006) and Fukuda et al. (2006)   322 
verify this belief by reporting that, higher sales increase TC levels. In this study this 
variable  is  defined  as  the  natural  logarithm  of  Sales  and  Operating  Revenue 
(NFINANCIAL.NKCODE’FC001). 
 
5.1.2.5 Liquidity 
 
 
Another factor frequently used when examining TC is liquidity. Liquidity as defined 
in  Rodriguez  (2006)  is  the  ratio  of current  assets  on  current  liabilities.  This  ratio 
indicates the ability and the ease of a firm to convert its investments to cash at their 
present market value and is also an indicator of its financial health. The studies of 
Kohler et al. (2000) and Mateut et al. (2006) have used similar definitions of liquidity. 
 
Generally it is expected that liquidity is inversely related to TC receivable. This is 
because financially healthy and liquid firms should not have problems in obtaining 
cheaper, more desirable forms of external finance such as bank credit. In consistency 
with this view, Rodriguez (2006) reports that when accounts payables are examined, 
liquidity has a negative sign. Nevertheless Kohler et al. (2000) found that the liquidity 
variable provides statistically insignificant results and Mateut et al. (2006) reported  
that liquidity presents different signs according to the dependent variables used. 
 
In  this  study,  the  definition  used  for  liquidity  is  Total  Current  Assets 
(NFINANCIAL.NKCODE’FB001)  divided  by  Total  Current  Liability 
(NFINANCIAL.NKCODE’FB068). 
   323 
5.1.2.6 Funds Internally Generated 
 
According to the pecking order hypothesis a firm will choose to use the cheapest and 
safest form of finance first. Therefore the first choice for every company will be its 
internally generated funds. TC is generally accepted to be a more expensive and less 
desirable alternative. 
 
Based  on  this  notion,  Rodriguez  (2006)  developed  a  variable  capturing  the 
significance of internally generated funds by using the ratio of cash flow on turnover. 
Rodriguez (2006) stated that this ratio depicts in what extent a company can meet its 
payments to its suppliers. Moreover a high cash flow to turnover ratio could also be 
perceived as a signal of the firm’s quality and therefore ease its access to private debt. 
 
For all these reasons the variable for internally  generated funds is expected to be 
negatively  related  to  TC  and  indeed  the  results  of  Rodriguez  (2006)  have  shown 
exactly that. In this paper, the use of this factor has been deemed necessary and it has 
been  defined  as  Cash  Flow  (NFINANCIAL.NKCODE’FP01101)  to  Sales  and 
Operating Revenue (NFINANCIAL.NKCODE’FC001). 
 
5.1.2.7 Asset Tangibility 
 
 
The more likely a company failure is, the less likely it is for a bank to be willing to 
extend credit to that firm. As a direct result of this, firms that are considered to be 
likely to default on their obligations will have to resort on the usage of TC.    324 
 
Based on this notion, Mateut et al. (2006) generated a variable indicating how risky 
each  company  is.  They  used  the  Quiscore  measure  produced  by  Qui  Credit 
Assessment Ltd, a firm assessing the likelihood of a company failure within the next 
twelve months.  
 
The author of this paper would also wish to deploy a variable measuring the firms’ 
financial  health  directly  but  unfortunately  lacks  the  access  to  the  Qui  Credit 
Assessment  or  a  similar  company.  Therefore  a  proxy  must  be  used  to  take  into 
account  the  risk  factor.  Probably  the  best  such  proxy  is  the  collateral  value  of  a 
company’s assets, measured by its tangible assets. The higher the collateral value of a 
firm’s assets, the more likely it is for the company to be seen as a safe, trustworthy 
borrower. Asset tangibility has been used by numerous studies in capital structure, 
such  as  those  of  Booth  et  al.  (2001),  Titman  and  Wessels  (1988)  and  Rajan  and 
Zingales (1995), and therefore is considered a robust choice. Asset tangibility, in this 
chapter,  is  defined  as  the  ratio  of  Total  Tangible  Fixed  Assets 
(NFINANCIAL’FB032) to Total Assets (NFINANCIAL’FB067). 
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5.1.3 Regression Models 
 
The general form of the equation that will be used in order to carry out the empirical 
analysis is depicted below in equation 37: 
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Equation 37:General Trade Credit Regression Model 
 
 
  
For the main part of the empirical analysis  it y  will be accounts payable to current 
liabilities. For the investigation of the TC extended and NTC  it y  will be accounts 
receivable to current liabilities and NTC to current liabilities respectively. Finally for 
the examination of the short-term bank credit,  it y  will change into short-term bank 
loans to current liabilities.  
 
On  the  explanatory  variables  side  the  reader  can  witness  the  dummy  variable 
accounting for size which, when short-term bank credit is taken into consideration, 
will  change  into  Shortbankloansit.  The  second  dummy  variable  takes  into 
consideration  monetary  policy  shocks  and  will  change  into  either  the  Bubble  or 
Crunch variables. The factors that follow are the natural logarithm of sales, liquidity, 
generated  funds  internally  scaled  to  total  assets  and  lastly,  tangible  fixed  assets 
divided by total assets.  
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5.2.0 Results 
 
Having extensively analysed the methodology in section 5.1.0, we will now proceed 
in depicting the results of the empirical analysis. Initially the descriptive statistics of 
the data set utilised will be shown; from this first analysis, comments will be made 
and conclusions will be drawn. Afterwards, the results of the main empirical analysis 
will be presented and analysed in detailed thus leading to the culmination of this part 
of the thesis. 
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5.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
In this part of the empirical analysis, the descriptive statistics of the data sets used will 
be depicted and examined. Table 301 and 302 (Appendix J) report the correlation 
matrices of this study’s factors for the public and private firms data set respectively. 
 
In  tables  301-302  (Appendix  J)  it  is  evident  that  between  the  dependent  and  the 
explanatory factors the correlation values are not high or “perfect” enough to cause 
any serious suspicions for multicollinearity. Moreover, accounts payable and short-
term borrowings, in both data sets, are highly and negatively correlated. This is initial 
evidence  in  favour  of  the  substitution  hypothesis  between these forms of  external 
finance.  Accounts  payable  and  accounts  receivable  are  positively  related;  this 
indicates that firms that extend more TC also receive more. Collateral values have an 
inverse relationship with all forms of TC while and are positively correlated with bank 
loans. Internally generated funds are negatively correlated to short-term bank debt and 
are positively correlated with TC. The natural logarithm of sales and the indicator of 
liquidity in most cases both appear to be inversely correlated with TC and bank debt. 
 
Next  follow  the  tables  depicting  the  descriptive  statistics  for  both  data  sets.  The 
factors of size as well as major monetary episodes have been taken into consideration. 
In  table  308  (Appendix  J)  the  reader  can  see  that  throughout  the  time  period 
examined, small firms have higher levels of TC received and extended as well as 
short-term bank credit than large sized firms. As far as the short-term bank loans 
received are concerned the results are in accordance with the empirical analysis of 
sections 5.1.4-5.1.5. It appears that large firms are experiencing a severe decrease of   328 
short-term bank debt while time passes by. Nevertheless small sized firms maintain 
their short-term borrowings levels. As expected, larger companies have consistently 
higher  values  of  sales,  liquidity  and  tangibility  ratios.    All  these  differences  are 
statistically significant at the 1% levels with the exception of short-term borrowings 
for small firms (table 308, Appendix J) 
 
In general the same conclusions are drawn by investigating table 309 (Appendix J) 
that exhibits the descriptive statistics generated by the data set including private firms. 
The only major difference is that when private companies are examined, large firms 
extend more TC than small firms. This is an initial indication that as Kohler et al. 
(2000)  state,  companies  with  access  to  capital  markets  operate  as  financial 
intermediaries  and  extend  credit  to  companies  that  are  unable  to  tap  the  capital 
markets themselves. 
 
In  order  to  examine  if  firms  indeed  substitute  bank  credit  with  TC  due  to  credit 
rationing, an annual comparison of the two external forms of finance is conducted.  
This analysis will also shed more light on the effect that monetary shocks have on 
trade and bank credit. 
 
Graph  47,  depicts  an  outstanding  story  in  favour  of  the  substitution  hypothesis 
between  trade  and  bank  credit.  As  the  reader  can  plainly  witness,  an  increase  of 
accounts payable is associated with an approximately equivalent decrease in short-
term  borrowings.  This  is  consistent  throughout  the  examined  period.  Interestingly 
enough  accounts  receivable  increase  steadily  as  time  progresses  thus  naturally 
resulting in a  constant increase of NTC. The effects of monetary contractions  are   329 
evident  in  the  end  of  the  80s  and  90s  by  a  significant  decrease  of  short-term 
borrowings that takes place. 
 
 
 
Graph 47:Accounts Payable, Receivable and Bank Loans, Listed Firms   330 
 
As is evident in graphs 48-49, smaller sized firms receive larger amounts of TC than 
their larger counterparts but they also extend more TC, especially during economic 
recessions. This could be due to the fact that small sized companies, due to financial 
and other kinds of constraints, have strong bonds with both their clients and their 
suppliers. This relationship is of course magnified during a monetary tightening when 
firms are more likely to become credit rationed and also face all sorts of financial 
difficulties. This is at least partly consistent with the view of Wilson et al. (2004) even 
though this study does not examine or reach to any conclusions as to whether this 
practise  followed  by  small  firms  leads  them  to  bankruptcy.  Furthermore  for 
companies with high values of total assets, accounts payable and accounts receivable 
move in the same direction. Even when the sample is divided according to size, the 
relationship between trade and bank credit seems to hold.  
 
 
Graph 48 : Accounts Payable, Receivable, Bank Loans, Small Size Listed Firms 
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Graph 49:Accounts Payable, Receivable, Bank Loans, Large Size Listed Firms 
 
 
When the dataset including private companies is investigated an interesting story is 
told (Graph 50). Private firms receive slightly higher TC than public firms but at the 
same time they also have lower values of accounts receivable. This is in accordance 
with the view of Kohler et al. (2000), reported in the beginning of this section, that 
states  that  companies  with  access  to  capital  markets  operate  as  financial 
intermediaries.   332 
 
 
Graph 50:Accounts Payable, Receivable, Bank Loans, Non-Listed Firms 
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5.2.2 Regression Analysis 
 
Having analysed the descriptive statistics of the data sets utilised and drawn some 
initial conclusions we will now proceed to the main part of the empirical analysis. In 
the  section  that  follows,  accounts  payable  scaled  to  current  liabilities  will  be 
examined. Section 5.2.2.2 will investigate the role of short-term bank debt in relation 
to the role of TC, section 5.2.2.3 will examine the factors that affect TC extended, 
section 5.2.4 will investigate the NTC circulating in the economy and finally section 
5.2.2.5  will  perform  robustness  tests  that  are  expected  to  validate  the  results  of 
sections 5.2.2.1-5.2.2.5. 
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5.2.2.1 Accounts Payable 
 
In this part of the empirical analysis TC received will be examined. Tables 316-317 
(Appendix K) report results of the public companies data set while tables 318-319 
(Appendix K) show the results of private firms data set.    
 
The first determinant of TC discussed will be the one depicting economic conditions. 
The  general  consensus  of  the  existing  studies  on  TC  is  that  during  monetary 
tightenings the usage of TC by firms should increase if TC is indeed a substitute of 
bank credit. In this paper the dummy variables Bubble and Crunch have been utilised 
to examine the burst of the land value bubble of the late 80s and the credit crunch of 
the late 90s. 
 
An initial examination of the Bubble variable results shows that for either public or 
private companies an increase of TC received occurs during the land value bubble 
(tables 316 and 318, Appendix K). As an example, in the small size public firms 
sample, the land bubble causes an 0.1107(E:0.069) increase to accounts payables. The 
Crunch variable present statistically insignificant results for the public firms sample 
while for the private firms data set negatively signed coefficients are reported (tables 
317 and 319, Appendix K). As an example, in the small sized private firms sample, 
the credit crunch causes an 0.1390(E:0.10) decrease to accounts payables.  
 
This  leads  us  to conclude  that  during  an  economic  expansion  all forms  of credit, 
including  of  course  TC,  rise.  In  other  words,  due  to  good  economic  conditions, 
suppliers  are  willing  to  extend  more  credit  to  their  clients  since  there  is  a  lower   335 
probability that they will default on their obligations. On the other hand during an 
economic contraction small, private companies appear to face difficulties obtaining 
TC. This is likely due to information asymmetries, that make lenders be suspicious of 
their potential borrowers, in conjunction with a possible worsening of their firms’ 
balance sheets due to the general economic conditions.    
 
Other dummy variables used depict the levels of a firm’s short-term bank credit as a 
proportion  of  its  current  liabilities  and  are  labelled  as  Lowshortbankloans 
Mediumshortbankloans  and  Highshortbankloans.  The  results  of  these  dummy 
variables  can  be  seen  in  the  last  three  columns  of  each  table.  If  TC  is  indeed  a 
substitute of bank credit then the higher the levels of a company’s short-term bank 
loans the lower its accounts payable should be. 
 
In tables 316-319 (Appendix K) the reader can see that the hypothesis stated in the 
above paragraph is verified in every single case. For example in table 316 (Appendix 
K),  having  low/medium  levels  of  short-term  loans  leads  to  an 
0.0346(E:0.023)/0.0067(E:0.006) increase to accounts payables; high levels of short-
term loans cause an 0.0404(E:0.027) decrease to accounts payables. Similar results 
are reported in all regressions run. It should be stated though that the gap between 
different groups of companies is increased significantly if private firms are examined. 
It would be desirable to conduct tests examining if these coefficient differences are 
statistically significant but due to space concerns such research is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. Therefore the conclusion drawn is that bank and trade credit are substitutes 
and it is most likely the case that companies that are not able to obtain the cheaper   336 
bank credit have to tap the TC channel. This relationship is more apparent for private 
firms that have fewer external finance options. 
 
Another frequently examined hypothesis in the TC literature is the financial assistance 
view. According to this theory, smaller sized firms that cannot tap the capital markets 
directly use more TC than their larger counterparts simply because smaller companies 
cannot access any other forms of credit. At the same time larger firms with access to 
bank credit act as financial intermediaries by extending TC to smaller firms. This of 
course will be tested more thoroughly in sections 5.2.2.2-5.2.2.4.  
 
The dummy variables used to test this theory classify companies as small medium and 
large. The results of these variables are shown in tables 316-319 (Appendix K) and 
verify the above mentioned theory in every case whether public or private firms are 
examined.  For  example  in  table  316  (Appendix  K),  having  small  size  causes  an 
0.0151(E:0.01)  increase  to  accounts  payables  while  large  size  causes  an 
0.0184(E:0.013) decrease to accounts payables. 
 
As was stated in section 5.1.2.4, Fukuda et al. (2006) and Mateut et al. (2006) found 
that the higher the magnitude of a firm’s sales levels the higher its account payables 
will be. In other words companies with increased financial activity are bound to use 
more TC in order to ensure that their business runs smoothly. The empirical results 
shown in tables 316-319 (Appendix K) verify the findings of these previous studies in 
every regression. In table 316, for small sized companies, a 1 s.d. increase to logsales 
causes a 0.0652(E:1.567) increase to accounts payables. 
   337 
The factor accounting for the companies’ collateral values also produces the expected 
results. As in Mateut et al. (2006), safe firms with high collateral values will not 
choose TC as an external finance option. It is likely that they will be able to receive a 
cheaper and more desirable bank loan; more on details on this will be given in the 
following  section.  Tables  316-319  (Appendix  K)  show  that  an  inverse  relation 
between asset tangibility and TC exists. Specifically, in small sized firms, a 1 s.d. 
increase to Tangfassets causes a 0.08(E:0.072) decrease to accounts payables.  All the 
coefficients reported are statistically significant. 
 
The  next  variable  used  in  this  study  is  liquidity.  According  to  theory  financially 
healthy firms, that can easily convert their investments to cash at their present market 
value, should have no problem in obtaining bank credit. Therefore these firms should 
not rely so much on TC. When private companies are examined the above mentioned 
theory is verified in every case (tables 318-319, Appendix K). For example, small 
sized  firms  in  table  318  (appendix  K),  a  1  s.d.  increase  to  Liquidity  causes  a 
0.0004(E:0.008) decrease to accounts payables.  When public firms are examined, the 
factor of liquidity exhibits a positive and significant coefficient, as can be seen in 
tables 316-317 (Appendix K). This leads us to conclude that firms that are not able to 
tap the capital markets take advantage of the liquidity factor and probably secure the 
desirable  bank  loans;  for  companies  that  have  access  to  capital  markets  liquidity 
probably operates a signal of quality. 
 
Next is the variable depicting the internally generated funds (GFI) to total assets ratio. 
Since internally generated funds are the cheapest and most secure form of finance 
firms are going to prefer it over any kind of external finance, including TC. This is not   338 
the story told in tables 316-319 (Appendix K). In this chapter GFI exhibit a positive 
coefficient; as an example, for small sized firms in table 316 (appendix K), a 1 s.d. 
increase to GFI causes a 0.0546(E:0.007) increase to accounts payables. Even if GFI 
are replaced by ebit scaled by total assets the story remains the same. It appears that 
GFI, as well as liquidity, operate as a signal of quality to suppliers. 
 
A final comment on the empirical analysis’ reported R
2 should be made. At a first 
glance the reader is likely to think that the R
2 shown in tables 316-319 (Appendix K) 
and generally in the tables of this paper are of low values. Nevertheless if relevant 
studies are taken into consideration then it will become evident that the R
2 values 
reported  are  within expected  levels.  More  specifically  in  Mateut  et  al.  (2006), R
2 
values range from 0.04 to 0.25. This is approximately the same range of values that R
2 
receive  in  this  study  as  the  reader  can  see  in  tables  316-319  (Appendix  K).  339 
 
5.2.2.2 Short-Term Bank Loans 
 
Bank credit and TC are two forms of external finance thought to substitute each other. 
Based on this assumption, Mateut et al. (2006) performed a regression analysis on 
both  financial  instruments  using  the  same  set  of  explanatory  variables.  The  same 
methodology is also going to be utilised in this chapter. The regression model run will 
be exactly the same as the one reported in section 5.2.2.1 but this time the dependent 
variable will be short-term borrowings to current liabilities. Results can be seen in 
tables 320-321 (Appendix K). 
 
As far as the monetary conditions dummy variables are concerned, the results shown 
in tables 320-321 (Appendix K) verify the substitution hypothesis between bank credit 
and TC. As shown in section 5.2.2.1, the land value bubble results in an expansion of 
TC. During the same time period the levels of short-term bank loans for all firms are 
significantly lower than in the 90s. Specifically, for small, public firms, the land value 
bubble results in a 0.0254(E:0.032) decrease of the short term loans ratio (table 320, 
Appendix K). During the credit crunch, in which an decrease of TC is recorded, an 
increase of short-term bank credit occurs. As an example, for small private firms, the 
credit crunch leads to a 0.4710(E0.775) increase of the short-term loans ratio (table 
321, Appendix K). 
 
The other dummy variable used accounts for the size factor. Results (tables 320-321, 
Appendix K) show that, for the public firms sample, smaller firms receive less short-
term bank credit than their larger counterparts. Specifically, during the land value   340 
bubble, a corporation being small/large results in a 0.0060(E:0.01)/0.0024(E:0.003) 
decrease and increase respectively of the short-term loans ratio. In conjunction with 
section 5.2.2.1, it appears that smaller firms rely on TC while larger ones on bank 
credit. This is further evidence in favour of the substation hypothesis that states that 
due to information asymmetries smaller, informational opaque corporations will be 
forced to use the more expensive TC while larger, trustworthy firms will have access 
on the cheaper bank credit. 
 
The findings coming from the standard explanatory factors, clearly show that TC and 
bank credit are substitutes. The coefficients of all the independent variables, shown in 
tables  320-321  (Appendix  K),  have  exactly  the  opposite  signs  in  comparison  to 
section 5.2.2.1. This means that companies with completely different characteristics 
select, or are able to receive, TC or bank credit respectively. Therefore the initial story 
told in the descriptive results of section 5.2.1 is reaffirmed. 
 
More specifically, the higher the size of a firm’s liquidity, GFI and transaction levels, 
the lower the levels of that firm’s short-term borrowings will be. As an example, for 
small  public  firms,  a  one  s.d.  increase  of  liquidity/GFI/logsales  leads  to  a 
0.0192(E:3.227)/0.2333(E:0.065)/0.0451(E:2.217)  decrease  to  the  short-term  loans 
ratio. Moreover higher collateral value results in higher short-term borrowings levels. 
For small public firms, a one s.d. increase of tangfassets leads to a 0.1407(E:0.260) 
increase to the short-term loans ratio.  
 
As well as verifying the validity of the substitution hypothesis, these results help draw 
further conclusions.  It is  likely that more liquid firms choose alternative forms of   341 
external finance other than short-term bank debt. Internally generated funds appear to 
be more desirable than short-term loans. Corporations with low financial activity are 
not able to secure short-term bank credit. Increased collateral values help secure bank 
credit. These findings are similar to those of chapter 3 and indicate that firms with 
certain undesirable characteristics are rationed from short-term bank credit and that 
corporations follow a pecking order as far as financial policy decisions are concerned.   
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5.2.2.3 Accounts Receivable 
 
In this section the TC extended by the firms’ will be investigated. The findings will be 
of great interest in relation to the financial assistance view. The financial assistance 
view, as discussed in section 5.1.3.4, stipulates that large companies with access to 
bank  credit  during  monetary  tightenings  play  the  role  of  financial  intermediaries 
extending TC to small companies without other access to external finance.  
 
The regression model run is exactly the same as that used in sections 5.2.2.1 and 
5.2.2.2 with the exception that the dependent variable this time is accounts receivable 
scaled to current liabilities. Results can be seen in tables 322-325 (Appendix K). 
 
As far as the dummy variable that takes monetary conditions into consideration is 
concerned, the results are the same when either public or private firms are examined. 
In tables 322-325 (Appendix K) it is evident that accounts receivable decrease during 
the land value bubble but increase during the credit crunch. As an example, for small 
public firms, the land value bubble leads to a 0.0253(E:0.010) decrease to accounts 
receivables. This verifies the initial evidence reported in section 5.2.1 and leads us to 
believe  that  when  monetary  conditions  worsen  more  TC  is  extended  by  Japanese 
firms either to help their business partners or make a profit.   
 
Whether  public  or  private  companies  are  examined  it  is  shown  (tables  322-325, 
Appendix K) that smaller firms extended more TC than their larger counterparts. As 
can  be  seen  in  table  322  (Appendix  K),  being  a  small/large  firm  leads  to  a 
0.0333(E:0.014)/0.0302(E:0.013)  increase/decrease  to  accounts  receivables.  These 
findings are similar to those of Wilson et al. (2004). This initial evidence help us   343 
conclude that the financial assistance view does not seem to be valid since the firms 
that are supposed to act as financial intermediaries in reality extend less TC than small 
sized firms. 
 
The  above  mentioned  findings  are  verified  by  the  short-term  borrowings  dummy 
variables.  According  to  the  financial  assistance  view,  firms  with  higher  levels  of 
short-term bank loans should be the ones extending the most TC. The exact opposite 
is reported in tables 322-325 (Appendix K). For example in table 322 (Appendix K) it 
can  be  seen  that  low/high  levels  of  short-term  loans  cause  a 
0.0185(E:0.008)/0.0189(E:0.008) increase/decrease to accounts receivables. Therefore 
the hypothesis that companies with access to bank credit transform it into TC and 
distribute to credit rationed firms does not hold.  
 
As far as the other explanatory factors are concerned (tables 322-325, Appendix K) 
the  results  for  the  public firms are  not  surprising.  The  natural logarithm  of sales, 
tangibility  of  assets  and  liquidity  both  have  a  positive  signed  coefficients.  As  an 
example, for small public firms during the land value bubble, one s.d. increase in 
logsales/tangfassets/liquidity  leads  to  a  0.1044(E:1.59)/0.4483(E:0.256)/0.2358 
(E:0.592) increase to the accounts receivables ratio. It appears that the larger the size 
of a firm’s transaction and collateral levels and the higher its liquidity the more TC it 
will issue. This leads us to the logical conclusion that out of the small sized firms with 
low levels of short-term bank loans those that have the best balance sheets are able to 
extend TC. 
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The same conclusions can also be drawn for private firms with one difference. The 
asset tangibility factor has an inverse relationship with TC extended. Specifically, for 
small firms during the land value bubble period, a one s.d. increase of tangfassets 
leads to a 0.3087 decrease of TC extended. This difference between public and private 
firms could simply be due to the fact that some of the smallest private firms, forced to 
use TC to keep its and its’ partners’ business afloat, are fast growing companies with 
low valued tangible assets. 
 
As a final note against the validity of the financial assistance view, companies with 
high levels of internally generated funds extend less TC. Therefore firms, public or 
private, with a financial surplus currently able to extend TC to other firms do not do 
so. The GFI  variables reports coefficients with negative signs in all the regressions 
run. In the instance of small firms in table 322 (Appendix K), a one s.d. increase in 
GFI causes an 0.1962 decrease to the accounts receivables ratio.  
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5.2.2.4. Net Trade Credit 
 
In order to  have a complete  view of the TC  channel the investigation  of NTC is 
necessary.  As  was  discussed  in  section  5.1.1.4   NTC  is  defined  as  the  difference 
between accounts receivables and accounts payables. Its investigation is very crucial 
for this research because it shows the actual volume  of TC circulating  within  the 
economy. As in previous sections the regression model utilised is the same as that of 
section 5.2.2.1. but this time the dependent variable is accounts receivables minus 
accounts payables scaled to current liabilities. 
 
As a first comment it should be stated that, as shown in the descriptive statistics of 
section  5.2.1,  TC  extended  is  larger  in  quantity  than  TC  received  in  every  year. 
Furthermore  the  gap  between  the  two  components  of  NTC  is  severely  increased 
during the credit crunch. 
 
As shown in tables 326-329 (Appendix K) the variables bubble and crunch indicate 
that during the land value bubble NTC is significantly lower while the opposite takes 
place during the credit crunch. Specifically, for small private firms, the bubble/crunch 
leads to a 0.2094(E:0.326)/0.4579(E:0.718) decrease/increase to NTC. This allows us 
to conclude that a monetary contraction leads to an increase of newly created TC. This 
is logical since during a time where bank credit is scarce firms will have to issue TC 
in order to either support their business partners or seize the opportunity of making a 
profit. It should be stated though that in most cases in the public firms data set the 
crunch variable produces statistically insignificant results. 
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The next variable discussed is the size dummy variable. The story told here is similar 
to that of section 5.2.2.3, small firms created more NTC than large firms (tables 326-
329,  Appendix  K).  For  example,  as  shown  in  table  326  (Appendix  K),  being  a 
small/large  firm  leads  to a 0.0199(E:0.023)/0.0133(E:0.0156) increase/ decrease to 
NTC. Therefore it is shown that it is actually small firms that create more NTC and 
not  large  firms  with  access  to  bank  credit.  This  is  in  contrast  with  the  financial 
assistance view and in accordance with the findings of Wilson et al. (2004), as was 
stated in section 5.2.2.3. 
 
The most important evidence for the validity of the financial view will come from the 
short term borrowing dummy variable that shows directly which firms have access to 
bank credit. If companies with levels of short-term bank credit are the ones issuing the 
most NTC then the financial assistance view holds. The results shown in tables 326-
329 (Appendix K) are not completely conclusive but do at least during the land value 
bubble, for either public or private firms, support the financial assistance view. For 
example,  in  table  326,  having  low/high  levels  of  short-term  loans  leads  to  a 
0.0149(E:0.018)/0.0160(E:0.019) decrease/increase in NTC. The investigation of the 
credit crunch does not allow any robust conclusions to be drawn for either sample due 
to the fact that many of the results are statistically insignificant. Therefore the results 
from the short-term borrowing dummy variable partially verify the hypothesis that 
firms with access to bank credit transform it into TC and pass it on to credit rationed 
firms thus acting as financial intermediaries.  
 
The results from the continuous independent variables (tables 326-329, Appendix K) 
for public firms are similar to those reported in section 5.2.2.3. Large, financially   347 
healthy firms with high collateral values issue more NTC. As an example, for small 
public  firms  during  the  land  value  bubble,  one  s.d.  increase  in 
logsales/tangfassets/liquidity  leads  to  a  0.0443(E:1.842)/0.3725(E:0.582)/0.1788 
(E:1.227) increase to NTC. Furthermore companies with high levels of GFI issue less 
NTC.  Specifically,  for  small  public  firms  in  table  326  (Appendix  K),  a  one  s.d. 
increase to GFI causes a 0.2526 decrease to NTC. The findings coming from the 
private firms are identical with the only difference being the factor for asset tangibility 
that has an inverse relationship with NTC. Again this is similar to section 5.2.2.3. 
 
The conclusion drawn from this section is that the biggest issuers of NTC are firms, 
public  or  private,  of  small  size  and  have  access  to  bank  credit.  This  is  in  partial 
accordance to Wilson et al. (2004) and possibly indicates that these firms are being 
credit  rationed  and  that  close  business  ties  between  small  sized  firms  exist  even 
though further investigation to verify this is needed. From this group the companies 
that will issue the most NTC will have the expected characteristics according to the 
majority of existing TC studies: these firms are large in size, financially healthy, have 
high collateral values and low internally generated funds.   348 
5.2.2.5 Robustness Tests 
 
In order to verify the results reported in section 5.2.2.1 robustness tests on accounts 
payable  were  run.  More  specifically  two  alternative  definitions  to  the  accounts 
payable to current liabilities ratio were utilised. The first was accounts payable scaled 
to total liabilities. This definition of TC received has been frequently used in past 
studies  such  as  those  of  Van  Der  Wijst  &  Hol  (2002),  Mateut  et  al.  (2006)  and 
Rodriguez (2006). The second alternative definition of TC received was constructed 
by Mateut et al. (2006) and was defined as accounts payable divided by the sum of 
accounts payable plus short-term bank credit.  
 
The results of the robustness test using accounts payable scaled to total liabilities as 
the  dependent  variable  are  shown  in  tables  330-333  (Appendix  K)  while  the 
robustness tests utilising the definition of accounts payable divided by the sum of 
accounts payable plus short-term bank credit are shown in tables 334-337 (Appendix 
K). Both robustness tests allow us to draw identical conclusions and therefore their 
analysis will be done jointly. 
 
 The  majority  of  the  findings  are  in  accordance  with  those  reported  in  the  main 
empirical analysis and thus support its validity. Two factors though present different 
results to section 5.2.2.1. The first factor is the dummy variable accounting for the 
credit crunch. In the private firms sample, the crunch variable in several regressions 
indicated that the specified period led to an increase of TC received. For example, in 
table 333 (Appendix K) it is shown that the credit crunch causes a 0.048 increase to 
the accounts payables ratio. According to this when monetary conditions tighten and   349 
bank credit becomes scarce firms resort to TC for finance. The second factor showing 
contradictory results to the main empirical analysis is liquidity. Specifically for small 
public firms a one s.d. increase to liquidity leads to a 0.0003 decrease to the accounts 
payable ratio. Section 5.2.2.1. showed that for public firms liquidity operates as a 
signal of quality. Nevertheless here liquidity has the same role for public and private 
firms;  it  lowers  informational  asymmetries  and  it  allows  companies  to  secure 
alternative, more desirable forms of external finance. 
 
The  next  series  of  robustness  tests  included  the  application  of  the  System  GMM 
estimators instead of the OLS, random, or fixed effects estimators that were used in 
the main empirical analysis. The reasons behind the selection of the System GMM 
estimators  and  their  advantages  over  static  panel  data  estimators  are  discussed  in 
section 3.2.1.4. The results of the GMM robustness tests are shown in tables 338-351 
(Appendix K). 
 
As  far  as  TC  received  is  concerned  the  findings  are  shown  in  tables  338-341 
(Appendix K). The bubble/crunch  and the short-term borrowings dummy variables’ 
results support the conclusions of section 5.2.2.1. The size dummy variables produce 
mostly statistically insignificant results but in the sole case that they do not, in the 
private firms/credit crunch data set, the findings re-affirm the validity of the main 
empirical analysis. The results coming from the continuous independent variables also 
provide support to the conclusions drawn in section 5.2.2.1. It should be stated that 
according to the data set examined some of the aforementioned variables produce 
statistically insignificant results. 
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The  examination  of  the  short-term  borrowings  ratio  yielded  further  supportive 
evidence towards the main empirical analysis. The findings shown in tables 342-343 
(Appendix  K) have the same signs as those of section 5.2.2.2. and only in a few 
specifications are statistically insignificant. 
 
As far as TC extended and NTC are concerned yet again the results shown in tables 
344-351 (Appendix K) confirm the findings of the main empirical analysis. It should 
be noted that even though the results of the size and short-term borrowings dummy 
variables  in  most  specifications  are  in  accordance  with  the  conclusions  drawn  in 
sections  5.2.2.3-5.2.2.4.  but  are  statistically  insignificant  and  therefore  robust 
conclusions cannot be drawn.  
 
A similar situation is recorded with the logsales/tangfassets/liquidity/GFI variables. 
Furthermore when the accounts receivables ratio is examined the natural logarithm of 
sales  indicates  that  companies  with  less  financial  activity  extend  more  TC.  For 
example,  for  small  companies  in  table  344  (Appendix  K),  a  one  s.d.  increase  of 
logsales causes a 0.1224 decrease of TC extended. If this is a valid result then, in 
conjunction  with  the  accounts  payables  and  NTC  findings,  it  would  mean  that 
companies with low financial activity receive more TC but issue less. This is a logical 
conclusion since firms with fewer financial transactions are likely to be rationed from 
bank credit, will seek to receive TC but will not be able to extend any. 
 
The  postestimation  GMM  tests,  ( J , 1 m ,  2 m  tests)  indicate  no  problems  of 
overidentifying  restrictions  and  serial  correlations  in  the  vast  majority  of  the 
specifications. In only three regressions run in table 344 (Appendix K) is a modest   351 
problem  of  endogeneity  reported.  Moreover    the  existence  of  second  order  serial 
correlation is evident in the data set containing public firms during the land value 
bubble period when either TC extended or TC received is examined (tables 338 and 
344,  Appendix  K).  Indeed  in  these  cases  second  order  serial  correlation  in  the 
residuals is present since in most specifications the  2 m  test reports a value equal to 
zero. Even if the instruments are lagged three times serial correlation continues to 
exist. 
 
In a similar fashion to the robustness tests of chapter 3-4, outliers were omitted from 
the  original  sample  by removing  the  1%  tails of  the  distribution  of  all  regression 
variables. 
 
The results of these robustness tests are shown in tables 352-365 (Appendix K) and 
confirm  the  conclusions  drawn  in  sections  5.2.2.1-5.2.2.4.  Nevertheless  in  section 
5.2.2.1.  it  was  shown  that  the  liquidity  factor  has  a  positive  association  with  TC 
received for public firms but an opposite relationship was recorded for private firms. 
In  tables  354-355  (Appendix  K)  it  is  shown  that financially  healthy  private firms 
receive more TC. Therefore, as in the robustness tests of tables 330-337 (Appendix 
K),  liquidity  plays  the  same  role  for  public  and  private  firms  by  lowering 
informational  asymmetries  and  allowing  companies  to  access  alternative  forms  of 
external finance.   
 
Furthermore it appears that the ommittance of outliers has magnified the effect that 
the monetary conditions dummy variables have on TC extended and NTC. Especially 
the size of the crunch variable coefficients in many specifications has tripled in size   352 
and, contrary to the main empirical analysis, is always statistically significant (tables 
358-365, Appendix K). The removal of outliers does not seem to have the same effect 
on the sales and asset tangibility variables since, contrary to section 5.2.2.4., when 
NTC is examined their results are statistically insignificant. 
 
As an additional robustness test it was decided to add manufacturing companies that 
did not submit their financial statements in the end of March in the original sample. 
The results shown in tables 364-379 (Appendix K) yet again verify the results of the 
main empirical analysis. What should be noted though is that in this new data set the 
factor of GFI is in several specifications statistically insignificant, this is regardless of 
what the dependent variable is. 
 
The  next  series  of  robustness  tests  included  a  re-run  of  the  regression  models 
estimated in sections 5.2.2.1.-5.2.2.4 but with the addition of a first order lag of the 
dependent variable. The results of these dynamic specifications are evident in tables 
380-393  (Appendix  K).  In  all  specifications  the  lagged  dependent  variables  are 
statistically  significant  have  positive  signs  thus  showing  that  all  forms  of  TC  are 
influenced by their past values. Nevertheless the insertion of the lagged dependent 
variables has no apparent effect of the results of the other independent factors apart 
from causing some of them, tangfassets and liquidity mainly, to become statistically 
insignificant. 
 
As  a  measure  for  ensuring  the  validity  of  the  results  coming  from  the  dummy 
variables  indicating  monetary  conditions  a  slightly  different  definition  for  the 
bubble/crunch variables was used. More specifically the land value bubble dummy   353 
variable received the value of 1 during the 1980-88 period and 0 during the 1989-98 
period. This change was made because the land bubble started to burst during the last 
quarter  of  1989. By  excluding  1989  any  distortions caused  by  it  will be  omitted. 
Similarly 2007 was excluded from the credit crunch dummy variable. This was done 
because during 2007 the global credit crunch occurred. Therefore the credit crunch 
dummy variable received the value of 0 during the 1990-98 period and 1 during the 
1999-2006 period.  
 
The results of this test are shown in tables 394-407 (Appendix K) and on the whole 
the bubble/crunch variables tell the same story told in the main empirical analysis. 
This time though when accounts payables are examined in the public firms data set 
the  crunch  variable,  contrary  to  section  5.2.2.1.,  presents  statistically  significant 
results  (table  395,  Appendix  K).  Specifically  the  credit  crunch  leads  to  a  0.0070 
decrease  of  TC  extended.  The  same  occurs  in  table  401  where  TC  extended  is 
examined and in table 405 where NTC is investigated. In both cases public firms are 
examined  and  the  crunch  variable  provides  statistically  significant  results  in 
accordance to sections 5.2.2.3-5.2.2.4. It appears that the year 2007 indeed causes a 
disturbance to the results, at least for public firms. On the other hand there is one case 
where  the  bubble  variable,  contrary  to  the  main  empirical  analysis,  produces 
statistically insignificant results: in table 400, where TC extended by public firms is 
investigated.  Nevertheless  due  to  the  fact  that  this  is  an  isolated  event  a  robust 
conclusion cannot be drawn. 
  
Similar  tests  were  also  run  for  the  size  and  short-term  loans  dummy  variables. 
Specifically  it  was  decided  to  use  different  cut-off  point  for  the  aforementioned   354 
dummy variables in order to ensure the validity of the results of the main empirical 
analysis. Every year the firms were ranked according to their total assets or short-term 
borrowings levels and the lowest 20% (the percentage in sections 5.2.2.1.-5.2.2.4 was 
30%) was classified as “small” or “low bank loans” firms. The highest 20%  was 
characterised as “large” or “high bank loans” firms whereas the remaining 60% was 
classified as “medium” or “medium leverage”.  
 
Tables 408-421 (Appendix K) prove that changing the cut-off point for these two 
dummy variables does not affect the results. An exception to this is the size factor 
where short-term borrowings are examined. As seen in tables 412-413 (Appendix K) 
the  results  coming  from  the  size  dummy  variable  are  statistically  insignificant 
contrary to those reported in section 5.2.2.2. Statistically insignificant results coming 
from  the  size  and  short-term  loans  dummy  variables  are  also  evident  is  some 
specifications when NTC is examined. Nevertheless this was also evident in section 
5.2.2.4. In total the findings show that the conclusions of this thesis are robust even if 
the cut-off points of the dummy variables change. 
 
The final robustness tests for dummy variables included a different definition of size. 
Instead  of  using  total  assets  to  categorise  companies  into  “small”,  “medium”  and 
“large” this series of specifications utilised the companies’ sales levels. Similarly to 
what happened in the main empirical analysis for every year all the Japanese firms 
were classified into the three aforementioned groups; a 30% cut-off point was used. 
The results shown in tables 422-429 (Appendix K) remain unchanged when compared 
to those depicted in the main empirical analysis. Nevertheless it should be stated that 
in several specifications the size variable is statistically insignificant even though it   355 
has the expected sign. Such is the case in table 423, where TC received for private 
firms is examined, and table 426, where TC extended for public firms is investigated. 
In general size dummy variables based on sales tell the same story with the dummy 
variable based on total assets but it appears that total assets capture better the effect 
that the size factor has on TC. 
 
As was stated in section 5.1.2.3 this study was inspired by that of Love et al. (2007) in 
which the authors stated that companies which enter a period of monetary contraction 
with a high proportion of short-term bank debt are more likely to be at a disadvantage 
and are thus expected to increase their reliance on credit offered by their suppliers. 
Love et al. (2007) used a dummy variable to test this hypothesis and so did this study. 
Nevertheless in this study’s case the dummy variable utilised was constructed on an 
annual basis.  
 
As  an  additional  robustness  test  a  new  dummy  variable  identical  to  the 
ShortTermBankDebt dummy variable used in the previous sections of this chapter was 
constructed. The only difference was that firms will be categorised into high, medium 
or small proportion of short-term bank loans relevant to their current liabilities only 
for the years of 1988 (one year before the burst of the land value bubble) and 1998 
(one  year  before  the  commencement  of  the  credit  crunch).  The  results  of  these 
robustness tests are depicted in tables 431-435 (Appendix K) and prove that even if 
the Love et al.’s (2007) definition of the ShortTermBankDebt dummy variable is used 
the results remain the same. 
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Robustness tests were utilised to investigate if the dummy variables used affect the 
left hand side variables indirectly and of course examine in further detail several sub-
groups  of  observations  in  our  sample.  In  order  to  carry  out  this  investigation 
interaction variables between the small/medium/large size, the bubble/crunch dummy 
variables and the continuous independent variables were constructed.   
 
Tables  450-463  (Appendix  K)  depict  the  results  of  the  bubble/crunch  interaction 
variables. The findings indicate that in most cases these dummy variables do have a 
differential  impact  on  the  results.  It  is  shown  that  during  a  period  of  monetary 
contraction firms of lower value of financial transactions, higher liquidity and lower 
collateral  values,  receive  more  TC.  Other  results  indicate  that  either  a  monetary 
contraction or a monetary expansion affects TC extended and NTC in the same way 
(tables 456-463, Appendix K). The public firms which issue the most TC are those 
that are less liquid, have lower collateral values, higher GFI and a lower volume of 
financial  transaction.  Similar  results  are  documented  for  private  companies  even 
though this time higher liquidity and higher GFI are associated with an increase in TC 
extended and NTC. These findings are consistent with the findings of section 5.2.2.3 
and contradict the financial assistance view. As far as the examination of short-term 
borrowings is concerned, it is difficult to interpret the findings shown in tables 454-
455  (Appendix  K)  since  many  of  the  reported  coefficients  are  statistically 
insignificant. The only robust conclusion is that during a monetary contraction high 
liquidity firms, public or private, receive more bank credit. 
 
The examination  of  the  interaction  variables  between  the  small/medium/large  size 
dummy  variables  and  the  other  independent  factors  also  yielded  statistically   357 
insignificant results in quite a few cases. For public firms two conclusions can be 
drawn  (tables  464-477,  Appendix  K).  Firstly  that  small  sized  firms  with  high 
collateral values receive more TC and less short-term bank credit than other firms. 
Secondly, small sized firms with high liquidity and generated funds internally are the 
ones issuing the most TC extended and NTC. The above mentioned sentence is also 
valid for private firms. These findings are consistent with the main empirical analysis 
and confirm that at least partially the size dummy variables have a differential impact 
to the regression results. 
 
In the final robustness run it was decided to include a continuous size variable, in 
addition to the “small”/”medium”/”large” dummy variables, in order to examine its 
effect on TC. Therefore all the specifications of sections 5.2.2.1.-5.2.2.4. were re-run 
but this time the natural logarithm of total assets was included. The results are shown 
in tables 437-449 (Appendix K).  
 
Firstly,  it  has  to  be  said  that  the  natural  logarithm  of  total  assets  has  an  inverse 
relationship  with  all  forms  of  TC  and  in  the  vast  majority  cases  is  statistically 
significant. For example, for small, public firms during the land value bubble when 
TC  received  is  examined,  a  one  s.d.  increase  to  logtotalassets  leads  to  a  0.1162 
decrease to the accounts payables ratio (table 436, Appendix K). This is in accordance 
with  the  main  empirical  analysis  where  it  was documented  that  the  smaller firms 
received  and  issued  more  TC  than  their  larger  counterparts.  When  short-term 
borrowings are examined the logtotalassets exhibits a positive association with the 
short-term loans ratio, again in accordance with section 5.2.2.2.  
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Secondly the inclusion of the natural logarithm of total assets results in most cases 
with  the  size  dummy  variables  having  statistically  insignificant  results.  This  is 
expected since both variables are proxies for size and thus only one was likely to have 
an effect on TC. Setting this aside the inclusion of the natural logarithm of total assets 
has no other apparent effect to the remaining continuous or dummy variables.  
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5.3.0 Conclusions 
 
 
The  aim  of  this  chapter  was  to  investigate  the  role  of  trade  credit  in  relation  to 
financial policy decisions. Findings from chapter 3 clearly indicated that trade credit 
affects capital structure and therefore the inclusion of this more detailed examination 
of trade credit was a natural decision. In the most recent and relevant study of Fukuda 
et al. (2006) trade credit did not receive much attention. Here however we examined a 
much larger data set over a substantially longer time period taking into consideration 
changes in monetary conditions and investigating both public and private firms. 
 
After examining both the ratios of accounts payables to current liabilities and short-
term bank loans to current liabilities, as well as running robustness tests, it was shown 
that bank credit is a clear substitute of trade credit. The dummy variables used to 
depict short-term bank loans have a strong and significant inverse relationship with 
accounts payable.  
 
Moreover, the set of standard variables used exhibit opposite signs when trade or bank 
credit is investigated. This clearly shows that a different clientele exists for both of 
these two forms of external finance.  Companies with high collateral values and low 
sales, liquidity and internally generated funds prefer to receive short-term bank loans. 
Corporations with the exact opposite characteristics choose trade credit. These results 
of these factors, with the exception of liquidity, are valid no matter what definition of 
trade credit received is examined. It appears that as in the studies of Kohler et al. 
(2000) and Mateut et al. (2006) evidence coming from the liquidity factor is mixed.   360 
 
These aforementioned findings are contradictory to the most recent and relevant study 
of trade credit for the country of Japan. Fukuda et al. (2006) reported in their paper 
that the substitution hypothesis held only when the banking sector was healthy. They 
also found that during the late 90s to early 00s bank and trade credit experienced a 
simultaneous contraction. A reason behind this could be that Fukuda et al. examined 
only a short time period and utilised a much smaller sample containing only private 
companies, compared to the one used in this paper. 
 
As far as the financial assistance view is concerned the initial descriptive statistics, the 
regression analysis of accounts payable and the robustness tests performed, show that 
smaller sized firms receive more trade credit than their larger counterparts. This is 
indeed in favour of the financial assistance view since smaller sized companies are 
more likely to be credit constrained and resort to trade credit. 
 
Most important though for the validity of the financial assistance view are the results 
coming  from  the  examination  of  trade  credit  extended  and  net  trade  credit.  The 
investigation  of  the  accounts  receivable  does  not  provide  support  to  the  financial 
assistance view. In all specifications it is shown that small firms issue more trade 
credit. Most importantly firms with low levels of short-term bank loans have higher 
values of trade credit extended. Nevertheless the examination of net trade credit has 
shown that small public/private firms with high levels of short-term bank loans (thus 
having  access  to  bank  credit)  are  the  biggest  issuers  of  net  trade  credit.  This  is 
partially in accordance with the financial assistance view but surprisingly it is the 
small and not the large firms that act as financial intermediaries.   361 
The results of this chapter are inconclusive as far as the financial assistance view is 
concerned, at least in its traditional definition. The findings instead indicate that due 
to close business ties it is the small sized firms with access to bank credit that act as 
financial intermediaries. This is in accordance with Wilson et al. (2004).  
 
As discussed in chapter 2 and examined in chapters 3 and 4, monetary conditions 
affect capital structure. In chapter 5 it is proved that during economic recessions credit 
is  rationed  and  companies  use  trade  credit  as  a  substitute  for  bank  credit.  This 
occurrence has not received much attention in the literature of capital structure and 
thus trade credit has been absent in most studies. An implication of this chapter is that 
trade credit should always be included when financial policy decisions are examined. 
 
Studies must examine how business ties alleviate the effect of monetary conditions 
through  the  possibly  easier access to  trade credit  than  bank  credit.  If  trade  credit 
depends partly on firm-to-firm relationships as oppose to bank-to-firm relationships 
then trade credit seems a logical alternative at a time when companies are looking to 
each  other  for  support  and  promoting  business.  The  implications  therefore  are 
recognising the practical choices of firms during economic tightenings. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
 
As  was  discussed  in  chapter  1,  the  majority  of  previous  studies  have  taken  into 
consideration only demand side explanations while conducting research in the area of 
capital structure. These previous papers have made the assumption that the financial 
manager’s  wishes  are  bound  to  become  reality.  The  two  main  capital  structure 
theories that have been derived by this school of thought were the trade-off theory, 
which is based on tax savings and agency costs, and the information asymmetries 
based pecking order hypothesis. 
 
The failure of these two competitive hypotheses to provide sufficient explanation of 
financial policy decisions has led to a new approach in examining capital structure. 
More  specifically  recent  papers,  such  as  those  of  Faulkender  &  Petersen  (2006), 
Kisgen (2006) and Bougheas et al. (2006), have taken into consideration that firms 
face  financial  constraints.  These  financial  constraints  exist  either  due  to  credit 
rationing or due to a bank lending/balance sheet channel. By incorporating the supply 
of  credit  in  the  investigation  of  capital  structure,  these  studies  have  successfully 
enhanced our understanding of the area. 
 
This paper has followed in the footsteps of these studies while conducting research for 
Japan. Japan, the world’s second largest economy is a perfect testing ground due to 
the extreme fluctuations in the supply of credit. To the author’s best knowledge this is 
the first study that incorporated financial constraints while studying Japanese firms’ 
financial policy decisions.    363 
 
In chapter 3, an investigation resembling a traditional capital structure examination 
was undertaken. In chapter 4 horse race tests were conducted between the pecking 
order hypothesis and the trade-off theory. In chapter 5 trade credit was analysed. All 
chapters examined public and private corporations for the period 1980-2007. 
 
The findings of chapter 3 show that both economic events led to a severe reduction in 
the firms’ leverage ratios. Public debt acted as a substitute of private debt during the 
burst of the bubble but not during the credit crunch. During the land bubble small 
public firms are more levered than large ones; the opposite is true during the credit 
crunch. Private companies on the other hand are constantly more levered than public 
firms and rely mostly on short-term bank credit as opposed to public credit relied 
upon by the latter. The same relationship exists between all small vs. all large firms. 
 
The further independent factors of profitability and retained earnings show an inverse 
relationship to external finance. Non-debt tax shields produced mixed inconclusive 
results  and  trade  credit  in  most  cases  was  a  substitute  to  external  finance.  Lastly 
keiretsu members are significantly more levered and have higher private debt levels 
than  other  firms.  These  results  were  indications  in  favour  of  the  pecking  order 
hypothesis and rejected the trade-off theory. Policy implications of these results are 
combined with conclusions from chapters 4-5 at the end of this section. 
 
The aforementioned findings led to an investigation of the competitive theories of 
capital  structure  in  chapter  4  to  find  which  is  the  best  performer.  A  similar 
methodology to that of Shyam-Sunder & Myers (1999) and Frank & Goyal (2003)   364 
was  followed.  A  “horse  race”  test  between  the  trade-off  and  the  pecking  order 
hypothesis was performed. To the author’s best knowledge this was the first study to 
perform a “horse race” test in the market of Japan and also the first study to examine 
the effect that different monetary conditions have on the performance of these two 
theories. 
 
The results of chapter 4 show that the pecking order performs better than the trade-off 
models in all cases of private firms. This also occurs during the land bubble for public 
firms. The trade-off models however perform better than the pecking order during the 
stagnant growth and credit crunch periods for public firms. The pecking order in itself 
performs better during the land bubble than it does during the stagnant growth and 
finally breaks down during the credit crunch for public firms. The opposite is true for 
the trade-off models. Between fixed and moving target models the fixed is the best 
performer. 
 
Results also show that size does play a significant role on the performance of both 
theories. For public firms both theories perform best for the large companies and for 
private  firms the pecking order  performs best for small  while the trade-off model 
findings are inconclusive. Leverage similarly plays a significant role. Both public and 
private firms’ results are generally the same: the higher the level of leverage the better 
the pecking order works and the lower the level of leverage the better the trade-off 
model works. 
 
Lastly two further findings must be stated. Disaggregating the financial deficit in most 
cases does provide extra information and when tests of statistical power are run the   365 
pecking  order  is  the  winner.  Again  policy  implications  of  the  above  results  are 
discussed in the end of this section. 
 
In  chapter  3  trade  credit,  a  term  that  does  not  usually  receive  much  attention  in 
relevant studies, was found to be a significant factor. A more detailed examination of 
the role of trade credit in capital structure was conducted in chapter 5 with a larger 
and rich dataset. 
 
The  findings  of  chapter  5  show  that  trade  credit  is  a  substitute  of  bank  credit. 
Companies that receive the lowest amount of short-term bank loans are those that also 
receive the highest amount of trade credit. More specifically firms with high collateral 
value and low sales, liquidity and internally generated funds prefer to receive short-
term bank loans. Corporations with the exact opposite characteristics choose trade 
credit. The results concerning the financial assistance view are inconclusive. It is the 
smaller firms with access to bank credit that act as financial intermediaries and thus 
issue the most net trade credit. 
 
Evaluating these results we conclude that our hypothesis, fluctuations in the supply 
and changes in monetary conditions have a serious on firms’ capital structures, has 
been proved and supported by this study. For example during the credit crunch firms, 
especially bank dependent ones, experience a severe reduction in their leverage levels. 
A policy implication of this finding is therefore that whenever a study in the field of 
the composition of capital structure takes place it must take into account the supply 
side of credit. Demand is not enough; supply must become a corner-stone of capital 
structure studies.   366 
 
On a practical note we must consider that firms with different characteristics face 
different financial constraints, have access to different types of external finance and 
thus  take  different  decisions  regarding  their  capital  structure.  Financial  policy 
decisions  will  therefore  always  depend  on  the  composition  of  the  firm  itself.  As 
Faulkender  and  Petersen  (2006),  Kisgen  (2006)  and  Bougheas  et  al.  (2006)  agree 
managers wishes do not necessarily become a reality. This conclusion further supports 
our policy implication that capital structure studies must not only take into account 
supply side explanations but also consider the effect that different characteristics have 
on  the  credit  availability.  For  example  smaller  firms  are  likely  to  be  more  credit 
rationed during a recession. 
 
In this case a government financial policy implication should be to pressure banks into 
giving priority to smaller firms particularly long-term bank loans. We must not forget 
that another conclusion of this study is that public debt should not be counted upon as 
a substitute to bank credit because capital markets seem to break down during a major 
recession  therefore  pressuring  banks  to  provide  credit  is  a  way  of  keeping  credit 
flowing within the economy. 
 
As an alternative smaller businesses, which are particularly prone to become credit 
rationed, should be encouraged to develop and exploit close business ties with their 
suppliers in order to use trade credit instead of bank credit. It is suggested by the 
author that trade credit as proved by the findings of this study is a serious contender to 
bank credit due to the fact firms are likely to have more control over its availability   367 
than bank credit. In times of monetary contractions trade credit should be a realistic 
option for all firms, especially small ones.  
 
Turning to the policy implications of conducting a capital structure study this paper 
concludes that such research must include demand-side explanations and supply-side 
explanations. When incorporating supply-side explanations studies must consider the 
different  financial constraints  of  different  groups  of  firms.  Trade credit  should  be 
added as an external finance option. Moreover the pecking order hypothesis is so far 
the  best  performing  theory  of  explaining  financial  policy  decisions.  However 
whichever  theory  is  used  researchers  must  not  forget  that  this  study  proves  that 
financial constraints clearly affect the performance of both theories.   
 
This evaluation of the results brings forward three categories of policy implications 
that  we  have  discussed.  Firstly  including  financial  constraints  in  capital  structure 
studies.  Secondly  a  better  understanding  of  firms’  financial  policy  options  and 
decisions. Lastly possible incorporations in the governments’ financial policy actions. 
All  these  aspects  of  the  research  in  this  paper  contribute  to  the  fundamental 
understanding of the key components of capital structure. 
 
As a final note the author submits that the findings and evaluations in the present 
study  enhances  our  knowledge  of  capital  structure,  and  provide  an  original 
contribution to research through both its theoretical and empirical findings. 
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